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 started this project with the hope that I’d be able to bring clarity into how it is that models, 
with their patent falsities, help scientists, and economists in particular, to learn about the 
world. Specifically, I was interested in recovering the aspects of the philosophical literature that 
could be relevant for economists to be aware of in their use of models. The philosophical literature 
was huge; philosophers had been concerned with models for a few decades and the explosion of 
research on this area in the last two had been remarkable.  I remember that, when I told Marcel 
Boumans that I was considering writing my dissertation on models, he suggested that I reconsider: 
the literature on models was already  so vast that there was barely anything original that could be 
said. I pursued it nonetheless because I thought I could write a succint philosophical account of 
both the power and limitations of models addressing economists. The project would be more a 
matter of translation into a language that appealed to economists than anything else. Philosophers 
would then, finally, be able to tell economists the extent to which they could trust their models; 
they could not be trusted blindly, as had allegedly been the case with the financial crisis. In a sense, 
I thought that the hardest part of the job would be to get the attention of economists; after all, 
they are known for their arrogance and for the outright dismissal of methodology and the history 
of economics, as the scrapping of these subjects in economic departments around the world 
attests. 
Even though I think the project of writing about models for economists and other social 
scientists—instead of for our philosopher peers—is an important one that still needs to be 
undertaken, at the time it was misguided for at least two reasons. First, because I didn’t have 
enough knowledge of the economics discipline. The more I read about economics the more I 
realise how little I knew then and how little I still know. Obviously, addressing economists involves 
to be able to speak in a language with which they are familiar and to have common understanding 
of the discipline. In this respect, I’ve come to understand better why economists have simply opted 
for not paying attention to outsiders: plenty of criticism has drawn a radically distorted picture of 
the discipline with which they obviously do not identify with.  
Second, because despite the burgeoning philosophical literature on models in the last couple of 
decades, there is still much to be written about models and how they are used, before a ‘translation 
exercise’, as I intended it, can be carried out. For a long time while writing this dissertation I 
doubted my ability to understand the philosophical literature on models. I felt that the fact that I 
didn’t have a solid background in philosophy was the reason why I couldn’t really make sense of 
how a great deal of this literature could inform the practice. Only late in this process I realised that 
perhaps it was not me who was trapped between two disciplines, neither of which I had a good 
grasp of. It was possible instead that not all the philosophical literature on models has the purpose 
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of informing the practice or of being relevant to it. Indeed, the philosophical literature on models 
is massive, but not all of it has had the purpose of having a dialogue with the practice. Part of it 
pursues instead projects that are mostly of philosophical interest and respond to questions that 
have been traditionally addressed by philosophy of science.  
This is ultimately what this dissertation became about. The suggestion is that in addressing 
questions that are traditional of philosophy, rather than a response to how models are used in 
practice, much of what is actually relevant has not received as much attention as it should. In 
relation to the original project I had, I came to realise that before philosophers can engage in a 
project addressing economists, a more comprehensive characterisation of the practice is necessary. 
Another way to put this is that, far from the philosophical literature having addressed everything 
there is to address about models, there are important aspects of the use of models that still require 
attention, in particular by what can be regarded as the mainstream literature in philosophy of 
models. As such, the dissertation became a rather critical project of current philosophical accounts 
that doesn’t fully satisfy me. I wish I could have been more constructive.  
* * * 
As a symbol of the culmination of a project like this one, the book, the material outcome, fails in 
many ways to convey the significance it has. My journey was sweet, salty, bitter, sour, umami. 
Exciting, inspiring, painful. Unique. There’s simply no way to convey the significance of such a 
rollercoaster. A non-trivial way to ameliorate this deficiency though, to be able to somehow convey 
the elaborate convolutions of the path and add to the significance of the final product, is to stamp 
on it the names of those that, in one way or another, contributed to the carving. In my case, the 
added significance is massive.   
There are some without whom I doubt I would have managed to finish this journey. To them I 
owe that I made it this far. My partner Menno Rol, for his unconditional support. His patience 
and confidence that I was capable of doing this were, for long while, the only source of energy I 
had. He built my home when I had none and kept me fed with Michelin-star creations and 
matching libations. Rolf Viervant, Monique Pietermaat, Liesbet van Zoonen, and Marcel Boumans 
were there to support me in the darkest hours. Rolf helped me to navigate and protect myself from 
the nastiest bits of Dutch bureaucracy, incompetence and arrogance. He also introduced me to 
and helped me understand the poetry of Martinus Nijhoff and Annie Schmidt, the short stories of 
Herman Pieter de Boer, and the Dutch version of Hamlet. Monique constantly checked on me to 
make sure I wouldn’t falter. I showed up one day at Liesbet’s office feeling lonely, unsupported 
and mistreated. Liesbet barely knew me and accepted to listen and counsel me. Later, when I got 
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a teaching job at the University of Amsterdam, she and her partner Jaap welcomed me in their 
house. I felt at home. Marcel, when in Rotterdam, taught me a lot about Macro. He was also one 
of the very few patient enough to let me practice my Dutch when it was still incipient. He 
recommended me for teaching jobs, first at Utrecht University and then at the UvA. Thanks to 
Marcel I managed to sustain myself financially and stay in the Netherlands to work on my 
dissertation. Rolf, Monique, Liesbet, Marcel: misschien beseffen jullie niet hoe ontzettend 
belangrijk jullie steun voor mij is geweest. Er zijn geen woorden om uit te drukken hoe dankbaar 
ik ben.  
My sister Sharon, almost nine thousand kilometres away, supported me over the phone. She never 
lost her faith in me and kept reminding me of it. She also took care of my debts in Colombia when 
I couldn’t pay them anymore so I could focus on my dissertation.  
My lawyer Berber Swart kept we away from the claws of the immigration service. When the IND 
notified me that I wasn’t welcome in the European Union anymore and that I’d have to pack my 
life back and leave, she let them know I wouldn’t be going anywhere––at least not back to the 
tropics. I did move, up north, beyond what once was known as the Dutch Siberia. Her 
understanding of my situation, the “vanzelfsprekendheid” with which she accepted and handled it 
were the most comforting and reassuring.  
My supervisor Julian Reiss left EIPE six months after I started my PhD. I’m pretty sure it would 
have been much more convenient for him to ask me to look for another supervisor. I am indebted 
to him for not having abandoned me. I think having him close would have had helped me to write 
a better dissertation; I probably wouldn’t have got lost as much as I did, and I would have had the 
opportunity to share and refine some ideas before they actually hit the paper. Instead, Julian had 
to read and comment on ideas that were dead-ends since the beginning. The ones that actually 
made it to this book are definitely much better and refined thanks to him. I must admit I’m not 
sure how much of Julian’s thinking I’ve actually “inherited”; the distance didn’t help and the 
maturity to see that is something I feel I’ve just recently began to acquire. But I’m sure that if I’ve 
become sharper at all, it’s because I knew Julian would not be impressed with flimsy ideas. Julian, 
thank you.    
My friends and paranymphs, Attilia Ruzzene and Luis Mireles-Flores have been an extraordinary 
support and source of inspiration. They are the example I have followed since I, as a kid, arrived 
in the Netherlands. At the office, in our tiny student living rooms, and at a bunch of Rotterdam 
bars, we’ve had all kinds of conversations, profound and shallow. Some are more significant than 
others. But they all allowed me to piecemeal discover what philosophy can do and the one I learnt 
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to cherish. Attilia has been a great influence in my view about the role we can and should play as 
(women) philosophers and academics in 21st century academia and society. It’s a question that 
concerns me deeply and one that has defined the path I’ve decided to walk from here onwards. I 
owe that to her. When everyone else slept, Luis was there to read my work. His support is 
invaluable. Luis has been crucial in helping me build up the self confidence that once faltered.  
Arthur van der Laan shared his life with me. He allowed me to keep in perspective what I was 
doing and to cherish the often short but magical moments that life brings. We shared hundreds of 
adventures that would refuel my soul to continue pursuing this lonely project. He also did the 
graphic work of this dissertation. 
Colleagues I had at EIPE allowed me to sharpen my ideas and to learn from theirs. François 
Claveau, my first and only co-author so far, taught me a lot during our collaboration, perhaps 
much more than he’s aware of. He also introduced me to Zotero, surely the most precious tool 
one can have in academia—if it’s compatible with your word processor. With Philippe Verreault-
Julien I shared ideas, the office (until he got a mechanical keyboard, then I couldn’t bear it 
anymore) and philosophical literature. His generosity (and his partner’s) are much appreciated. 
Çaglar Dede is the one with whom I shared the most academic interests. Our mutual interest in 
economics (in the way we’re interested in it) lead to great conversations about philosophy, 
economics and life. It’s too bad he kept his office mate James Grayot too much for himself. 
Otherwise I would have been able to learn more from James’s sharpness and enjoy his jokes. Vaios 
Koliofotis’s remarkable genuineness was always refreshing to have around, especially if he was in 
a good mood.  
               
                 
                
           
                    
               
            
               
               
 
          
              
Conrad Heilmann is probably the one who best knows the turns, loops, ups and downs this
rollercoaster took. I appreciate that he was always willing to help and dedicate time for which I’m
pretty sure he wasn’t properly compensated. His dedication to EIPE, in particular to make it more
transparent and organised is really remarkable. I seriously doubt whether EIPE would have made
it so far in the last years if it weren’t for him. Jack Vromen was supportive all along, and particularly
in the very last bits. I remember with great fondness the conversations and laughs we had at
conference dinners and EIPE seminars. Ticia Herold, Ursula David, and Judith Gulpers were
always helpful. Ticia wrote many last-minute letters and certificates for me. My baby steps in Dutch
were thanks to Lizzy Patilaya. Manon Geluk taught me to “sjoelen”—crucial to integrate in Dutch
society.
I profited from thecommentsand discussions with many colleaguesat conferencesand academic
gatherings. To them I owe them their time and dedication. Some that I feel have contributed
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significantly, in different ways, for what they have taught me about philosophy, economics and/or 
academia are Deirdre McCloskey, Wade Hands, Alan Kirman, Pedro Garcia Duarte, Marcel 
Boumans, Roger Backhouse, Harro Maas, David Teira, Till Grüne-Yanoff, Kevin Hoover, 
Caterina Marchionni, Robert Northcott, Gonçalo Fonseca, Carlo Martini, Chiara Lisciandra, Aki 
Lehtinen, Emrah Aydinonat, Fred Muller, Ingrid Robeyns, Uskali Mäki, Harold Kincaid, José 
Edwards, Juan Manuel Durán (who went shopping for shoes with me in Helsinki), Magdalena 
Malecka, Sonja Amadae, Tom Wells, Mario Huzel, Constanze Binder, Beatrice Cherrier, Roberto 
Fumagalli, Asgeir Brynjar Torfason, Juan Acosta, and Roel Visser. Veronica Santos welcomed me 
in her home during my writing retreat in Berlin in the summer of 2017 and Marc Adam helped me 
to be disciplined. Jimena Hurtado Prieto and Christian Jaramillo are possibly the ones who have 
had the most influence in me; thanks to them I learnt about philosophy of economics when I was 
a kid. Federica Russo and Don Ross are two scholars I admire profoundly and from whom I’ve 
learnt a lot. I’m not sure whether in this dissertation I managed to do justice to the lessons I’ve 
learnt from them. Perhaps not. But they remain a source of inspiration for the work I do. Thank 
you both. 
Thanks to INET’s Young Scholars Initiative I have had the opportunity to meet many great 
scholars, attend good and bad conferences, and meet dozens of inspiring and inspired young 
economists––some incipient collaborators; yes, Nomi, I’m looking at you! The whole YSI 
experience was great fun and contributed to my understanding of economics as a discipline, often 
seen from the perspective of outsiders, who resent the state of the art of the discipline.  
Friends who have been part of this rollercoaster and to whom I owe a debt of gratitude are Ana 
Bobinac, Elisabeth does (amazing office mate), Marco Meyer, Jens van ‘t Klooster, Nomi 
Friedman-Sokuler, and Pip Ridley. I will always be indebted to my friend Pedro Llosa Vélez who 
welcomed me in his home, without knowing me, in the old Rotterdamsche Macondo. Pedro and 
Joshua Graehl definitely set the winds that would blow for me from the moment I set foot in the 
Flatlands. You boys are amazing and I love you.  
My family, without having much of an idea about why someone would want to write a dissertation 
in philosophy, or what that is useful for, were supportive at a distance. They would pamper me 
everytime I’d head back to Colombia, perhaps hoping I’d decide to go back for good. Without 
knowing that, no matter what happens, they will always be there, I wouldn’t even have dared to 
set foot in the airport to start this journey.  
Finally, I want to thank my small and large committees for accepting to be part of this process. I 
appreciate dearly the time and commitment dedicated to this dissertation. My small committee, 
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Mary Morgan, Roger Backhouse and Marcel Boumans posed important and challenging questions 
particularly about the disciplinary boundaries that I attempt to call into question in the dissertation 
and that I, inadvertendly, continued to reproduce. I’ve learnt. Thank you all.  
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lmost ten years have passed since September 15, 2008, the day on which the investment 
bank Lehman Brothers, after 158 years of operations, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection. Governments around the world, attempting to avoid a complete financial debacle, 
bailed out many other banks. Nonetheless, the Great Recession ensued. Since then, mountains of 
pages have been written about what went wrong, including how economists and their models were 
incapable of foreseeing the confluence of events that was under way, and how macroeconomic 
theory needs to be modified to prevent financial meltdowns of such a magnitude from happening 
again.  
It is particularly significant that the confidence in economic models and the authority economists 
using them enjoy, based on their command and understanding of the economy, has dwindled. 
Prior to the financial crisis the economics discipline enjoyed a long period of credibility and self-
confidence. At least in macroeconomics, according to some commentators such as Robert Lucas 
(2003), the central problem of the macroeconomics of depression prevention had been solved for 
all practical purposes. Many macroeconomists thought they had sufficient understanding of the 
economy and technical means to influence it, to be able to generate steady growth and avoid deep 
recessions; the policy of inflation targeting, for instance, has managed to bring inflation under 
control in many developed economies for a sustained period of time. Not only due to the 
devastating consequences of the crisis, but also due to this excessive confidence that arose as a 
consequence of The Great Moderation, the discipline has experienced massive criticism from both 
within and outside. This has been directed specially towards macroeconomic models, their 
realisticness—or rather lack of it—and the implications that follow from them for public policy1.  
Interestingly, in the nearly ten years since Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection, the 
philosophical literature on economic models has had little to say, if anything at all, about this 
situation. To be sure, philosophers have long discussed issues such as the realisticness of 
assumptions—e.g. Mäki (1998, 2009)—or the use of idealisations—e.g. Hoover (2010); Weisberg, 
(2007)—which are issues that come to light in the claims made by critics. But the causes of the 
crisis and some issues raised by the models that were used by monetary authorities, governments, 
rating agencies, banks, etc., are broader than just issues of idealisation or the realisticness of 
assumptions. The neglect is particularly worrisome if, as Hands (2015) has suggested, economic 
methodology is an inferior good—one that is consumed more when incomes fall. The years of the 
                                               
1 Some of the criticisms of current models are their failure to account for asymmetric information, 
or the use models in which there is a single representative agent. See Stiglitz (2011, 2015) for a 
discussion. 
A 
	4 
recession were an excellent opportunity to sell some philosophy of models, and yet little of it was 
produced.   
This situation can be attributed, at least partly, to the fact that philosophers of economics, in 
general, have seldom engaged with macroeconomics (Hands, 2015; Ross, 2014). In his attempt to 
urge for a philosophy of macroeconomics, Ross (2014) suggests that the lack of interest in macro 
is partly the result of an interaction between the belief of mainstream economists that 
macroeconomics should have microeconomic foundations and an “occupational bias” on the part 
of philosophers to engage with the logical and epistemological foundations of the sciences. If the 
foundations of economics are indeed of microeconomic character, Ross suggests, then 
philosophers have no reason to engage with macroeconomics.  
I think the “occupational bias” that Ross (2014) has suggested is particularly manifest in the current 
modelling literature. The interest of philosophers in models arose when these began to be seen as 
vehicles of scientific knowledge; something that was previously attributed to theories alone. Since 
philosophers upgraded models in the ranks of scientific significance, the challenge has been to 
explain what makes these former second-class citizens of the scientific world worth of their 
ascension. They clearly deviate from the phenomena they are meant to describe2 due to the many 
idealisations and abstractions used in building them, and yet they allow model users to learn about 
phenomena. 
Models climb up the ladder of significance 
Models, as objects of philosophical analysis have a rather recent history. Nancy Cartwright’s (1983) 
How the Laws of Physics Lie had a profound impact on how models were seen in relation to theories3. 
An important claim she made in this book was that it is not because of their truth that laws are 
explanatory. To the contrary, Cartwright argued, laws such as those of quantum mechanics fail to 
give true accounts of phenomena in the same way that phenomenological laws do. Theories are 
thus not about concrete phenomena. Instead, a model, “a specially prepared, usually fictional 
description of the system under study” (1983, p. 158) is used, in order be able to apply the theory 
to reality, and be able to explain a phenomenon (which in Cartwright’s view is to find a model that 
fits into the basic framework of the theory). With this new account of explanation, the simulacrum 
                                               
2 I’m here using the term ‘describe’ following Bailer-Jones's (2009) characterisation of models as 
interpretative descriptions of phenomena.  
3 Another, earlier, work of importance is Hesse (1966), but her book was very exceptional at the 
time. 
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account, Cartwright argued that models are essential for a theory to be explanatory; this was a role 
that models at the time were not widely believed to have.  
At the same time, there was a conscious attempt by some to demote theory from the central role 
it had. There was an ongoing “revolution against a theory-dominated” view of science that 
prevailed among some philosophers, sociologists and historians (Cartwright, Shomar, & Suarez 
(1995)). The idea of this movement was to reconsider the view that philosophy of science was 
concerned with scientific theories; instead, they claimed, it should be concerned with scientific 
knowledge in general, and knowledge not only comes in the form of theories. Under this new 
conception of philosophy of science as a tool-box (Cartwright et al., 1995), theory was just one of 
the tools available to build models, which are the ones that ultimately represent phenomena 
(Cartwright et al., 1995, p. 140): 
I want to urge that fundamental theory represents nothing and there is nothing for it to 
represent. There are only real things and the real ways they behave. And these are 
represented by models, models constructed with the aid of all the knowledge and 
techniques and tricks and devices we have. Theory plays its own small important role 
here. But it is a tool like any other; and you can not build a house with a hammer alone.  
With this new, tool-box view of philosophy of science, Cartwright argued for an instrumentalist 
view of science. That is, that our scientific understanding and its corresponding image of the world, 
which is present in our theories, as much as in our instruments,  mathematical techniques, methods 
of approximation, etc., should be seen as adaptable tools in a common scientific tool-box, instead 
of as claims about the nature and structure of reality, expressed as propositions that are true or 
false (Cartwright et al. (1995)). In this view, theories had been demoted to be just a tool in the 
scientific edifice and models had been attributed a higher status, being the ones that actually 
represented the world and thereby provided the means for the justification of scientific knowledge.  
The final spur given to models, in which they were given not only a high status but also autonomy 
from theory came with the work of Morgan & Morrison (1999). In this edited volume, 
commentators, and in particular Morrison & Morgan (1999), argued for the partial independence 
of models from theory, by models being autonomous agents that function as investigative tools 
that enable learning about both theory and the world. Morrison & Morgan (1999) offered an 
account of models as mediators, in which they are partially independent because of the way in 
which they are constructed; they function as tools, in the same way that construction tools allow 
houses and bridges to be built. Models are, however, more sophisticated; they are investigative 
devices that involve some kind of representation either of theory, the world, or both. This 
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representational faculty is what allows model-users to learn about, again, theory, the world, or 
both. The way in which learning occurs, given that there is representation of the object of enquiry, 
is by manipulating models—toying around with them. 
This account can be said to have established models as a separate epistemic genre (Morgan, 2012)4, 
receiving the attention of philosophers because of what this new account represented for the role 
of models in science. In fact, commentators such as Kuorikoski & Marchionni (2015, p. 381) 
attribute the centrality of models in the epistemology of science to the work of Morgan & Morrison 
(1999):  
The recognition that models and simulations play a central role in the epistemology of 
science is about fifteen years old. Although models had long been discussed as possible 
foundational units in the logical analysis of scientific knowledge, the philosophical study 
of modelling as a distinct epistemic practice really got going in the wake of the Models as 
Mediators anthology […].  
Arguably, therefore, the anthology of Morgan & Morrison (1999) nearly two decades ago, marked 
the triumph of the revolution that intended to remove theory from its throne. There’s no question 
now among philosophers that models have a primary role in science. But, although it became clear 
that models have this primary role, it has been much less clear what precisely explains models’ 
success. Previous accounts, including Cartwright’s mentioned above and those in the Models as 
Mediators volume, have been based on single cases that, though enlightening, are not easily 
generalisable. There are too many kinds of models used for many purposes. Since then, therefore, 
the new revolution or, the new quest, philosophers have set for themselves has been to understand 
whether there are some properties that models have in common and, if so, what are those 
properties which have gained them their status as vehicles of scientific knowledge and how 
precisely do they accomplish this. 
The mystery of models 
Models are mysterious. At least for philosophers. Philosophers have come to recognise that 
models are at the centre of the scientific practice, that in the cases they have studied these are the 
objects that scientists use as vehicles of scientific knowledge, but that, given some known 
properties of models such that they generally fail to represent their targets accurately, it is unclear 
how they play such a significant role. Although models in many disciplines puzzle philosophers, 
in economics the mystery of models is particularly evident. Misrepresentation by models is 
                                               
4 See Hausman (2015) for a critique. 
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ubiquitous and for many even absurd—e.g. models with perfectly rational agents who possess all 
available information. Yet, at the same time, economists place a lot of confidence in their models, 
the discipline has significant authority in public discourse, and allegedly has some superiority over 
other social sciences, especially those that rely less on models and quantitative methods. 
Some philosophers of science have been dedicated to solving the mystery of models by trying to 
identify the source of the mystery. They have placed bets on two sources in particular: their 
ontology (what models are) and their semantics (the representational relation of models to what 
they represent). Given how many kinds of models there are—e.g. scale models, sets of 
mathematical equations, etc.—one of the questions addressed in the ontology of models literature 
is what it is that makes a model a model and, specifically, whether there is any abstract property 
that unifies all these different things as models. Some philosophers dismiss this question as 
unimportant for the purpose of philosophy of science or for understanding scientific practice (e.g. 
French (2010)). Other philosophers have suggested that models’ functional role is what unifies them 
and have tried to build an ontology around their function, describing them as functional entities 
(Gelfert, 2017). With respect to the semantics of models, the focus has been on in virtue of what 
a model represents its target. There are several views in this respect, the most popular being that 
models represent in virtue of being similar to their targets (Giere, 2004; Teller, 2001). 
Other philosophers have attempted to solve the mystery by concentrating on the epistemology of 
models and, in particular, on the form in which the epistemic import of models comes. There are 
also ‘sceptics’ who argue that models are merely heuristic devices (Alexandrova, 2008; Alexandrova 
& Northcott, 2009; Hausman, 1992, Chapter 4). Some specific questions attempted in this 
literature are whether models can count as evidence (Reiss, 2008, Chapter 6; This dissertation, 
Chapter 2); whether they are explanatory (Alexandrova & Northcott, 2013; Bokulich, 2011; Reiss, 
2012) and whether they yield understanding (Aydinonat, 2007; Kuorikoski & Ylikoski, 2015; 
Ylikoski & Aydinonat, 2014).  
The underlying thought in this philosophical work is that models are a success story that still 
requires explanation as to where the success is coming from. For instance, Margaret Morrison 
(2015, p. 1) motivates her latest book on models and simulations as follows: 
How do reconstructive methods and practices of science, specifically those associated 
with mathematics, modelling, and simulation, impart information and knowledge of the 
world around us? An answer to that question defines my goal for this book.  
	8 
The emphasis of her new book is on the relation between mathematics and modelling and 
addresses the related topic of simulation, which has begun to play a significant role in science, 
given how cheap and efficient computation has become. A few pages later, she continues (2015, 
p. 4, emphasis in the original):  
My interest in explicating that relation [between mathematics and physics] stems from an 
attempt to understand how the abstract nature of mathematics can nevertheless yield 
concrete physical information; how a reconstruction of reality by abstract mathematics 
can help us solve physical problems. I take it as a given that this relation is mysterious, 
but the mystery needn’t prevent us from attempting to uncover at least some of its 
features. In other words, we can hopefully understand how mathematics can deliver 
physical information without understanding why it does.  
Not all commentators are so explicit about the mystery of models. In great many cases the debates 
have become so specific, and so many different views concerning models have emerged, that the 
reason for which philosophers got interested in models in the first place, is no longer mentioned. 
Still, philosophers continue to attempt to explain the success of science, nowadays in the form of 
models and simulations. There are now different philosophical accounts of scientific 
representation specifically or, more generally, of modelling, whose aim is to explain how models 
are capable of making us learn about the world, and thereby explain their success.  
The use of models: a look at the praxis 
In this dissertation, I argue that philosophical accounts of modelling ought to look at the practice 
of modelling. Obviously, this doesn’t sound like something new. It isn’t something new. Thomas 
Kuhn's (1996) defence of history as a means to ground philosophical accounts in actual scientific 
practice has been taken on board by philosophical accounts. In fact, Cartwright’s legacy of placing 
models at the centre of scientific enquiry in the philosophy of science discourse is a consequence 
of her method in philosophy, namely that arriving at a position in the philosophy of science is 
based on the observation of scientific practice (Bailer-Jones, 2008), which is itself another of the 
legacies of the so-called Stanford School of Philosophy of Science, of which Cartwright was a 
member. Attention for scientific practice is thus at the forefront of philosophical accounts and 
they generally aim at some descriptive accuracy by relying on at least one case study or example 
that illustrates or provides evidence for a philosophical claim. 
My proposal here is for philosophical accounts of models to look at the practice as an end in itself. 
As I discussed above, the interest of philosophers in models has arisen because they are objects in 
scientific practice that answer an old philosophical question, namely, what the source of knowledge 
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is. Models are seen as the objects that answer that question, and the attempt has thus been to find 
how they do it. Another way to put this is that, interest in models arises out of an optimistic bias to 
explain the scientific endeavour as a success. My proposal is instead for philosophical accounts of 
models to leave this optimistic bias behind and focus on the practice of modelling—in this 
particular case, economic modelling—as it is. This means that the practice is observed in all its 
complexity, which includes, aside from the epistemic aspects that justify the success that we 
attribute to science, the many non-epistemic elements that govern the use of models. In more 
concrete terms, getting rid of the optimistic bias implies among other things: 
¨ Exploring more fields and subfields. As I mentioned at the outset, macroeconomics has 
been largely neglected in the philosophy of economics and in the modelling literature in 
particular 5 . Why doesn’t ignoring an entire field, especially one with so many social 
consequences, generate anxiety among philosophers? 
¨ Exploring a larger set of models than is currently done. In general, in the philosophy of 
models, a few workhorse models have been used as a basis for philosophical claims. In 
economics, in particular, only a handful of models has been explored—Schelling’s model 
of spatial segregation in an old favourite.  
¨ Exploring research questions rather than individual models. Philosophers have tended to 
focus on the representational properties or the epistemic import of a single model. But 
models generally don’t stand on their own. Scientists and model users are mostly interested 
in a particular question or phenomenon for which different models and kinds of models 
are used. Why focus on just one? 
¨ Exploring the different realms or scenarios in which models are used. Perhaps before it 
was easier to talk about science referring to academia and a few research institutions. Such 
a view fits with the underlying assumption that science’s only aim is to learn about the 
world. But, is that still the case? Didn’t Elon Musk’s SpaceX, a private enterprise, just 
launched the Falcon Heavy, and has multiple contracts with NASA for resupplying the 
ISS? What about the research carried out by the pharma industry?    
                                               
5 There are some clear exceptions like Boumans (1999, 2005); Hoover (2010); Morgan (2012). 
However, the approach of Boumans and Morgan, in particular, is arguably more historical than 
philosophical. More on this in chapter 4. 
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¨ Exploring model failure. Not all uses of models are successful. What constitutes model 
failure? What lessons can be learnt from these failures?  
Delving into these explorations might allow more accurate and nuanced philosophical claims—so 
not just, ‘Are models explanatory?’—and at the same time allow us to explore new questions that 
arise out of this practice. I should thus emphasise that I do not mean to suggest that the old 
philosophical questions should be eschewed; we have learnt quite something from them, but I 
think we might be able to learn even more if the practice is investigated with less baggage than we 
currently do.  
Let me offer a brief but telling example. I discussed above how models in philosophy have been 
upgraded from second-class citizens to role models (pun intended). I didn’t mention explicitly, 
however, what being second-class actually meant. For at least the first half of the twentieth century, 
models were considered to matter merely temporarily; they were supposed to reflect ongoing 
thinking that was still imperfect and that could therefore not yet be considered a theory: “The 
received opinion was that good theories rendered models theoretically and practically redundant” 
(Bailer-Jones, 2009, p. 82). Another way to say this is that models were considered to play a mere 
heuristic role. Given this background, now that models have been upgraded, philosophers have 
not only tried to argue for the epistemic import of models, but also do some of these philosophers 
seem to feel rather uncomfortable with the thought that (some) models may just have that heuristic 
role, and perhaps nothing else. Here’s Grüne-Yanoff (2013, p. 851): 
Philosophers, if they treat such cases at all [non-representational models], have by and 
large appraised such modelling practices as playing merely a heuristic role […] This 
heuristic justification is weak because success criteria for such functions are unclear in 
the extreme. Furthermore, it places the use of such models in the same category as taking 
a walk, reading the newspaper, or whatever else scientists do in order to inspire 
themselves to further theory development. Bunching important kinds of scientific 
modelling together with practices that cannot be rationally accounted for seems an 
unsatisfactory state, which this article seeks to repair.  
Why is it unsatisfactory that perhaps, just perhaps, some models are as effective for scientists as 
reading the newspaper or taking a walk? Why anticipate that it just can’t be the case that some models 
might be merely useful for thinking? Morgan (1999, 2012) is a commentator who has insisted on 
the importance of model manipulation and of first understanding “the world in the model”, in 
order to later understand the world. And, in some of the interviews that Bailer-Jones (2009) 
conducted with scientists, some of them concede as much (p. 11):   
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You’ve got some plausible models which comforts you because you can think, well, this 
is not a total mystery to me; I can imagine what might be going on here. I don’t actually 
know what’s going on here, but this is all right, we got some ideas. Barrie Jones, physicist 
and planetary astronomer. 
The example is meant to show how some old philosophical baggage––in this case that to call a 
model a heuristic is met with anxiety––drives our questions and perhaps even the conclusions we 
draw from the look we give to the practice. After all, Grüne-Yanoff doesn’t seem to be prepared 
to concede that non-representational models might just have the same effect on scientists as 
reading the newspaper for their scientific activity.  
Before I go on to outline the contents of each of the chapters that follow, let me say something 
about why this fresh look at the practice is important for the philosophy of models. At the outset 
I mentioned the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The fact itself is not as significant—though it is 
the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history, with USD 613 billion debt (Mamudi, 2008)—as it is being 
a symbol of the biggest recession since the Great Depression in 1929. This is important because 
of the grave implications it has had socially, economically, and politically. And, it is widely accepted 
that the financial crisis and the poor handling of the recession was the making of bad models or, 
ultimately, of poor science. The point is that limiting philosophical accounts of models to 
epistemological concerns presupposes that science is only in the business of learning true things 
about the world. Obviously this is not the case. Science is used, often in the form of models, and 
learning about those uses is important to understand and assess the effects that those models might 
have.    
In her “Philosophy of Science for the Twenty-First Century”, Janet Kourany (2003)6 urges a 
socially responsible philosophy of science. She makes reference to the logical positivists of the 
Vienna Circle, who advanced their philosophy of science with sight towards the interaction 
between science and society and the interest they had in the social movements of the time. She 
laments and criticises the purely epistemological concerns of philosophers of science—“The 
‘social’, for these philosophers, stops at the doors of scientists’ immediate environments” (p.5)—
but contends that a new, socially responsible philosophy of science is emerging at the hands of 
feminists. Feminists are concerned with science because of the deleterious effects that scientific 
knowledge has had on the struggle of women for equality and because of the positive effects that 
science may have on that struggle. I don’t want to claim here that I bear a feminist flag with this 
dissertation—perhaps regrettably, my interest in this literature came too late for that—but I do 
                                               
6 See the exchange that followed in Giere (2003); Kourany (2003b).  
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want to advocate a more socially responsible philosophy of science and, specifically, a more socially 
responsible philosophy of models. These mysterious objects are being used in an enormous 
number of domains, and understanding how they are being used is paramount to understand their 
effects on people and the ways in which they can be put to socially responsible uses.  
The contents of this dissertation 
The chapters that follow are observations. That is, each chapter has been written independently 
of the others and addresses different aspects of the extant philosophical literature on models to 
which I think the new look at the praxis mentioned above can bring important insights. Two main 
topics are discussed: what the unit of analysis of philosophical accounts of models is and should 
be, treated in chapters two and three, and model failure, treated in chapters four and five. 
In chapter two, I address the question what unit of analysis of models philosophers should 
investigate. I argue that the philosophical investigation of models should be focussed on clusters 
or research questions, rather than on single models and their components, as has generally been 
done. I suggest that two specific philosophical questions, namely the representational character of 
models and the attempt to frame discussions of realism in terms of models may have guided the 
interest of philosophers towards individual models and model components. However, the practice 
as well as philosophical arguments that maintain that our models are incapable of fulfilling all the 
purposes we might have for them at once, are compelling reasons to explore how models are 
related. I discuss some of the literature on New Economic Geography (NEG) for a two-fold 
purpose. First, to address the claim that modelling in economics is mainly an endeavour to generate 
robust theorems about causal mechanisms by practising robustness analysis. I argue against this 
position. Second, to expand the analysis of models to other areas of enquiry.  
In chapter three, François Claveau and I discuss three epistemic roles that models might play and 
offer sufficient conditions for a model to actually play that epistemic role. We use the traditional 
definition of knowledge as true justified belief (KATJB) as a basis to define learning and thus 
establish the conditions that a model would have to fulfil. The motivation of the chapter is that, 
while there has been a long interest from philosophers to defend the epistemic success of models, 
there has seldom in the literature been a clear definition of what precisely this epistemic benefit is. 
The attempt here is thus to, having defined learning as ‘coming to know’, establish the sufficient 
conditions that a model would have to fulfil in order to determine whether it can be said to have 
epistemic benefit. The three epistemic roles we discuss are, evidential, which states that models 
can count as evidence for a claim about the world; stimulating, which states that models can be a 
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stimulus for carrying out empirical research, and revealing, which states that models can generate 
new hypotheses about the world.   
Although this chapter might be considered to fall prey to the “occupational bias” that Ross (2014) 
refers to, it has three important features that correspond to the look at the praxis that I endorsed 
above. First, it is an exploration of a cluster of models or, rather, of a research question, instead of 
a single model. In this sense, it can be taken as an example of what was argued in chapter two. We 
use the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) model7, which is part of the search and matching 
theory that has been developed in economics since the 70s, as a case from which we pick out the 
potential epistemic roles models can have. Second, since our analysis is on a research question 
rather than on a single model, we are able to rely on the relations that exist between purely 
theoretical models, statistical models, and data. So, in our example, justification for believing a 
particular proposition about the world coming from the model is possible thanks to an network 
of beliefs that agents have come to have thanks to other sources such as empirical data. In this 
sense, models are not mysterious but rather another tool, among many, that are used to understand 
the world. Third, it is an enquiry in the field of labour economics, which has important relations 
with and implications for macroeconomics. As mentioned above, this is a field that has seldom 
been investigated by philosophers of economics concerned with modelling.  
In chapter four I move to a different subject. In an attempt to make sense of what it means for 
macroeconomic models to have failed, which many commentators have argued in light of the 
financial crisis, I explore the philosophical literature for guides as to how the accounts that have 
been offered so far, can elucidate these claims of failure. My conclusion after surveying the 
literature is that there is little that has been explored by philosophers with respect to model failure 
and little in their accounts that can be used for making sense of this aspect of modelling. In general 
terms, this exercise suggests that, despite the great interest that models have received from 
philosophers, especially due to the acknowledgement that models play a major role in scientific 
practice, the reach of the literature has been constrained to comprise only three specific aspects. 
One of them is the almost exclusive focus on theoretical models (as individual units). This is 
particularly remarkable in economics, given the transformation that the discipline has gone 
through in the last decades to a more empirical (or applied) science. This transformation is not 
reflected in our philosophical accounts of models and raises important questions about how close 
philosophical enquiry actually is to the practice. The other two are the focus on explanation and 
                                               
7 The DMP model is known as a model (singular). However, strictly speaking it is a class of models 
that were developed throughout the years by the three economists mentioned above.  
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understanding, and on the identification of causal mechanisms. Surely these aspects are important 
for science and the use of models more generally. But they are not the only aspects driving science 
and the use of models. In studying only these, other aspects of the practice are underestimated.     
In chapter five, the last one, I continue with the subject of model failure. I argue for the need of 
an explicit analysis of model failure and, specifically, for a pragmatic account of models. Such a 
pragmatic account, I argue, is capable of accommodating aspects that determine the outcomes of 
the modelling activity, and that cannot be accommodated by extant accounts of models. I discuss 
Uskali Mäki's (2017) account of models “[ModRep]” for two reasons. First, because, though 
introduced as an account of representation, it has been extended over the years to include 
pragmatic elements. Second, and more importantly, because Mäki (2017) suggests that [ModRep] 
is sufficient to accommodate model failure. I argue, based on a few examples of the practice, that 
some potential sources of failure could not be accounted for by such an account and therefore 
suggest three additional elements.  
To conclude, two notes are in order. First, the focus of this dissertation is on economic models. 
This means that, whenever I make references to theory, I refer to non-empirical models, unless 
otherwise specified. While I recognise that the theory-model relation is an important subject in 
general philosophy of science, this is not the object of this dissertation. ‘Theory’ is thus used rather 
casually, without intending to take sides on the debate of what precisely models and theories are. 
This, I believe, should have no consequences for the points I try to develop in this dissertation.  
The second note is about grammar. While it has by now become more or less standard in 
philosophy of science to use the feminine pronouns as a means to attempt to correct gender 
imbalances—at least in writing—the use of gender-neutral singular ‘they’ is not as common or 
perhaps even considered incorrect. I have made use of gender-neutral pronouns in some chapters 
of this dissertation because I think this is what gender balance (in writing) should ultimately be 
about. English is a language that allows neutral expression and I profited from that. I haven’t used 
gender-neutral language throughout the dissertation because it has been a learning process for 
myself as well––I used to write in terms of ‘he’ alone.  
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More Models: Clusters as the Unit of Analysis 
Introduction 
 
For a great part of the 20th century, theories were regarded by philosophers as the vehicles of 
scientific knowledge. Models, instead, were regarded as merely tentative and unfinished scientific 
products. This changed in the last few decades, in which models became more and more 
prominent in scientific practice and philosophers became more attentive to what actually happens 
in scientific practice. They thus turned their attention to these objects, specifically trying to 
understand their ontology, their epistemology, and their relation to the world in terms of both 
reference and truth.  
Philosophers of science have focussed on a limited number of models in this quest to understand 
the role of models in science. That is, some models have become “paradigmatic” in being the 
object of attention of philosophers and on which different accounts of models have been based. 
The Lotka-Volterra model in biology, Schelling’s model of spatial segregation in economics, and 
the San Francisco Bay model in fluid dynamics are a few examples of these paradigmatic models. 
Two important reasons for why these models in particular have received attention are that they 
are relatively simple, and can therefore be easily explained and discussed without a need for 
technicalities and, more importantly, that these models represent some of the different kinds of 
models that have been so far identified: mathematical, abstract, and scale models, respectively.  
This approach of studying individual, simple, and representative models has some advantages. It 
has, for instance, allowed philosophers of different fields to communicate with each other and 
thereby contribute to a common, general understanding of models, without necessarily having the 
same background knowledge. However, it is remarkable that little attention has been given to the 
relationship among models. Models are seldom built from scratch or used in isolation. Models 
usually respond to a specific research question, which is shaped by the development of earlier 
models, and which in turn determines the inputs or ingredients with which a model is built, its 
purposes, and its contribution. 
In this chapter I shall argue that acknowledging the ways in which a model is related to other 
models may have important implications for the assessment that we as philosophers make with 
respect to the epistemic import of models. By focussing exclusively on the components of 
individual models, we might be overlooking epistemic import coming from models as clusters.  
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In the next section I discuss two philosophical questions that have been the object of enquiry of 
philosophers concerned with models and which I take to be important in having guided the 
attention of philosophers to the internal components of a model. Then I briefly discuss a few 
characterisations of models that take for granted the importance of the relationship between a 
model and its target. In section III, I discuss two exceptions in this literature: a view that has 
characterised theoretical modelling as mostly derivational robustness analysis and a view that 
defends how understanding is possible with clusters of theoretical models. Even though I agree 
with the spirit of the contributions, specifically their attempt to study clusters rather than individual 
models, I think their diagnosis of epistemic import is hasty. I suggest that before we attempt to 
draw conclusions about the epistemic contribution of models, we need to study more of them and 
the relations they have to other models. Any conclusion drawn from the study of a handful of 
single models should be merely tentative. Finally, in section IV, I offer a sketch of how a view of 
understanding in the literature in epistemology can contribute to our assessment of the epistemic 
import of models.  
2. One model 
Models do not generally stand on their own. Instead, they are related to other models. Sometimes 
this will be because they borrow convenient functional forms from other models, or because their 
results are consistent with those of other models, or because they respond to a specific research 
question that is treated from different perspectives. Kevin Hoover (1990), for instance, though in 
a different context, has traced the links and history of the models that are regarded as belonging 
to the New Classical school. The same could be done for a number of schools in economics and 
probably for different disciplines. Furthermore, individual models are generally quite limited for 
all the functions we would like them to perform. In terms of model qualities, there seems to be a 
trade-off between generality, precision and realisticness (Levins 1966; Odenbaugh 2003)1. And, in 
terms of purposes, some cases suggest that mechanistic models, because they aren’t as adaptable, 
might perform worse at prediction exercises than simpler, non-mechanistic models (Reiss 2007).   
However, philosophers concerned with understanding models in scientific practice have paid 
almost exclusive attention to individual models. That is, most of their accounts have been based 
on the examination of a single model and their properties. This situation is striking considering 
that one of the reasons for why philosophers have turned to models is because of their ubiquity 
                                               
1 Orzack and Orzack and Elliot have contested this claim.  
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in scientific practice and the interest that philosophers have in understanding their role in this 
practice.  
I think there are at least two important philosophical questions that have prompted philosophers 
to pay more attention to individual models than to the relations that they have with other models. 
The first question is related to the representational character of models. 
As argued by commentators such as Cartwright (1983) and  Giere (2004), it is models, instead of 
theories, that represent phenomena. This feature of models is now accepted and therefore, in the 
last decades, interest has turned to more specific details about this relation of models with the 
world. Specifically, these have been questions that seek to understand the constituents of scientific 
representation, or broadly speaking, what scientific representation is 2 . Naturally, since these 
questions are concerned with the representational relation that stands between a model and its 
target, attention has been given to models and their properties and that of their targets. The 
literature has grown quite fast, partly because many different accounts have been offered, and all 
of them face objections and counterexamples. This has thus given impetus to the literature as 
amendments and new proposals are brought to the table.    
Furthermore, some of these accounts, in particular the reductive ones, which are those that intend 
to explain away scientific representation in terms of more ‘basic’ notions, require models and their 
targets to be analysed in terms of their properties. For instance, a popular reductive view is Ronald 
Giere’s account of representation as similarity. According to this view, scientists pick some specific 
features of models that are taken to be similar to features of the designated real target. And, it is 
the existence of these specified similarities that makes possible the use of the model to represent 
the real system, in the way specified by the modeller. (Giere, 2004). This account, and any other 
that is reductive inevitably demands that attention be placed in models, their properties, and those 
of the target system. In other words, it demands an inward look into models and their targets. 
This, for the simple reason that to determine whether the model is similar (or, say, isomorphic) in 
the required respects to its target, a comparison has to be made between some properties of the 
model and the target. 
The second question concerns issues of realism, such as the role of idealisations in models and 
what this entails for scientific realism. Debates on realism with respect to science have traditionally 
taken place in relation to theories and laws. However, since models are now regarded as vehicles 
of scientific knowledge, their false assumptions raise questions about the exact role they play. 
                                               
2 Frigg & Nguyen suggest that there are, in fact, at least five questions related to scientific representation in 
the literature. I discuss these in Chapter four and will therefore not discuss them further here.  
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Galilean idealisations, for instance, have been characterised as removing disturbing factors for the 
practical purpose of making models tractable, and that can later be de-idealised for more accurate 
representation––and thereby more accurate predictions. The implication of this characterisation is 
a defence of realism, as the aim and the success of these models is ultimately rendered by accurate 
representations. Some counterarguments to this view are that scientists seldom de-idealise their 
models and, particularly in economics, it is often unclear how assumptions would have to be 
changed in order to de-idealise them. Since models are considered to be successful in conveying 
true insights about the their targets, the role of idealisations and the epistemic import of models 
raises philosophical questions that philosophers have been eager to answer.  
In the attempt to provide answers to these and related questions, philosophers have turned their 
attention to models and their components. Let me briefly discuss some of of the accounts that 
have been defended by commentators that address them. I’ll focus on discussions in the 
philosophy of economics because this is ultimately what interests me in this dissertation. Uskali 
Mäki has contributed to both of the debates mentioned above and, specifically in economics, has 
defended the method of isolation as a central method in economics (1992), arguing that unrealistic, 
Galilean assumptions are what allow modellers to isolate a causal mechanism. He has also 
defended the functional decomposition approach (2009), which focusses on the individual 
components of models and the functions they have, and by which he has defended a realist 
position, locating truth inside the model (2011). Mäki (2009, 2009, 2011) has offered an account 
of scientific representation in which his view of idealisation and realism come together.  
Other commentators have focussed on the epistemology of models, addressing issues of 
representation or idealisations more indirectly. Bob Sugden (2000, 2011) has addressed the 
question of how economists make inferences from models and what kinds of inferences these are. 
He has argued that the credibility a model-user places in a model is what determines whether 
inferences can be made about the world. How credible the model is depends on the relation of 
similarity there is between the model and the target. Morgan & Morrison (1999) have focussed on 
the nature of models as autonomous objects. They suggest that when a modeller builds a model, 
she uses elements that do not necessarily come from theories or data, but from “outside”. This 
gives autonomy to the model to function as an investigative instrument. A model can be 
manipulated by the model user to learn about implications that hold within the model. This 
manipulability and the model representing its target are, according to Morgan and Morrison, 
sufficient conditions to learn about the world by using a model. Grüne-Yanoff (2009), in addition, 
has argued that a representational relation is not a necessary condition for learning about the world. 
He characterises as minimal models those that do not satisfy the condition of having a link to the 
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real world, either by means of being similar, having a relation of partial resemblance, or adhering 
to natural laws. He suggests that it is possible to learn from these minimal models because they 
have the capacity to affect a modellers’ confidence in impossibility hypotheses about the world.  
In general, the focus on models and the epistemological claims have both been about individual 
models. So, not only the claims have been defended with examples of a single individual model––
e.g. von Thünen’s Isolated State model in Mäki, or Schelling’s model of segregation in Sugden and 
Grüne-Yanoff––but the epistemological question itself, namely what models’ epistemological 
import is, has been framed in terms of a single model. To be sure, both aspects are important: the 
first one because of its economy––it’s easier to communicate a claim with a simple, known 
example––and the second because whether a single model has any epistemic import is in itself an 
important philosophical question. But this not need preclude questions of how models are actually 
used, whether they could collectively have other representational relation with the world, or 
whether they may have another kind or a different degree of epistemic import. However, attention 
has been given almost exclusively to individual models.  
In the next section I discuss two views of models that are an exception to this single-model 
approach3. First I discuss a view that tries to characterise economic modelling as robustness 
analysis. Then I discuss a view that explicitly endorses model clusters as the unit of analysis and 
that thereby afford understanding. Even though I share the view that model clusters is the most 
appropriate unit of analysis, I shall argue that robustness analysis is too limited as a general 
characterisation of economic theoretical modelling (against the first view) and that the analysis of 
how models afford understanding by means of analysing them as clusters is too hasty (against the 
second view). 
3. More models 
Kuorikoski, Lehtinen, & Marchionni (2010) toy with the idea of models as more than single units; 
they acknowledge that models are related to other models and suggest that this entails a somewhat 
added epistemic import in the form of higher confidence in the inferences drawn from models. 
They argue that a substantial part of modern theoretical economics is devoted to “deriving known 
results from alternative or sparser modelling assumptions”, which they suggest to call a form of 
robustness analysis: Derivational Robustness Analysis (DRA). The idea here is that a set of 
                                               
3 Another exception is Bokulich (2003) who offers a view of ‘horizontal model construction’ as an alternative 
to what she calls ‘vertical approaches’ which take models as mediators between theories and data. Her 
alternative is useful as a means to facilitate inter-theoretic relations and understanding phenomena at the limit 
of two theoretical frameworks––e.g. quantum chaos. I don’t discuss this work here because her the inter-
theoretic relations is not an aspect that is treated in this dissertation.  
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different means, in this case models, arrives independently at the same result, thereby providing 
reasons to believe that the result is reliable, despite the falsities and/or idealisations that may have 
been employed in the models. Although this is certainly not a method of empirical confirmation, 
it makes the inferences that are drawn from models more reliable. Kuorikoski et al. (2010) 
distinguish three kinds of assumptions, namely, substantial assumptions, Galilean assumptions, 
and tractability assumptions. The first set is supposed to track the causal factors that bring about 
the causal mechanism a modeller is interested in. Galilean assumptions, are used to isolate the 
mechanism that substantial assumptions capture––they are used to eliminate the disturbing factors 
that may affect the causal mechanism of interest. Finally, tractability assumptions are introduced 
to make the model mathematically solvable; they are typically false, but they are expected not to 
have any influence in the result of the model. Robustness analysis is practised to make sure that 
the tractability assumptions are not responsible for driving the result. It is thus these assumptions 
that are adjusted in different models, to verify whether versions of the same model with different 
tractability assumptions derive the same result. The aim of robustness analysis is thus 
to “distinguish the real from the illusory; the reliable from the unreliable; the objective from the 
subjective; the object of focus from artefacts of perspective” (Wimsatt, cited in Kuorikoski et al. 
p. 542). The aim of their paper is to attempt to demonstrate that even though robustness analysis 
is not an empirical confirmation procedure, it does have some epistemic import. This, in 
turn explains, or rather justifies, why a substantial part of theoretical economics is dedicated to 
this endeavour. If robustness analysis had no epistemic value, they argue, the practice of a 
substantive part of theoretical economists would have very little justification. 
Kuorikoski et al. (2010) start their analysis with a model, described by Paul Krugman in 1991 called 
the Centre Periphery (CP) model. Their claim is that the activity which followed this model can be 
regarded as robustness analysis because many other economists started building models 
that “appear to be checking whether the main conclusions of the CP model remain valid when 
some of its unrealistic assumptions are altered” (p. 553). In Krugman’s model, two opposite forces 
develop which determine whether the bulk of the economic activity locates in one of two regions, 
giving rise to a core-periphery pattern. Kuorikoski et al. (2010) identify the model result [RCP] and 
the causal mechanism [CCP] there isolated. Their claim is that this causal mechanism is the one 
being captured by other versions of the model, using other tractability assumptions.  
[RCP] Ceteris paribus, spatial agglomeration occurs when economies of scale are high, 
market power is strong, and transportation costs are low (that is, when the centripetal 
forces are stronger than the centrifugal forces). 
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[CCP] In the presence of immobile and mobile activities, the interaction among 
economies of scale, monopolistic competition and transportation costs gives rise to 
centripetal and centrifugal forces. 
Among the assumptions that are varied are the form of the utility function, which in Ottaviano, 
Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002) is substituted for a quadratic form, and the transportation costs, which 
are changed from the ‘iceberg’ form, to a linear form. Similarly, other models assume that the 
manufacturing industry makes use of both skilled and unskilled labour, as opposed to Krugman’s 
original model in which only skilled labour is used. The assumptions that remain constant 
throughout the set of model variations are those that correspond to what they call the substantial 
assumptions, namely, the presence of monopolistic competition, economies of scale and 
transportation costs––the causal mechanism. Despite the variations, most of these models reach 
the same result, which suggests that it is the substantial assumptions which drive the result and 
not the tractability assumptions; the results of the models are robust. From this Kuorikoski et al. 
(2010) conclude that the economists who built these models were engaged in robustness analysis.  
Their contribution is important because it draws attention to the analysis of models in clusters 
instead of single models and thereby to the entertainment of the possibility that more epistemic 
import resides in clusters of models. The idea of robustness suggests that there is epistemic import 
in clusters that otherwise would not be observable4. If the epistemic import of models is assessed 
according to the strength of the relation that a single model has with its target alone—by looking 
for instance, as Mäki suggests, at how much a model resembles its target––then any potential 
epistemic gain emerging from the group of models as a whole is not considered. In robustness 
analysis, the increased reliability of the inferences drawn from models is only evident once a cluster 
is taken into account.  
There are, however, at least two difficulties with the defence by Kuorikoski et al. (2010) of 
robustness analysis in economics. First, as Reiss (2012) has argued, an ideal robustness test would 
require the permutation of each and every one of the assumptions. This is a very different process 
than what Kuorikoski et al. (2010) have described and therefore the reliability of the process 
doesn’t seem to be guaranteed. Reiss (2012) also claims that in the few instances in which 
robustness analysis is done in economics, robustness tests tend to fail. Understanding the 
implications of these failures seems paramount to understand the practice of robustness analysis 
in economics.  
                                               
4 This is not to say that Kuorikoski et al. (2010) argue against the need for representation in modelling. Their 
standpoint, regardless of what theory of representation they endorse, is one that looks beyond the individual 
properties of models, even if their defence of robustness highlights precisely that models are composed of 
smaller parts. (see section 4 of their (2010)).  
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Second, in their paper they submit that this is what a significant portion of the economics 
profession does. In the introduction  they say that “[m]odern theoretical economics largely 
consists of building and examining abstract mathematical models. A substantial portion of this 
modelling activity is devoted to deriving known results from alternative or sparser modelling 
assumptions” (p. 541). The idea is thus that economists presume some causal mechanism to be at 
play in an economic phenomenon, and, because their modelling requires making tractability 
assumptions, they devote themselves to checking that it is not the tractability assumptions but 
their causal intuitions that drive the observed result. The implication of characterising “a 
substantial portion of this modelling activity” as robustness analysis is that the only work that is 
left to do is to agree on the epistemological import of robustness analysis. That is, if we know that 
this is what most economists do, as philosophers we just need to understand the epistemology of 
that practice in order to understand the epistemology of economic modelling.  
Perhaps it could be argued that this way of referring to the practice is just an idealisation, that the 
claim was not intended as an accurate description. This claim is indeed milder; instead of saying 
that this is what the profession does, the authors would be saying that it could be understood as if 
it did so. However, it is unclear whether this characterisation would help to convey what the 
epistemic contribution of economic models is. If our purpose as philosophers is to understand 
scientific practice and how models, as they are used, are able to convey information about the 
world, we cannot rely on characterisations that do not relate to science as it is practiced. This 
criticism was made to philosophy already decades ago, against views such as the Received or the 
Semantic Views of theories, which were more interested in a logically defensible reconstruction of 
what theories and models were, than in accounting for the actual practice of science. Things 
complicate further if on top of providing descriptively inaccurate reconstructions, the 
reconstruction itself is problematic, as Reiss (2012) argued and I indicated above. 
It seems to me that Kuorikoski et al. (2010) characterise economic theoretical modelling as largely 
DRA as a way to grant further legitimacy to economic modelling and, simultaneously, to DRA as 
a scientific activity: economists practice DRA because of it’s epistemic import and DRA must have 
a significant epistemic import given that it is what a lot of economists do. These are two separate 
issues. The value of DRA as a scientific activity is worth understanding from a philosophical 
perspective regardless of how pervasive it is in a discipline. Likewise, though separately, it is of 
philosophical interest to understand what exactly economists do when they model and why. Before 
I go on to show with a case that models are used in other ways than just to practice robustness 
analysis, let me discuss another view in the literature that endorses the study of models as clusters.  
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Ylikoski & Aydinonat (2014) is an explicit proposal to analyse clusters of models in order to 
properly understand their epistemic import. In their paper, Ylikoski & Aydinonat (2014) attempt 
to elucidate the way in which clusters of theoretical models are used in order to gain understanding 
about a particular phenomenon. They take the Schelling’s model of segregation and the research 
that followed as their case study, emphasising that the Schelling model is not a single model but a 
family, developed by Schelling himself and other modellers over the years considering different 
but related problems. 
Ylikoski & Aydinonat (2014) argue that the epistemic import of models can only be fully 
understood in the context of a cluster of models relevant to the explanatory task at hand. In their 
view, models are related to each other by genealogical origin and similarity, constituting families 
of models like Schelling’s. Theoretical models like Schelling’s are not devised for explaining a 
specific empirical phenomenon but to merely enquire into theoretical possibilities. This is why, 
according to them, philosophers should look at clusters of models, instead of at a single model. 
They recognise that, while it is a good start of Kuorikoski et al. (2010) to look beyond a single 
model, robustness analysis is just one of the things economists do with models. Economists 
typically make variations to their models in order to understand what happens when certain 
conditions change which are deemed central. In general, they suggest, the main focus of research 
that the Schelling models (and theoretical models more generally) allow for is the exploration of 
what-if questions. This is not a case of robustness analysis because variations in this case are often 
of core assumptions, and not of tractability ones.  
Furthermore, a theoretical model is so abstract that it can’t be said to provide “possible causal 
scenarios”—historical causal scenarios that tell how an explanandum could have come about. 
Instead, they provide skeletons of these causal scenarios, or “causal mechanism schemes”, as 
Ylikoski & Aydinonat (2014) call them. These are concerned with what is causally possible, without 
referring to a phenomenon in particular. This idea of providing just skeletons of the causal 
scenarios is very similar to what Odenbaugh & Alexandrova (2011) have in mind5. Theoretical 
models like Schelling’s offer causal mechanisms that, in principle could bring about the effect that 
is being investigated, such as segregation. This occurs in a setting in which scientists have an array 
of competing explanations for a phenomenon, meaning that Schelling’s contribution is that it 
changes the menu of possible explanations that scientists may entertain for the causes of 
segregation.  
                                               
5 Odenbaugh & Alexandrova refer to ‘open formulae’, an idea that was already developed by Alexandrova 
(2008). 
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The epistemic import of models has two sources according to the authors. On the one hand, 
epistemic import comes from clusters of models, for the increased number of what-if inferences 
that a scientist can make with them. On the other hand, epistemic import comes from the cluster 
of competing explanations that emerge from different models. If scientists want to be able to 
explain a phenomenon, a good strategy is to have a set of possible explanations and piecemeal 
discard those that the evidence contradicts––a process of eliminative induction they refer to as a 
weak version of inference to the best explanation. The larger the set, the more difficult it is to find 
the right explanation, but also the higher the probability that the right explanation is within the 
set. A more complete set of explanations, in turn, imposes higher demands on the evidence 
required to  exclude possible explanations. The higher the demands on the evidence the more 
warranted the inference to the best explanation is. In addition, Ylikoski & Aydinonat (2014) 
contend that models have a formal structure that raises the standards that are imposed when a 
mechanism scheme can be modelled in a rigorous way.  
While this analysis is helpful to understand what a cluster of models may be capable of doing in 
terms of epistemic import, it only brings us this far. In other words, it doesn’t allow us to 
distinguish between a cluster with epistemic import from one without. Recall that the sources of 
epistemic import in this analysis are the what-if inferences that a cluster allows––a cluster allows 
more inferences than a single model, given the model variations––and the competing explanations 
that emerge from a more complete meta-model of explanations of the phenomenon. From 
additional what-if inferences, we might be able get a broader insight of a particular phenomenon. 
Whether the inferences are correct is another matter. With respect to the contribution of the 
models to the possible causal mechanism that brings a phenomenon about, the gain we get from 
clusters of models is less clear. It seems that entertaining a new hypothesis from a single model 
could be enough for this purpose. The point is therefore that the analysis suggests that just any 
cluster, for being a cluster, yields understanding. Ylikoski & Aydinonat (2014) seem to use their 
analysis to justify why social scientists consider Schelling’s models explanatory despite the many 
shortcomings and criticisms that have been offered in the literature. They thus take for granted 
that Schelling’s models have epistemic import. They also claim that their analysis and diagnosis is 
likely to apply to other theoretical models in economics and biology, “that are taken to have 
explanatory import”. How does this analysis help us those models that aren’t as explored, or that 
haven’t received as much attention as Schelling has, and therefore we don’t know whether they 
have any epistemic import?  
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4. More models: vertical and horizontal complementarities 
I shall show below that there are important relations additional to the ones established by carrying 
out robustness analysis that are obscured if the practice of theoretical economics is characterised 
as such. I use the same example that Kuorikoski et al (2010) use, namely a group of models in the 
branch of new economic geography (NEG) for two reasons. First and foremost, I want to lend 
legitimacy to my case: I’m using the same case that Kuorikoski et al. (2010) claim to be a case of 
robustness analysis in order to show that there is much more at play than mere robustness analysis. 
Second, to expand the analysis to models that so far have not been as explored as others.  
An obvious place to start investigating how a model fits together with other models is to look at 
the context in which it was developed. This point may sound trivial, but the context of models is 
seldom considered in the extant analyses of models. Kuorikoski et al. are arguably no exception, 
since they don’t discuss this in their paper. All they say is that NEG “is a recent approach in spatial 
issues developed within economics, the aim of which is to explain the location of economic 
activity.” (p. 553).  
The context of Krugman (1991) is an interesting one. Krugman (1991) is regarded as the precursor 
of New Economic Geography because there used to be a long schism between economic 
geographers and economists with respect to explanations of regional development (Martin & 
Sunley, 1996). For economic geographers it was strange that economists reduced the explanation 
of why there is trade or what the advantages of it are, to differences in comparative advantage, 
treating countries as dimensionless, in which only factor endowments matter. For geographers, 
naturally, the role of geography in determining trade has always been important. Yet, economists 
had seldom paid attention to these insights, partly because economic geographers use different 
methods and partly because explaining the core-periphery patterns, which emerged more 
prominently in the second half of the 20th century, can’t be explained by factor endowment 
theories. Instead, imperfect competition, specifically increasing returns to scale, is necessary. But 
between the 1940s and the 1970s it was the theory of general competitive equilibrium that 
dominated economic thinking. The treatment of imperfect competition was not as theoretically 
and formally developed as its perfectly competitive counterpart (Krugman, 1990, p. 2): 
If we ask why so much of the American economy is concentrated in a few coastal strips, 
we are immediately driven to speak about economies of scale and externalities. Yet 
economies of scale internal to firms imply imperfect competition, which until recently 
was regarded as too difficult to model rigorously, while purely technological external 
economies seem both implausible and too elusive to have useful empirical content.  
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Krugman (1991) thus marks the point at which economists ‘discovered geography’ and attempted 
to explain the location of economic activity taking into account the role of geography. His model 
attempts to show that a simple economic setting, which features monopolistic competition––
thereby the possibility of firms of facing increasing returns––and transportation costs, is capable 
of giving rise to a core-periphery pattern of economic activity.  
The purpose of this paper is to suggest that application of models and techniques derived 
from theoretical industrial organisation now allow a reconsideration of economic 
geography; that it is now time to attempt to incorporate the insights of the long but 
informal tradition in this area into formal models. In order to make the point, the paper 
develops a simple illustrative model designed to shed light on one of the key questions 
of location: why and when does manufacturing become concentrated in a few regions, 
leaving others relatively undeveloped? (p.3) 
This context is important, not only to understand Krugman’s contribution, but also the 
contributions that followed. For expository purposes, I shall only focus on one of the models that 
Kuorikoski et al. (2010) use for their argument that economists carry out robustness analysis with 
economic models. Such a limited focus is enough to illustrate my point that there are other kinds 
of relations than merely those established for practising robustness analysis. As mentioned above, 
Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002) arrive at the same results as Krugman (1991) while they 
substitute the CES utility function for a quadratic form and the ‘iceberg’ transportation costs for 
a linear form. According to Ottaviano et al. (2002), their model has two purposes. The first purpose 
is to introduce a model that exhibits the same features as those of the rest of the literature, 
including Krugman (1991), while allowing for the derivation of analytical results using simple 
algebra. This first part of their purpose could very well be interpreted as an attempt to do a 
robustness test: to replicate the results that Krugman obtained, but in this case deriving the results 
analytically, instead of numerically, as other contributions had done.  
However, the reason for why it was desirable that the model exhibit the same features as the rest 
of the literature was because it was an attempt to solve some technical limitations that were present 
in the literature at the moment. Until then, NEG models had relied on a set of strategies that were 
considered problematic. One problem was that most of the models developed until then required 
numerical computations in order to be solved. This was seen as a disadvantage and therefore there 
was a strong interest in being able to derive the model analytically. Another problem was that the 
literature had relied on the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition. The CES utility 
function was part of this strategy to express the consumers’ love for variety, as was required. 
Ottaviano et al. (2002) used a quadratic function instead that enabled them to express this love for 
variety and that allowed them to adopt a broader concept of equilibrium than what the Dixit-
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Stiglitz strategy allowed. Yet another difficulty was that ‘iceberg’ transportation costs included 
transportation costs in a rather rudimentary way: the assumption of ‘iceberg’ costs is that part of 
the product melts on its way to its destination. As a result, equilibrium prices turn out to be 
independent of the spatial distribution of firms and consumers. This result conflicts with spatial 
pricing theory, which says that demand elasticity varies with distance and prices change with the 
level of demand and the intensity of competition (Ottaviano et al., 2002). 
The second purpose of the model is to show that their new specification allows them to investigate 
further aspects of the same phenomenon than what the extant models had so far investigated, 
namely, to make a welfare analysis of the agglomeration process; to analyse the role of history and 
expectations in the emergence of economic clusters; and to analyse the impact of urban costs on 
the spatial distribution of economic activities (Ottaviano et al., 2002). These aims are more in line 
with the claims of Ylikoski & Aydinonat (2014) and Odenbaugh and Alexandrova’s view that 
robustness analysis is a tool of discovery. In a reply to Kuorikoski et al. (2010), they argue that 
robustness analysis should be seen as a tool of discovery and not as a tool of confirmation, as 
Kuorikoski et al., (2010) seem to suggest. Odenbaugh & Alexandrova (2011) argue that robust 
theorems do not confirm the hypotheses that later appear in causal explanations of phenomena. 
Instead, hinting to Paul Humphreys and William Wimsatt’s “templates”, they argue that models 
are useful for building good explanations. More specifically, they suggest that robust theorems 
“provide us with open formulae that can be used to build hypotheses about mechanisms, and 
robustness analysis is a way of chiselling out these open formulae” (2011, p. 769). In the case of 
Ottaviano et al. (2002), obtaining a robust result indicated that their results of the agglomeration 
process were consistent with the rest of the literature. This consistency allowed them to make 
additional inferences about another aspect of the phenomenon under investigation, namely a 
welfare analysis of the agglomeration process.  They could thus be thought of as building new 
hypotheses. In that particular model, for example, the welfare analysis shows that there is a range 
of trade costs for which the equilibrium doesn’t align with the social optimum, giving room to 
potential regional policy interventions. Similar kind of inferences with respect to the role of path-
dependence and agent expectations and the impact of urban costs on spatial distribution of 
economic activities were also possible with this model. These were additional to what was possible 
to investigate with previous models.  
Ottaviano et al. (2002) were not engaged in a robustness analysis exercise and therefore shouldn’t 
be characterised as such. I’d like to suggest instead that what seems to be going on here is an 
attempt to provide some sort of horizontal complementarity to the models. A phenomenon, 
although regarded as a phenomenon—in this particular case, a pattern of agglomeration of 
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economic activity—can usually be studied from different perspectives and explored with 
extensions, complications or implications of the phenomenon under study. So models can be 
developed such that, strictly speaking, they are about the same phenomenon, but in a somehow 
varied form. They are thus complementary to other models in a horizontal way, in the sense that 
the cluster of models put together provides an analysis that is broader, more comprehensive. Each 
individual model treats a very specific aspect of a phenomenon. In the case of Ottaviano et al. 
(2002) they come up with the inclusion of a welfare analysis and the impact of expectations on the 
agglomeration of economic activity. A more comprehensive analysis is thus available if these 
contributions are considered.   
Moreover, while the new model allowed to make new what-if inferences, such as “what are the 
welfare consequences for the population if economic agglomeration takes place in the way 
described by NEG models”––and thus lending support to Ylikoski & Aydinonat’s analysis––the 
interest was not in the causal mechanism behind core-periphery patterns. In fact, according to 
Ottaviano (2003), the mechanism that brings about core-periphery patterns has been well known 
for more than a century. After describing the consolidation of the New Economic Geography 
(NEG) begun by Krugman, Ottaviano (2003, p. 667) states: “This mechanism is not new. For 
example, it is carefully described by both Marshall, 1890, and Ohlin, 1933”. The interest was 
instead in being able to generate the known pattern bringing together two kinds of models and 
techniques that until then had been separate. Ottaviano continues: “The crucial contribution of 
NEG is that it is translated into a general equilibrium model with solid microeconomic 
foundations” (p. 667). The point here was therefore not to understand the world. The question 
was not, “can I obtain the same model result with slightly different assumptions?” nor “what 
happens in my model if this or that assumption is incorporated?” There was no question about 
what is the mechanism that brings about this pattern of economic activity. Instead, the point was 
to be able to improve economic theory: to be able to generate a known result with the tools that 
were considered acceptable to the discipline.  
Neary (2001) and Ottaviano (2003) recognise that a pitfall of the approach initiated by Krugman 
was that the results were obtained using very specific functional forms and numerical methods. It 
is for this reason that Ottaviano et al. (2002) modify some of the original assumptions. Ideally, the 
models should be as realistic6 as possible, and in this emergent literature this was hardly possible. 
For instance, Krugman, in an assessment of the literature states: 
                                               
6 ‘Realistic’ is likely to be controversial, considering the extent to which economists have been lambasted 
precisely for the lack of realisticness of their models. I shall not engage in such a debate here nor question 
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Because the main obstacle that economists have traditionally faced when trying to 
confront issues involving increasing returns is one of tractability, overcoming that 
obstacle depends crucially on technical tricks: on strategic assumptions that may be 
unrealistic but make a model easier to build, on clever new ways of solving models that 
might otherwise seem too complex to deal with. To date, the new economic geography 
has depended heavily on the tricks summarized in Fujita, Krugman and Venables (2002) 
with the slogan ‘‘Dixit-Stiglitz, icebergs, evolution, and the computer” (Krugman, 1998, 
p. 164). 
More generally, the observation just made raises two related points. First, some economic models 
are not explanatory. We just learnt that at least some of the models in NEG were not in this 
business. This is not a tragedy. I also don’t think this turns economists into idiots savants who 
know nothing else than to show off with their mathematical trickery. Economists here seemed to 
be compromised with a long-term project, in which being able to model the phenomenon in 
question with the tools and methods that were known and acceptable to them was just a first step. 
The Kuhnian idea of normal science that puzzle-solving is about scientists testing their own 
capacity to solve puzzles while taking for granted the theory was here turned on its head. 
Economists were in fact testing the theory. Krugman made a first attempt, with many technical 
concessions, that were later modified to bring more realisticness and acceptability to the theory 
being developed. Once there was convergence and a basic framework was accepted, the next step 
was, according to Ottaviano (2003), to come up with a coherent necessary framework that 
connects the theory with the policy implications of NEG. They attempted to take the models 
literally at their policy implications, in order to start contributing to building the coherent 
‘organisational framework’. 
The point of this paper is rather the opposite: what is needed at this stage is precisely to 
take the models literally and ask what their exact policy implications are. This is a 
necessary preliminary step to provide a model-grounded benchmark for more realistic 
extensions of NEG insights to the policy domain (Ottaviano, 2003, p. 666).  
Above I suggested that the type of relation that arises between two or more models which gives 
rise to a more comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon may be called a relation of 
horizontal complementarity. Analogously, digging deeper into a phenomenon, analysing the 
conditions under which certain result obtains, or attempting a more realistic model for a particular 
phenomenon, is something that makes two or more models vertically complementary. Whereas 
                                               
their understanding of what realisticness is. The point is simply that certain assumptions in the first NEG 
literature were not satisfactory for economists for not adhering to certain standards. (As to the idiosyncratic 
term ‘realisticness’, this has entered the debate due to Uskali Mäki, who wanted to distinguish it from ‘realism’ 
as a philosophical stance.) 
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horizontal complementarity aims at a broader comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon, 
vertical complementarity is more related to the method and the way a phenomenon is modelled. 
This brings me to the second point that arises, which is that in order to understand the epistemic 
import of models, we still need to explore a wider array of economic models. This could help us 
find out how the distinction between vertical and horizontal complementarity helps to make 
assessments of the epistemic import of such models. It would also enable us to assess the epistemic 
import of clusters of models compared to that of individual models and to see whether it is 
possible to assess the individual contribution of models within a cluster. Ylikoski & Aydinonat do 
not distinguish individual models from clusters of models. So it is unclear whether according to 
their analysis it is possible to assess the epistemic contribution of a cluster and, independently, the 
epistemic contribution of a model within a cluster. This is to me a legitimate question to ask. 
Ylikoski & Aydinonat seem to defend the stronger claim that only models as clusters have 
epistemic import. In this regard, I think we first we have to learn more about more models. My 
much weaker claim, then, is that more models have to be analysed in clusters in order to properly 
understand their epistemic contribution.  
5. Many models and understanding  
Given the analysis I have made above, I’d like to suggest that a way to look into the epistemic 
contribution of economic models is to look into a debate that has more or less recently taken some 
force in the philosophy of science, namely the debate on understanding as a notion independent 
from explanation. Ylikoski & Aydinonat (2014) are contributions to this debate. While it is obvious 
that to understand phenomena is what we’re after—rather than simply produce neat, scientific 
explanations for the sake of it—the notion of understanding had been largely dismissed in the 
philosophy of science because of its evident subjective aspect. Some philosophers have gotten 
interest in this divide and have brought enlightening perspectives to the debate that are worth 
exploring, particularly if one favours a descriptively accurate philosophy of science. In this section 
I discuss Catherine Elgin’s defence of a broad conception of understanding in which both factive 
and non-factive notions are simply part of a continuum of what understanding is. It seems to me 
that such a view of understanding is helpful in the analysis that philosophers of science are 
interested in when it comes to the epistemic contribution of economic (and other social sciences) 
models.  
Elgin (2007) has attempted to develop a more comprehensive conception of understanding than 
one that regards it only as factive. That is, one that can only obtain if based on facts, or truths. She 
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thinks that this view is too restrictive for scientific practice, in the sense that it states that we only 
have understanding when the propositions that express it are true. This restrictive notion does not 
reflect current scientific practice because in science we ascribe understanding to certain enquiries 
that are not necessarily true. Furthermore, idealisations––she calls them felicitous falsehoods—are 
ubiquitous in science and therefore, strictly speaking, scientific understanding of phenomena is 
not obtained from true propositions. Her general motivation is that, if epistemology concerns only 
with a factive conception of understanding, then epistemology cannot accommodate scientific 
understanding—at least in its entirety—which, according to her, is necessary, considering that 
science is one of humanity’s greatest cognitive achievements.   
Elgin defends a conception of understanding as “a grasp of a comprehensive body of information 
that is grounded in fact, is duly responsive to evidence, and enables non-trivial inference, argument, 
and perhaps action regarding that subject the information pertains to” (2007, p. 39). I’ll highlight 
two points about this conception. First, the unit of understanding, or the “primary bearer of 
understanding’s epistemic entitlement” is a body of information and not individual propositions. 
It is thus not about ‘merely’ knowing a single proposition or a bunch of them. It involves being 
able to reason with them, making inferences, or, more generally, using this body of information. 
It also involves that not all the propositions that comprise the body of information need to be 
true. One can understand a subject, say the last 50 years of armed conflict in Colombia, while 
entertaining some propositions about it that are strictly false.  
Second, her conception of understanding admits of degrees. Elgin argues that there are three 
dimensions that are shared with a factive account along which degrees are admitted, namely breath, 
depth and significance. Breadth states that a person may have a greater degree of understanding 
of say, the armed conflict in Colombia than another if this body of information is embedded in a 
greater context of Colombian history––e.g. if the former knows about the colonisation processes 
in the different regions that took place after the Spanish colonisation and the implications this had 
for how land was distributed7.  Depth states that the propositions that comprise the body are more 
tightly connected, that is, the body has more propositions or there are more relations among 
propositions. In the case of the armed conflict in Colombia this could amount to propositions 
about time periods of the colonisation processes or whether certain land was distributed according 
to institutions imposed by the Spaniards such as the encomienda. Finally, significance has to do with 
whether a particular proposition or subset of propositions is given more importance than others 
given their significance in the matter—e.g. understanding the significance of “Operación 
                                               
7 As with many civil wars, the Colombian war has roots in land property and distribution.  
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Marquetalia”––a Military Operation that caused a peasant uprising in 1964, which is marked as the 
origin of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), one of the guerrillas involved in 
the current armed conflict.  
Besides these three dimensions, there is another one that a factive account of understanding 
cannot accommodate, according to Elgin (2007). This is one in which a body of information from 
which understanding is derived is strictly false—a person has false beliefs—but these are somehow 
closer to beliefs that are closer to the truth. Here Elgin (2007) gives the example of a second grader 
who believes that humans are descendants of apes; a strictly-speaking false belief, but that, as an 
understanding of human evolution is closer to the truth, and thus cognitively better, than someone 
who denies evolution altogether. Of course, the crux of the matter is how to distinguish those 
false-but-cognitively-better beliefs from others that aren’t cognitively or epistemically better in any 
way. Elgin (2007) doesn’t go as far, but her general point is still important and relevant: early steps 
in a sequence from false beliefs to beliefs that may be true should fall within the ambit of 
epistemology, just because they are often cognitively valuable. An analogous case in economics is 
probably Jevons’s rather crazy belief that business cycles were caused by cycles associated to 
sunspots, but closer to the truth than the belief entertained by scholars before him that cycles 
weren’t actually cycles but caused by completely exceptional events like war (Morgan, 1990, 
Chapter 1). Although misguided in considering sunspots as the cause of business cycles, Jevons 
was closer to the truth in his understanding of fluctuations in economic activity than scholars 
before him.  
How does all this relate to the point of this paper? How does Elgin’s treatment relate to analysing 
models as clusters rather than as single units? Insofar as understanding admits of degrees and 
stretches from a continuum of say, “very little but in the right direction” to greater extents of 
understanding, to judge whether a model provides understanding, it is more helpful to judge it in 
relative terms. A model analysed in isolation can’t tell us much more about a phenomenon than 
the inferences we’re able to make in relation to how well it represents its target.. Instead, if a model 
and its context are considered, and the model under consideration is judged relative to previous 
or similar models, a more comprehensive notion of understanding is likely to emerge. We are able 
to tell how many more inferences we can make in comparison to our understanding without the 
model. In the NEG case, Krugman’s model and its features can be thought of as being benchmarks 
that allow other models to expand horizontally or vertically. The former allow for a more 
comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon, whereas the latter allow for more 
comprehensive understanding or refinement of the tools. 
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Moreover, it is possible to grasp not only the epistemic contribution of the cluster of models, say 
how much we understand a phenomenon in general, but also how each individual model 
contributes to that general understanding. So, with an analysis of clusters of models, a question 
like “What is the epistemic contribution of this particular model?” can be answered. Such question 
is likely more relevant for the practice than the question of what the epistemic contribution of 
models in general is.  
Naturally, it all hinges on how the understanding of the model is related or can be extrapolated to 
the world, which is what we’re ultimately interested in. This is obviously an empirical question that 
can be answered only on a case by case basis. But understanding the relations that exist between 
models, which includes those with their empirical counterparts, is certainly a way to assess the 
relevance of theoretical models. This is, in fact, explicit in Ottaviano’s claim above that once a 
certain theoretical framework was more or less consolidated, it was time for NEG to start 
consolidating a framework useful for the empirical questions that include policy. These are most 
likely the ones that warrant confidence in determining whether understanding derived from a 
theoretical model is indeed understanding, grounded on fact, and duly responsive to evidence. 
Conclusion 
In this paper I argue that the extant accounts of economic theoretical models have focussed mostly 
on the analysis of what a single model can contribute epistemically, ignoring relations between 
models that may prove useful in such analysis. Two characterisations of models in the literature 
are exceptions, recognising that models are neither built nor used in isolation and thus analysing 
the epistemic import of clusters. The first one, by Kuorikoski et al. (2010, 2012) characterises 
modelling as derivational robustness analysis. The idea here is that such a practice makes more 
reliable the inferences that are made about a causal mechanism by arriving at the same result with 
different model specifications. Using their own example, namely a cluster of models in New 
Geographical Economics, I show that models in such a cluster had different purposes than to just 
confirm the robustness of a causal mechanism. The second view is one developed by Ylikoski & 
Aydinonat (2014), in which they defend the view that models as clusters alone have epistemic 
import, and specifically defend the epistemic import of Schelling’s models of segregation. Here I 
argue that, by their account, there is no way to identify an explanatory cluster from a non-
explanatory one. It all seems to rest on choosing the ‘right’ cluster. There’s also not a way to tell 
whether individual models contribute within the cluster. I thus suggest that until we have 
investigated more economic models, we’re unlikely to find out what their epistemic import is. 
Finally, I use an account of understanding developed in the literature on epistemology to briefly 
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suggest how the analysis of models as clusters may elucidate the actual contribution of models. 
This is offered merely as a suggestion and does not pretend to close the debate. To the contrary, 
the primary aim is to open it by offering an alternative avenue worth exploring. 
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Epistemic Contributions of Models: Conditions for 
Propositional Learning1 
Introduction 
Models are powerful tools that can make us learn. Few contemporary observers of science doubt 
that and economists agree; the highest honours of their discipline go to the most influential model 
builders. Among a long list of modellers who are Nobel laureates, we count Peter A. Diamond, 
Dale T. Mortensen and Christopher A. Pissarides, who were awarded the prize in 2010 as a 
recognition of their work in developing a model of the labour market—the DMP model.2 
While researchers agree that models make significant epistemic contributions in science, judging 
whether a specific model made us learn is no easy matter. The recent literature on models, though 
rich in insights, is not as helpful as one might hope in dealing with this issue. Much energy has 
been spent arguing that models can be highly useful and there are today lists of what they can do 
(e.g., Morgan and Knuuttila 2012, p. 73). Unfortunately, these lists give us little handle when it 
comes to analysing claims about whether we have learnt from a specific model and in what sense.  
The main goal of this article is to help with such analysis. In particular, we highlight three epistemic 
roles that models can play in our learning about the world. In addition, we provide conditions that 
are sufficient for each role to be actually played by a given model. A secondary contribution of our 
paper is to connect more tightly the discussion on 'learning from models' to general epistemology. 
We connect the two by using the traditional account of propositional knowledge to analyse how 
models can help us learn about the world. Our explicit epistemological perspective allows us to 
structure the relationship among our three epistemic roles and to articulate how learning from 
models fits into a more general picture of knowledge acquisition.3  
The scope of our project must be properly delimited. We do not claim that the three roles 
identified are the only ones models might play. We are also not the first to try to supply conditions 
for learning from a model. For instance, the proposals by Alexandrova (2008), that models supply 
open formulae and Grüne-Yanoff (2009), that they falsify impossibility hypotheses, can be 
understood in terms of attempting to provide sufficient conditions. Yet, the present article goes 
                                                        
1 With François Claveau. Both authors have contributed evenly to the chapter. 
2 DMP stands for the initials of the three modellers. 
3 By using an epistemological concept of learning, we are not suggesting that other perspectives—
e.g., cognitive—are not fruitful or important. 
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beyond these contributions by identifying conditions for a number of epistemic roles and by 
articulating these conditions with the help of the traditional account of propositional knowledge.  
Our general account of learning is presented in the next section. We then discuss our three 
epistemic roles. Finally, we present a case study of the DMP model, which is meant to illustrate 
how our conditions can help in structuring a fruitful debate over the epistemic contributions of a 
given model. 
1. On learning 
To be able to characterise precisely potential epistemic contributions of models, we need to be 
clear on what we take learning to be. For the purpose of this paper, we propose to take learning 
to be the process of “coming to know” (Audi 2011, p. 162), and to rely on the traditional account 
of knowledge as true justified belief. According to this account, which is about knowledge of 
propositions, an agent knows a proposition if and only if three conditions hold: (i) the proposition 
is true, (ii) the agent believes the proposition, and (iii) the agent has an appropriate justification for 
this belief.4  
Propositional knowledge is only one type of knowledge, which excludes other types of knowledge 
such as knowledge-how (see Fantl 2012). This restricted focus of ours might be a significant 
omission when we think about models since it is very likely that models contribute to know-how 
besides contributing to know-that (i.e. propositional knowledge). For instance, through exercising 
with models, one might develop abilities to better react to various real-world happenings much in 
the same way an aircraft pilot develops intuitions and reflexes in a flight simulator. Although we 
recognise that a significant amount of learning can be related to knowledge-how, we think that 
providing explicit conditions for learning in terms of propositional knowledge is already a 
significant contribution, to which we limit ourselves here. 
The traditional account of knowledge as true justified belief (KATJB) is not without its faults. 
Since Edmund Gettier's famous article (Gettier 1963), it is largely granted that the three conditions 
stated above, though apparently necessary, are not fully sufficient for knowing a proposition. Once 
the general structure of Gettier's counterexamples is understood, it is easy to produce thought 
                                                        
4 Some terms in this definition of knowledge—foremost ‘truth’ and ‘justification’—could be given 
a variety of interpretations. We do not need to commit to specific interpretations for the purpose of 
this paper. For the major contending theories of truth and justification see entries in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (e.g., Glanzberg 2013; Ichikawa and Steup 2012) and readers like 
Bernecker and Dretske (2000) and Bernecker and Pritchard (2011). 
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experiments in which a true justified belief can intuitively not count as knowledge (Zagzebski 
1994). Although this implies that there could be cases that our account would regard as involving 
learning—acquiring knowledge—when in fact knowledge is not acquired, Gettier cases are scarce. 
By their very nature, Gettier cases can amount to only a small proportion of the elements in the 
set of all true justified beliefs (Hetherington 2011, p. 121). Since our goal is not to provide a 
definition of knowledge, an account that reliably, but fallibly, distinguishes between knowledge 
and non-knowledge is satisfactory. 
There are good reasons to stick to KATJB in this article despite its drawback. First, the account 
focusses on what epistemologists still believe to be the concepts most tightly connected to 
propositional knowledge: truth, belief and justification. In fact, most of the recent accounts of 
propositional knowledge try to modify KATJB just enough to avoid Gettier cases (Hetherington 
2011; Ichikawa and Steup 2012). Second, KATJB is simpler than most other accounts, since others 
include other elements such as infallibility or the elimination of luck as attempts to shield against 
Gettier cases. And third, none of the alternative accounts are free of problems; they all seem to 
fail to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. There is simply no account that 
perfectly distinguishes knowing from not knowing. 
What is clear, however, is that knowing is a state of an agent: at a certain point in time, an agent 
knows or not a proposition. By contrast, learning is a process of passing from a state of not 
knowing a proposition to the state of knowing it—it is coming to know. Thus, we characterise a 
process as learning if an agent starts the process lacking belief or justification (or both) in a true 
proposition, and ends it with both belief and justification in the proposition.5 Before turning to 
models, we want to discuss the possible instances of learning implicit in the previous statement.  
Learning can involve the process of ‘coming to believe a true proposition’. We want to distinguish 
between two possible ways in which this process of belief generation occurs. First, the agent can 
change her mind—change her doxastic attitude—with respect to this proposition. In this case, the 
agent starts the process either disbelieving the proposition or withholding judgment with respect 
                                                        
5 In our account, the process of learning ends with knowledge. Some might want to work with a 
more permissive account for which learning is 'coming closer to know' instead of 'coming to know'. 
The concept of 'closeness' on which this alternative account relies is however difficult to pin down. 
It leads to difficult questions: Are we learning if we come to be justified in believing a false 
proposition? What if we come to believe a true proposition for entirely crazy reasons? Though we 
do not try to develop such a weaker account in this article, it might be possible to do so 
successfully; we therefore present our account as supplying only jointly sufficient (but perhaps not 
jointly necessary) conditions for learning. 
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to it and finishes the process believing it.6 Second, the agent might start the process without even 
having a doxastic attitude for the proposition. Indeed, an agent holds, at any point in time, doxastic 
attitudes for only a tiny fraction of all the possible propositions she could envisage. In the 18th 
century, no one had a doxastic attitude for the value of Planck's constant. The process of coming 
to believe a true proposition can thus involve forming a doxastic attitude rather than simply 
changing it. 
In addition to, or instead of, coming to believe, learning can occur through the process of ‘coming 
to be justified to believe a proposition’. The concept of justification relies on the distinction between 
adequate and inadequate evidence: an agent comes to be justified to hold a certain doxastic attitude 
if and only if her evidence for this attitude crosses the threshold for adequacy. Evidence for a 
proposition suggests that the proposition is true; if the evidence is adequate, truth is indicated 
reliably. But even adequate evidence is fallible; truth and justification should not be conflated. 
It is helpful to think about epistemic justification in terms of a network of doxastic attitudes for 
propositions connected to each other. Propositions can stand in an evidential relation to each 
other—believing one proposition warrants, to some degree, believing another. Since Paula believes 
that ‘the clock indicates 14.00 local time’, she feels confident that ‘it is not night’. If we locate the 
doxastic attitude for the proposition ‘it is not night’ at the centre of our network, Paula's belief 
that ‘the clock indicates 14.00’ will be connected to this central node, together with many other 
doxastic attitudes.  
The set of doxastic attitudes having an evidential relation with the doxastic attitude at the centre 
of the network constitutes the evidence for this attitude. This evidence will be adequate or 
inadequate depending on properties of the network such as its evidential density. This property 
summarises the number of doxastic attitudes connected to the central attitude. The density of 
Paula's network centred at the belief in the proposition ‘it is not night’ would be higher if, on top 
of believing ‘the clock indicates 14.00 local time’, she also had a doxastic attitude for ‘the sun is 
shining through the window’. 
To sum up, we take learning to be about ‘coming to hold a justified belief for a true proposition’. 
Learning y means that, at the start of the process, the agent does not know the proposition. 
Depending on what the agent is missing—belief or justification—learning involves either ‘coming 
to believe’ or ‘coming to be justified in believing’ (or both). In any case, the process ends with the 
                                                        
6 Here we conceptualise doxastic attitudes in a trichotomous framework: disbelief, withhold 
judgment and belief, but it could also be rephrased in terms of, say, ‘degree of belief’. 
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three conditions for knowledge being met: truth, belief and justification. In the rest of this paper, 
this account will be used to answer the following question: How can models make us learn? 
2. Learning with models 
Something that can be easily granted for most models is that by constructing and manipulating a 
model, an agent learns propositions about the model that she works with. We call these ‘model 
propositions’. Morgan (2012) refers to this learning as ‘enquiring into the model’.  
Two conditions must hold for it to be the case that an agent has learnt with the model about this 
same model. First, the agent must be in the proper end state: there must be some true model 
proposition that the agent justifiably believes. In other words, the agent must, at the end point, 
know this proposition. Second, the agent's knowledge must have been acquired thanks to the 
modelling exercise. In particular, there are two relevant counterfactual dependencies: either the 
agent would not have believed the proposition had it not been for the activity of generating the 
model, or she would not have been justified in believing the proposition (or both). 
A model must thus make the agent believe the proposition, or make the agent be justified in 
believing the proposition, or both. How does a model make an agent believe a proposition? 
Modelling arguably generates beliefs in the two ways discussed in the previous section. Toying 
with a model makes the agent form doxastic attitudes for many model propositions that were not 
even on her radar before. That is, prior to the modelling exercise, the agent plausibly possessed 
doxastic attitudes just for a few model propositions—based on intuitions or theoretical 
considerations. Likewise, modelling might also lead the agent to revise previously-held doxastic 
attitudes with respect to some model propositions.  
Regarding justification, the manipulation of a model typically provides justification for its model 
propositions. For instance, the fact that Arrow and Debreu (1954) derived the existence of an 
equilibrium in their general equilibrium model looks like adequate evidence for their belief that ‘an 
equilibrium exists in this model’. It is also plausible to say that they did not have adequate evidence 
for their belief in this proposition prior to their derivation since the effort put in the derivation 
would make little sense otherwise. Note that this derivation and the belief that Arrow and Debreu 
are competent modellers are solid grounds for observers like us to grant one aspect of the end-
state condition: this model proposition must be true. In short, in cases like the general equilibrium 
model of Arrow and Debreu, it seems implausible to deny that a model contributes to learning 
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about itself in that agents come to believe and come to be justified in believing true propositions 
about it.  
Granting that models make us learn about themselves is obviously not granting much. Now we 
turn to how the agent's learning about a model can be a stepping-stone to learn about other target 
systems, especially phenomena in the real world.  
2.1. Evidential role: the model contributing to justification 
We start with what is perhaps the most contentious—and most discussed—potential epistemic 
contribution of models. Roughly, the idea of the evidential role is that model propositions, by 
contributing to justify real-world propositions, can contribute to learning about the world.  
To begin, let us take the following real-world proposition: ‘Low employment protection is a cause 
of the low unemployment rate in the USA’. At a certain point in time, an agent might lack 
justification—might have inadequate evidence—to believe this proposition and consequently 
develop strategies to increase the strength of her evidential network. The agent might, for example, 
investigate whether countries with more employment protection typically have higher 
unemployment rates. By doing similar empirical research, she will increase the chance of being 
justified in holding her doxastic attitude for the initial proposition. 
The question at issue when it comes to discussing the plausibility of an evidential role for models 
is whether model propositions can have the same function of strengthening one's evidential network 
for a real-world proposition. There are three conditions that must hold jointly for a model to play 
an evidential role. First, an end-state condition: there is a true real-world proposition p that the 
agent justifiably believes. Second, there is at least one model proposition q that is part of the agent’s 
evidential network for p. Finally, if the agent did not have the doxastic attitude she has for q, she 
would not be justified in believing q. In other words, at least one model proposition makes a 
difference to knowledge: given the context, the doxastic attitude for model proposition q is 
necessary for justification.7 This condition is meant to rule out situations in which the evidence is 
already adequate to justify the belief in p. In such situations, even if it were granted that a model 
                                                        
7 In contrast to the counterfactual dependence involved in learning about a model (see above) and 
to most of the ones discussed for the other roles below, the counterfactual dependence here is not 
causal, but rather “logical” or “analytical” (Kim 1973, p.	570). At the end state, the doxastic attitude 
for the model proposition is necessary for the evidence to believe p to pass the threshold for 
adequacy. When counterfactual dependence is causal, assessing it requires going back in the 
causal process resulting in knowledge to judge whether this process (and its end state) have been 
causally dependent on the model. 
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proposition is part of the evidence for p—the second condition—there would not be an epistemic 
contribution since the model proposition would be redundant for justification.  
Whether and how often the second condition holds for economic models is the most contentious 
issue in the discussion of the evidential role in the literature. An influential view is that some 
propositions known to be true of the model are evidence for real-world propositions if, and only 
if, the model appropriately isolates the key features of the real-world system (e.g., Cartwright 1989; 
Mäki 2009). This view, however, leads some scholars to a sceptical conclusion (e.g. Reiss 2008; 
Alexandrova 2008): it seems that many specific assumptions are built in economic models that are 
doing more than cleanly isolating the ‘key features’.  
Nevertheless, it can be argued that there are ways to avoid the conclusion that propositions about 
economic models are never part of the evidential network for real-world propositions. To start 
with, a model can indicate the falsity of particular types of real-world hypotheses—e.g., claims that 
something can never be the case—even though the model does not cleanly isolate key features of 
the real-world (Grüne-Yanoff 2009).  
More generally, asking for a clean isolation of the target's key features appears too severe when we 
think of models as experiments in analogy to the experiments that we perform on one part of the 
world in order to learn about another part of it. For instance, we routinely test drugs on mice to 
assess their potential toxicity for humans. We run these experiments because we think that their 
results are evidentially relevant to our doxastic attitudes for claims about drug toxicity for humans. 
This source of evidence is far from perfectly reliable—a lethal drug for mice might be beneficial 
for humans and vice versa—which comes from the fact that mice do not share all the 'key features' 
of a human organism. But it can hardly be denied that propositions about these experiments are 
often part of the evidential network of propositions about humans. The same might hold for 
models as credible worlds (Sugden 2000). Model economies are unlike real economies in many 
respects, much like mice are unlike humans. But the similarities shared by the two economies 
might be enough for model propositions to be counted as part of the evidence for real-world 
propositions. 
We will not provide here a general, philosophical account of what it is for a model to be similar to 
a real economy, similar in the right way such that model propositions can become part of the 
evidential network for real-world propositions. Yet, the conditions provided in this subsection can 
help in structuring an argument to the effect that a specific model played, or not, an evidential role. 
This usefulness of our framework is illustrated below in our case study of the DMP model. Our 
illustration will also show, however, that these arguments are typically hard to uphold. 
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2.2. Revealing role: the model as hypothesis generator 
We now turn to a potential epistemic contribution of models that is less discussed and sometimes 
simply referred to as a heuristic contribution. As we said above, one arguably learns about the 
properties of the model by constructing and manipulating it. In consequence, one comes to have 
justified beliefs in a host of true model propositions. One way by which this initial process can 
contribute to real-world learning is when some proposition about the model is transposed as a 
proposition about the world—that is, as a hypothesis about a target system of interest—and that 
the agent, in the end, comes to know this proposition. We would say in such a situation that the 
agent comes to form a doxastic attitude for the real-world hypothesis because of the model.  
There are also three conditions to be met by a model to play this role. First, the end state condition: 
real-world proposition p is true and the agent justifiably believes it. The second condition is that 
there must be a conceptual connection between the model proposition q and p. More specifically, 
propositions q and p predicate the same, or sufficiently similar, properties to their respective 
systems of interest. For instance, q could say that employment protection is a positive cause of the 
unemployment rate for model M, and p could say that the USA is such that employment protection 
and the unemployment rate are similarly causally related. We do not want to be overly restrictive 
on the conceptual connection required since some amount of interpretation is always necessary in 
order to take a property in a model to be sufficiently similar to a real-world property. It should 
however be clear that not any interpretation will do—e.g., propositions true of Bohr’s model of 
the atom cannot legitimately be interpreted as sufficiently close to hypotheses about whether 
Bashar al-Assad will still be the president of Syria in 2015. 
The final condition states a specific counterfactual dependence: if the agent had not known q, she 
would not have formed a doxastic attitude for p. In other words, if the agent had already an 
epistemic attitude with respect to the real-world hypothesis or if this real-world hypothesis was 
bound to be considered because of other developments—a case of overdetermination—then the 
model would not be making an epistemic contribution. 
Is there a link between the conceptual exploration discussed in many commentaries on models 
(e.g., Hausman 1992, p. 79; Nersessian 2008; Morgan 2012, pp. 270-72, 368-72) and this revealing 
role? It is to be expected that many of the hypotheses revealed by a model come up through the 
creation, exploration and clarification of some concepts through modelling.8 After all, models are 
                                                        
8 As we stated above, here we restrict ourselves to propositional learning from models and say only 
little about other potential types of learning from models. We already noted the favourable 
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widely recognised for their role in creating, exploring and clarifying concepts. For instance, the 
advent of game theory brought many concepts to the forefront, one example being the distinction 
between incomplete and imperfect information or, more famously, a situation having the structure 
of a prisoner's dilemma. However, there is no necessity in the connection between conceptual 
exploration and the revealing role; it might well be that some hypotheses are revealed by further 
manipulation of a model using well-established categories.  
2.3. Stimulating role: the model as stimulus for empirical research 
Models can suggest more than hypotheses; they can also suggest ways to increase the density of 
the evidential network for real-world hypotheses that the agent cares about. In other words, 
models can stimulate empirical research. This possibility forms the core of the last potential 
epistemic role we want to emphasise.  
Part of the purpose of doing empirical research is to come to form doxastic attitudes for more 
real-world propositions (e.g., experimental results) that are evidentially related to propositions that 
the agent cares about. Models can help increase the density of one's evidential network because 
the propositions to investigate in order to justify one's doxastic attitude for a hypothesis are not 
always evident. By toying with the model, researchers can come to realise that some empirical 
research would be relevant to conduct. The role of the model here is thus to stimulate pursuing 
novel empirical research.  
Again, three conditions need to be satisfied by a model to fulfil this role. First, the end state 
condition: a real-world proposition p is true and the agent justifiably believes it. Second, there is 
another real-world proposition r for which the agent has a doxastic attitude, but the research that 
generated the agent's doxastic attitude for r would not have been pursued had it not been for the 
modelling exercise. In other words, the model has a causal influence on the generation of a doxastic 
attitude for r and it has this influence through stimulating research. 
Finally, a third condition requires that the doxastic attitude for r is a non-redundant element of the 
evidential network for p: if it were not for the doxastic attitude for r, the agent would not be 
justified in believing p. The evidential network would not reach the threshold for adequacy if the 
agent did not entertain this attitude.  
                                                        
prospects of an account also looking at procedural learning (i.e. resulting in know-how). A full 
epistemological account will also include conceptual learning—the introduction of vocabulary, see 
Audi (2011, p.	162-163). 
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Like for the revealing role, the stimulating role is tightly linked to conceptual exploration, although 
we should not see conceptual novelty as being necessary to the revealing role. The link is tight 
because what makes modelling a particularly effective activity at coming up with new ways to 
investigate target systems is, perhaps, that modelling makes us conceptualise the world differently.  
3. An illustration with the DMP model 
The previous section discussed potential epistemic roles of models. Now we turn to looking at 
different claims made in the literature regarding the epistemic contributions of the DMP model. 
The main goal of this section is to illustrate that our epistemic roles neatly dissect various assertions 
about this model and that they indicate what is required for these assertions to be true. In addition, 
we will argue that the DMP model actually played specific epistemic roles while recognising that 
our arguments, being based on empirical propositions, are disputable.  
The origins of the DMP model go back to the end of the 1960s when many researchers were 
looking for new “microeconomic foundations of employment and inflation theory” (the title of 
Phelps et al. 1970). The core idea embedded in this model is that the labour market is a matching 
system with search frictions. There are frictions because, on the supply side, job seekers are not 
instantaneously informed about all the job offers and their associated advantages and, on the 
demand side, potential employers have no direct access to all job seekers and their wage 
expectations. A match between a job seeker and an employer takes time since they must find each 
other. When a match occurs, each side has some bargaining power since it would be costly for the 
other side to break the match and go back to search mode.9 
The best way to see the peculiarity of the DMP model is to contrast it to the main model of the 
labour market predating it. This earlier model—still taught in introductory labour economics—
depicts the labour market as a standard neoclassical market with price-taking demand (i.e. firms) 
and supply (i.e. potential workers). The two sides of the market are summarised—as usual—in a 
downward-sloping demand and an upward-sloping supply. The quantity of labour actually used 
and the associated wage rate (if nothing interferes) is taken to be the intersection of these two 
curves—the competitive equilibrium. In this model, ‘unemployment’ is interpreted as being caused 
by factors forcing the wage rate to be higher than the equilibrium wage rate, thus implying an over-
supply of labour at the given wage. In contrast with the DMP model, there is no idea of time 
                                                        
9 For a book-length exposition of the model, see Pissarides (2000); for shorter presentations, see 
Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004, pp.	517-536) and Nobelprize.org (2010a, pp.	12-20). 
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necessary for a match to occur, and there is no idea of wage bargaining between the two sides of 
a match. 
3.1. Evidential role  
Many economists interpret the DMP model as providing evidence for real-world claims. For 
example, the press release accompanying the announcement of the 2010 Prize in Economic 
Sciences stated that: 
The Laureates' models help us understand the ways in which unemployment, job 
vacancies, and wages are affected by regulation and economic policy. [...] One conclusion 
is that more generous unemployment benefits give rise to higher unemployment[.] 
(Nobelprize.org, 2010b) 
This claim can plausibly be interpreted as asserting that the DMP model played an evidential role 
with respect to the real-world proposition: ‘In real economies, more generous unemployment 
benefits give rise to higher unemployment’ (henceforth ‘p’). 
Did the DMP model play an evidential role with respect to p? In other words, are the conditions 
presented in the previous section met? Regarding the end-state condition, there are reasons to 
grant that it is met: first, the vast majority of economists believe the real-world proposition p; second, 
a rich literature using different methods and data seems to provide adequate evidence to justify this 
belief (for surveys, see Fredriksson and Holmlund 2006; Boeri and van Ours 2008, ch. 11); third, 
since justification reliably—yet fallibly—indicates the truth value of a proposition, p is likely to be 
true. 
There are also some reasons to grant that at least one proposition about the DMP model is part 
of the evidential network for p (the second condition of the evidential role). In this case, the most 
plausible proposition q is ‘In the DMP model, more generous unemployment benefits give rise to 
higher unemployment’, which is indeed a known property of the model. Among economists, the 
argument for the view that q is part of the evidential network for believing p includes claims about 
the realisticness of the model10 and, most importantly, about the fact that many results of the DMP 
model concord with results independently obtained with empirical methods (i.e. a claim about the 
degree of output validation of the model). Since the model seems to track the world so well on 
many aspects, we can, the argument goes, take truths about it as belonging to the evidential 
                                                        
10 For instance, Pissarides says in his Nobel lecture: “To me, search theory was appealing as a 
foundation for a theory of unemployment because it appeared realistic.” (Nobelprize.org, 2010c) 
See also Blanchard 2007, pp.	413-14. 
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network for real-world propositions like p. Note that this argument does not imply the dubious 
claim that one would be justified in believing p on the sole ground of knowing q. In the present 
case, q is one element among many more propositions in the evidential network for p. Other 
important propositions are concordant results from statistical analyses of various types that do not 
rely on the DMP model (see Claveau 2011). 
Finally, there is a compelling reason for why the justification of p counterfactually depends on 
knowing q (the last condition). This model proposition is a novel model result in the sense that, 
perhaps surprisingly, the model of the previous generation (the standard supply and demand 
model, see above) did not have the conceptual resources to produce a relationship between 
unemployment benefits and unemployment.11 Since the DMP model has these conceptual 
resources, it would be pretty devastating if there was no way to produce a positive relationship 
between benefits and unemployment in the various versions of the model. This incapacity could 
indicate that the statistical results are all artefacts. By contrast, knowing q helps support the belief 
that the empirical results pointing to a causal link from benefits to unemployment are not all 
spurious.  
Although we side with most economists here in believing that the DMP model played an evidential 
role with respect to this specific p, we readily note that there is room for objections. It could be 
argued that the end-state condition is not met because, for instance, the evidential network for p 
is more sparse and incongruent than we are ready to admit (cf. Howell 2005). One might also 
wonder why q should be taken as even a mildly reliable guide to the truth-value of p given that 
some elements and results of the DMP model are quite unlike the world.12 Finally, the ones reacting 
against the centrality of the modelling culture in economics (e.g., Lawson 1997) might reply that q 
is redundant, that we have no need of a model proposition in the evidential network for p. We 
think that these objections can be satisfactorily answered, but these answers would require 
developments unnecessary for the purpose of this paper.  
                                                        
11 The closest proposition to q one could get in this earlier model is: ‘In this model, higher 
unemployment benefits decrease employment.’ Indeed, generous unemployment benefits were 
modelled as decreasing the labour supplied at any wage; thus decreasing equilibrium employment, 
not increasing unemployment. See Boeri and van Ours 2008, pp.	230-34. 
12 For instance, even proponents of the model take its depiction of bargaining as being “a very poor 
description of reality” (Blanchard 2007, p.	414) and recognise that it does not manage to replicate 
even something as central as the cyclical fluctuations in unemployment (Nobelprize.org 2010a, 
p.	23; Shimer 2005). 
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3.2. Revealing role  
The DMP model has been praised for being a great platform to think about the labour market. 
For instance, Olivier Blanchard (2006, p. 26), current chief economist of the International 
Monetary Fund, wrote that, compared to the earlier model, the DMP model is a “richer framework 
to think about unemployment, a framework based on flows, matching and bargaining.” Blanchard 
is here emphasising the possibility of extensive conceptual exploration through the DMP model. The 
concepts brought to the forefront by this model include a clear distinction between flows and 
stocks of workers, matching efficiency, search intensity, and wage bargaining. One way by which 
this conceptual exploration can result in propositional learning about the world is the revealing role.  
There are many new questions that can be investigated inside the DMP model but could not in 
the earlier model: what is the relationship between the stock of unemployed people and the flows 
in and out of unemployment? What determines the speed at which potential workers are matched 
to firms? More specifically, what determines the search intensity of unemployed persons? What 
matters to the bargaining process between firms and their potential employees? For the DMP 
model to play a revealing role, a necessary condition is that some answers to these or similar 
questions with respect to the model be transposed as hypotheses about the real world. 
Take, for example, what economists call the ‘entitlement effect’ of unemployment benefits 
(Mortensen 1977; Boeri and van Ours, 2008, sec. 11.2.2). While discussing the evidential role, we 
said that unemployment benefits are believed by most economists to increase unemployment, but 
Mortensen realised that, in one version of his model, one group of job seekers had shorter spells of 
unemployment when unemployment benefits were higher.13 This group is the one that is not 
covered by the unemployment benefit system, but can expect to be covered during its next 
unemployment spell. Since getting a job also involves a better future as unemployed, this group 
has incentives to find a job faster. 
Once this entitlement effect is shown to exist in the model, economists might entertain a related 
hypothesis about the world: ‘Increasing unemployment benefits in a real country will reduce the 
length of unemployment spells for at least some uncovered job seekers’ (henceforth ‘p’). The DMP 
model seems to have played a revealing role with respect to learning p. 
The second condition for the revealing role—the conceptual connection—should be easy to grant 
in this case. Although the DMP model is highly idealised, we can locate a group of agents in it 
                                                        
13 It is because the entitlement effect is dominated by other effects at the aggregate level that most 
economists believe that, for a whole economy, unemployment benefits increase unemployment.  
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corresponding to the real individuals that are both jobless and unaided by the unemployment 
insurance system. We can also easily associate a property of the model group to the lengths of 
unemployment spells in our real group. The conceptual link between the entitlement effect in the 
DMP model and p is thus hard to question. 
Is the end-state condition fulfilled? Many economists—especially among the ones specialising in 
labour economics—believe p, which claims only the existence of entitlement effects among some job 
seekers. Although few empirical studies have tested the real-world existence of entitlement effects, 
the existing results seem sufficient to justify p.14 And p, given this evidence and given the weak 
requirement for the claim, is likely to be true. 
Can we also grant the last condition that it would not have occurred to economists to believe p 
had it not been for the development of the DMP model? To the best of our knowledge, p was not 
entertained prior to the modelling work of Mortensen (1977) and there is no parallel literature 
today talking about something like p without being aware of Mortensen's work. Though we cannot 
definitively rule out that p was bound to be entertained soon enough independently of the 
development of the DMP model, the available evidence points toward the fulfilment of this last 
condition too. 
3.3. Stimulating role  
A contribution of the DMP model might have been to stimulate empirical research in epistemically 
valuable directions. The Economic Sciences Prize Committee claims that the development of the 
DMP model had this effect. According to this committee, the contribution was twofold. First, the 
model stimulated data collection: 
The early microeconomic models of job search initiated new data collection efforts 
focusing on individual labour market transitions, in particular transitions from 
unemployment to employment (Nobelprize.org 2010a, p. 20). 
 By changing the modelling focus from stocks to flows, the development of the DMP model 
stimulated researchers to request (or, less frequently, actually gather themselves) reliable data on 
flows.  
                                                        
14 For instance, Bennmarker et al. (2007) find evidence of an entitlement effect for men, but not for 
women. 
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Second, the DMP model gave impetus, according to the Prize Committee, to the use and 
refinement of some empirical methods, most importantly duration analysis15: 
The methodological literature on econometric duration analysis has expanded 
substantially over the past couple of decades, a development that is to a large extent 
driven by the growth and impact of microeconomic search theory. (Nobelprize.org 
2010a, p. 23)  
Can we thus say that the DMP model played a stimulating role? Take, for instance, the following 
proposition p: “the [U.S.] private-sector (gross) job creation rate began declining well before the 
2001 recession and continued to slide until the middle of 2003.” (Davis et al. 2006, p. 24) It can 
hardly be doubted that the first and the last conditions hold with respect to p. 
To start with, Davis et al. believe p. They base this belief on the analysis of two data sources: the 
Job Openings and Labour Turnover Survey (JOLTS; see Clark and Hyson 2001) and the Business 
Employment Dynamics (BED) data (Pivetz et al. 2001). The authors put forward two propositions 
in their analysis. First, “[f]igures 2 and 3 [plotting BED data] show a long downward slide in job 
creation rates before, during and well after the 2001 recession.” (p. 12). Second, “[t]he hires rate 
[from the JOLTS] declines from 3.8 per cent of employment in December 2000 to 3.0 per cent in 
April 2003” (p. 13). We denote these two propositions q1 and q2. Note that q1 and q2 are about 
patterns in data, while p is directly about the United States. Propositions q1 and q2 constitute the 
main evidential ground for p. It is thus hard to deny that believing them is a necessary condition for 
being justified to believe p. Furthermore, q1 and q2 seem to be sufficient to justify believing p. In 
particular, the fact that both data sources produce a similar pattern makes it unlikely that this 
pattern is driven by an artefact in the data. Finally, since believing p seems to be justified, we should 
be tempted to grant the truth of p. In short, it is highly plausible to affirm that Davis et al. know p 
(first condition) and that they do so thanks to q1 and q2 (last condition). 
For the DMP model to have played a stimulating role with respect to p, the second condition must 
also hold: if the model had not been developed, would economists be in a position to believe 
evidential propositions like q1 and q2? The opinion relayed by the Prize Committee (see above) is 
that the model is responsible for the collection of new data like the JOLTS and BED data, and 
thus, ultimately, for the beliefs in q1 and q2. We have no substantial reason to reject this opinion—
the data collection and the active development of the methods started after the initial work on the 
                                                        
15 Duration analysis as applied to labour markets empirically studies the length of unemployment 
spells and the factors explaining it. 
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DMP model and the scholars involved in all these developments had significant interactions during 
the period. 
That the DMP model played a stimulating role with respect to learning p might not be granting 
much. This proposition is descriptive and it pertains to a single country for a specific period of 
time. But the stimulating role of the DMP model might become impressive if we can be convinced 
that many other propositions were learnt through this role. These propositions will not be 
necessarily local and descriptive; they could be descriptive generalisations justified by pooling 
national surveys together or they could be causal propositions justified by combining duration 
analysis and natural experiments. We do not have space to explicitly argue for these epistemic 
contributions of the DMP model. We simply note that, if we grant these contributions, the DMP 
model would have stimulated a great deal of learning about real economies.  
The same point holds for the evidential and revealing roles. By focussing on specific propositions, 
we could have given the impression that these contributions amount to little. But the overall 
epistemic contribution of the DMP model would be impressive if convincing arguments using a 
wide array of important real-world propositions could be constructed. 
Conclusions 
A model can make us learn in a variety of ways. This paper discussed several ways by which 
propositional learning can occur with models. Manipulating the model can obviously make us learn 
truths about the model itself. But, more importantly, a model might also contribute in different 
ways to make us learn about the world. We discussed three such ways. First, truths about the model 
might be part of the evidence justifying one's belief in a true real-world proposition—the evidential 
role. Second, truths about the model might reveal real-world hypotheses that turn out to be true 
and justifiable—the revealing role. Third, the model might stimulate researchers to undertake new 
empirical research, the result of which comes to justify beliefs in some true real-world 
propositions—the stimulating role. For each of these roles, we provided and discussed a list of 
conditions. We then used this framework to analyse the praises given to the DMP model. 
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What do Philosophical Theories Say about Model Failure? 
Introduction 
Some models haven’t fared particularly well lately. Their inability to anticipate the financial 
crisis and to come up with policies for treating its consequences has amply been 
documented. Andrew Haldane, the chief economist of the Bank of England, recently 
conceded that the models’ failure to predict the financial crisis as well as the effects of 
Brexit on the British economy was due to exceedingly narrow models not coping with 
irrational behaviour (Inman, 2017). Likewise, in the political domain, the failure to predict 
the election of Donald Trump to the United States’ presidency continues to have 
laypeople, political scientists, and other pundits aghast, in part because otherwise reliable 
models from different sources using different methods all pointed in the same direction. 
How should we understand this situation? How can we judge whether it was models that 
failed and not that, for instance, economists, or some of them, misused their models, as 
(Rodrik, 2015, Chapter 1) suggests is mostly the case in economics? Are there model 
failures that could have been prevented, or from which we can learn to avoid them 
happening again? 
To attempt to answer questions like these, one option is to turn to the extant philosophical 
literature on models. Interest by philosophers in the use of models in science has increased 
significantly in the last couple of decades, generating a vast literature. The main motivation 
for this interest, according to Frigg & Hartmann (2009), is that philosophers have come to 
realise the ubiquitous role that models play in science. They suggest that despite the many 
different kinds of models, there are mainly three types of questions that the literature has 
attempted to answer. First, there is literature on the ontology of models, which addresses 
questions such as what models are and how they relate to theories. Second, there is 
literature on the semantics of modelling, which mainly tries to identify how models relate 
to the things they are models of: their targets. Finally, there is literature on the epistemology 
of models, which addresses questions related to what and how we can learn from models. 
In general, this literature has been nurtured by the ‘mystery’ that models pose, namely that 
models, despite their idealisations and abstractions, can still be used for practical, real world 
purposes. In other words, considering that science is regarded as a successful cognitive 
enterprise, and models are ubiquitous in realising such a success, the main interest of this 
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literature is to understand the success of models: why they are useful. From this point of 
view, the three types of questions or categories in which Frigg & Hartmann (2009) divide 
the literature, can also be interpreted as three different perspectives from which this 
question can be tackled.  
In this chapter I shall explore these categories in order to find out what they can contribute 
to the discussion of model failure. Therefore, understanding the role of models and the 
practice of modelling, as philosophers have attempted to do, should inevitably be able to 
account for this negative aspect of the practice. My aim is therefore to identify criteria in 
the current philosophical accounts of models that may offer an indication of what may 
make model failure more likely. Ideally, this should also offer clues that may allow us to 
prevent future model failure.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In section II, I briefly introduce the context of 
the discussion and offer a working definition of model failure. The next three sections 
discuss each of the branches of the literature introduced above. I begin with a few words 
on the ontology of models in section III. From this discussion, it should be clear why I 
don’t engage with this literature further, given the aims of this chapter. In section IV I then 
discuss the semantics of modelling, focussing on the conditions for scientific 
representation offered by Frigg & Nguyen (2016). I also discuss Weisberg's (2013) attempt 
to cash out his account of modelling using the notion of similarity as the relation that is 
established between model and the world. In section V I move on to a discussion of the 
epistemology of models, focussing on the accounts offered by Aydinonat (2007; Grüne-
Yanoff (2009, 2013); Kuorikoski & Ylikoski (2015) and Ylikoski & Aydinonat (2014). In 
section VI, I raise some possible objections to my (implicit) claim that in this literature we 
should be able to find elements that say something about model failure. The final section 
offers conclusions.  
2. Context and model failure  
Claims of model failure have been quite common recently. Academic economists and 
political scientists, pundits, and policy makers have all been the target of different sorts of 
accusations about the use of faulty models to predict the financial and economic crisis, to 
respond to it and to predict the outcome of political elections, among other things. Surely 
some of these claims are not new. Economics, in particular, has long been characterised 
by a sort of partisanship: there is the orthodoxy on the one hand, and on the other a bunch 
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of marginalised heterodox schools of thought that have offered different conceptual 
and methodological approaches. In turn, these schools have also directed harsh criticism 
against the orthodoxy. Philosophers, for their part, have also offered their share of critique 
of both economics and economists. Famous critiques of economics by philosophers 
include Alex Rosenberg’s (Curtain & Rosenberg, 2013) pungent claim that economics is 
not a science but, at best, a craft1. Recently though, the critiques that have been specifically 
directed at models have become more pressing, partly because of the dramatic 
consequences that events like the crisis had, and because the criticism, at least with respect 
to economics, has come this time not only from those at the margins, but from insiders, 
which include some Nobel laureates such as Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz (Krugman, 
2009; Stiglitz, 2011, 2015).  
One way to address these criticisms is to turn to the literature on models in philosophy. 
Even though models have been used in science for at least a century, the philosophical 
literature about this topic is relatively recent. It has grown to a considerable size only in 
the last couple of decades. During the first half of the twentieth century, when logical 
positivism was at its climax, philosophers tended to think of models as temporary heuristic 
tools, that is, tools for the discovery of new ideas that would eventually turn into proper 
theories. Given that most of them believed in a neat division between the context of 
discovery and the context of justification, models were not thought to be part of the realm 
of concern for philosophers—which at the time was restricted to the context of 
justification. Since the beginning of the 1980s, though, with work such as Nancy 
Cartwright’s How the Laws of Physics Lie (1983), models began to receive much more 
attention2, surpassing other, more traditional topics, in the philosophy of science. 
Theories of scientific representation, for instance, lie at the crossroads of two branches of 
literature in philosophy (Suárez, 2010). One of these branches is “analytical philosophy”, 
which is concerned with understanding the relationship of theory with the world. The 
other branch of the literature is the “philosophy and history of science” with an interest in 
developing “a proper understanding of the practice of modelling in the sciences” (2010, p. 
91). Even though, according to Suárez, the former precedes the latter historically, it is the 
                                               
1 Rosenberg is ambivalent, at best, about his views on economics. In his (1992), he challenges 
the status of economics as a science. In (2009) he concedes that, in part thanks to some   
developments in economics, it may be regarded as a ‘biological’ science. In his (2013) he 
maintains, again, that economics is not a science but a craft. 
2 Hesse (1966) was an exception in its time. 
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latter that has become relatively more important due to the attention that models have 
received in the last years. A growing interest has thus emerged in understanding models, 
the role they play in science, and how exactly it is that they afford their epistemic benefits. 
Hence, turning to the extant philosophical theories of models seems worthwhile if the goal 
is to understand model failure.   
To try to come to grips with the aforementioned criticisms by looking only at the extant 
philosophical accounts of models might come across as naïve. For such an exploration 
seems to presuppose that the critics are right and that the causes of the crisis are exclusively 
related to model failure. Naturally, the situation is much more complex. There was a 
savings glut, mainly coming from China that drove US government bonds’ interest rates 
down and in turn drove investors to search for riskier and higher returns, in the form of 
CDOs. There are also issues related to policy and regulation. To have let Lehman Brothers 
go bankrupt is itself a matter of controversy concerning the effects it had on the real 
economy. And regulatory measures by central bankers established at Basel could have been 
stricter in relation to capital ratios, the definition of capital or the share of a bank’s assets 
that should be liquid (see The Economist (2013)). These are just a handful of all the causes 
that have been discussed—Davies (2010) discusses thirty-eight sets of causes offered––
but enough to suggest that an exclusive look at models is an extremely narrow approach.  
It is thus important to state clearly from the outset the scope and aim of the chapter. 
Without pretending to downplay the significance of other causes, the chapter’s scope is 
the question of potential model failure. The reason is that the chapter’s aim is to explore 
current philosophical accounts of models and not the financial crisis. The financial crisis 
and the subsequent recession are taken as an important motivation to ask the question of 
what philosophical accounts of models have to say about model failure. This means that, 
for my analysis, I suspend judgement about the accuracy of the claims that models caused 
the crisis and simply take for granted that models can fail. It doesn’t mean, however, that 
the question is irrelevant for examining the causes of the crisis. If philosophical accounts 
of models offer insights about model failure in general, for instance by establishing 
whether there are certain conditions that make model failure more likely, these insights can 
illuminate a thorough examination of the crisis that considers the role of models and the 
many other aspects that might have been significant. In short, the chapter takes a rather 
indirect route to the question of what the significance of models in the latest crisis was. It 
enquires about what philosophical accounts of models say of failure, in general.  
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Until now, I have only hinted at what I mean by model failure by alluding to the criticisms 
that have been made of models in economics and political science. Now let me say a little 
bit more about what I have in mind when I ask whether philosophical theories of models 
are able to offer criteria that allow us to identify ‘model failure’.  
A good starting point for thinking about model failure is to ask whether there is a precise 
characterisation of what a modelling exercise consists of, which includes a general idea of 
the things that might go wrong in this procedure. Here I’m thinking along the lines of a 
common understanding of the modelling process and the identification of “typical” 
failures very much in the same way an electrical appliance fails. A dishwasher or an oven, 
have some common failures that are typically acknowledged in the troubleshooting section 
of the user manual. Some failures, such as that the appliance doesn’t turn on, are 
acknowledged in these sections as more common than say, that screws loosen or that the 
springs of buttons break down. The important point here is the fact that common failures 
are identified as vulnerabilities of the appliance. 
 A similar, perhaps less mundane example of what I have in mind is the analysis that is 
carried out to determine the causes of accidents in general, and airplane accidents in 
particular. In the first years of the aviation industry, accidents were likely to be mainly 
caused by mechanical failures. However, since the 1950s, with important improvements in 
aviation technologies and training, this trend has been changing, with at least some form 
of human error accounting for 70 to 80 percent of the accidents (Shappell and Wiegmann, 
1996, cited in  Shappell & Wiegmann (2003). Accident investigations lead to the identified 
causes to be catalogued accordingly, having so far generated an important database that 
allows for the identification of patterns in the causation of accidents. Identification of these 
patterns allows in turn for the design of preventive measures such as the early replacement 
of parts, redesign of an interface or specific training for the crew in human factors. This 
collection and analysis of information has significantly contributed to the decrease in 
accidents in aviation in the last decades, making airplanes one of the safest modes of 
transportation.  
There are two kinds of data collected: technical and human factors. Engineers are more 
successful in cataloguing technical data. There is much less ambiguity about the technical 
causes of an accident, given that it’s easier to detect malfunction in components and parts. 
The human factors, on the other hand, are still an area under development and several 
frameworks of human error have been offered, all with the purpose of capturing the right 
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categories for identifying human-error causes of accidents. Shappell & Wiegmann (2003) 
have identified six frameworks or perspectives from which human error can be analysed. 
For instance, there is the cognitive perspective, which conceptualises the agent’s mind––
e.g. the pilot––as an information processing system. Failures that are commonly detected 
under this framework are information related, such as whether the pilot was able to detect 
changes in the system, and if so, whether on the basis of that information the diagnostic 
made by the pilot was accurate. Failure to detect a change in the system would be regarded 
as information error and failure to diagnose the change accurately would be regarded as 
diagnostic error. Other identified errors are goal error, strategy error, procedure error, and 
action error. Accident analysis under this framework suggests that failures of judgement 
are typically associated with major accidents whereas procedural and execution errors are 
more likely to lead to minor accidents (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003, Chapter 2). Another 
framework is the ergonomic or systems perspective, which starts from the assumption that 
errors occur generally at the interaction between humans, the machines they operate, and 
the environment in which they operate. This kind of analysis has contributed to 
improvements in cockpit layout, for instance. Other perspectives are the behavioural, 
which regards agents and their performance as driven by rewards and punishments; the 
aeromedical, which assumes that errors are symptoms of fatigue or illness; the 
psychosocial, which emphasises errors as coming from failure in human relations and 
communication among teammates; and, finally, the organisational perspective, which 
emphasise failures in the decision making of managers, supervisors, and the organisation 
in general. The current challenge of the aviation industry is to be able to find a unified 
framework that can make use of the advantages of each of these frameworks.  
                 
                
             
               
         
             
           
                
  
      
  
     
 
    
  
      
  
 
It doesnÕ t seem like here are a priori reasons for why this sort of analysis would not be 
feasible for models. To the contrary, if we look at how this has worked in aviation, the 
reduction in airplaneaccidentshasoccurred because there is a thoroughunderstanding of what 
f lying airplanesentails, which includesnot only the technical details of an airplane, but the 
full process includinghuman interaction and organisational arrangements, and the attempt 
to use this understanding for accident prevention. Philosophers claim to be attempting to 
understand the modelling practice, which makes already for half the task. Whether it Õs 
possible to develop this kind of framework for models is a question that can only be 
answered aposteriori.
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There is, however, a difficulty with accepting this kind of analysis as our guiding 
framework. While in aviation there’s an obvious candidate for failure, namely accidents 
(with or without fatalities), in the use of models it is unclear when exactly a model can be 
regarded as having failed. Model failure is therefore not so easily tracked. It is difficult to 
say unequivocally and generally what failure constitutes, considering that there are 
arguably, at least a priori, many ways in which a model might fail. To begin, a model fails 
relative to a specific purpose. Prediction and explanation are two of such purposes. And 
then, it is possible that a (epistemic) purpose such as prediction, has different goals––e.g. 
to evaluate a policy or some financial gain. Another difficulty is that it is not always clear 
what the purpose (and goal) of a specific model is. Furthermore, even if we observe what 
could be taken as an analogous case to the accident, say the financial crisis, there might 
still be many other causes that have nothing to do with models, like I suggested above.  
So how can we identify model failure such that it’s possible to establish what philosophical 
accounts of models have to say about failure? There are four obvious options. The most 
obvious is simply to survey philosophical accounts of models and search for explicit 
treatments of failure. As I mentioned at the outset, however, the accounts so far offered 
have mostly focussed on explaining success. With the exception of Mäki (2017), which will 
be treated in the next chapter, there aren’t philosophical accounts of models that treat 
failure explicitly. A second option is to a priori determine what model failure is and again 
survey the philosophical accounts to determine to what extent they explain failure in the 
specified sense. The problem with this strategy was already mentioned above: models fail 
relative to a specific purpose. It’s thus difficult to see how an a priori general definition of 
failure—that is not as unhelpful as “models fail when they are incapable of fulfilling their 
purposes”—would be able to say anything specific about how and when models fail. A 
more specific definition may leave many instances of failure undetected. A third option is 
to explore models directly in the economic literature, try to determine how they might fail 
and then measure the philosophical accounts against these models. The greatest difficulty 
with this strategy (at least for the purposes of this chapter) is that the number of economic 
models that could be explored would be too limited in order to also make a fair assessment 
of the philosophical literature. A philosophical account could account for certain kinds of 
failure that haven’t been detected in the economic models and vice versa. This wouldn’t 
be an even comparison between philosophical accounts. The last option is to search for a 
sort of proxy or something that helps to identify potential sources of failure. Criticisms, if 
not a proxy for model failure—they could be made for a different reason than the actual 
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failure of models—if well-articulated, might be very helpful in identifying not only those 
models that have failed but why. Even though this reduces the set of economic models to 
explore, the investigation would still require going through all criticisms made of economic 
models, before we can measure these potential sources against the philosophical accounts.  
Being left without any satisfactory strategies to pursue this exercise, I will proceed as 
follows. First, I will simply accept that, for the moment, we can only start with a vague and 
general definition of model failure such as “models fail when they have been properly used 
and are still incapable of fulfilling their purposes”. Surely, “to have been properly used” is 
very vague. But it is trying to exclude the easy cases in which there is intentional 
manipulation of the model with deception and tricks to make it  either fulfil its purpose—
e.g. contrast it with fake empirical data—or make it incapable of fulfilling its purpose––
e.g. a climate change denier who tampers with the model to give non-accurate data about 
global warming.  The second thing I’ll do is go through one of the criticisms voiced with 
respect to the crisis, namely about the failure of models to predict the housing bubble. 
Going through this case might be useful to refine the definition, even if slightly.  
Something to keep in mind, which might be helpful to identify when a model fails, is that 
we seem to regard a model to have failed when there is an expectation that a model is able 
to deliver on its purpose. These expectations––e.g. that the housing market should have 
been predicted––might arise either because this ability to fulfil the purpose has proved to 
be there before, or because there was a claim that this particular achievement was possible. 
The first kind is founded on an inductive inference––say, because bubbles in the housing 
market have been predicted before, so it is expected that it be predicted once again––
whereas the latter is founded on a claim about what a model is meant to do and capable 
of attaining. Either way, an important aspect to understand model failure is to identify why 
the expectation arose in the first place and whether it is legitimate that it arises. This implies 
that any attempt to understand why a model may be considered to have failed inevitably 
requires analysing the antecedents of the model, including the context in which it was 
developed––otherwise, we can’t track how the expectation arose. This seems to be a 
difference with understanding model success: we might be able to prove the success of a 
model by contrasting it with data or with background knowledge without knowing what 
the expectations of the model were. In fact, the success of some models is sometimes 
attributed to their offering of unexpected results, which become new hypotheses about 
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the world (this dissertation, Chapter 3). By contrast, we can’t show a model to have failed 
if we don’t know what was expected of the model in the first place. 
With this in mind, let me now discuss the criticism made about the housing market in the 
US prior to the crisis. The housing market is one of the most significant factors in the run-
up to the crisis for at least two reasons. First, it is a massive market; housing investments 
(residential and non-residential) account for half of all gross private investment, and the 
liabilities of home mortgages are more or less equivalent to two thirds of the US GDP 
(Chambers, Garriga, & Schlagenhauf, 2009). Second, the structured financial instruments 
such as collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), whose trade came to a sudden halt in 2008, 
were backed up by prime and subprime mortgages. One of the underlying forces driving 
the surge in housing demand and of CDOs was the belief that house prices would continue 
to rise, sometimes at incredible rates, as a survey by Case & Shiller (2003) of home owners 
attests. A great deal of the criticisms that have been made of economists about the failure 
to anticipate the financial crisis have included criticisms for failing to notice or 
acknowledge that there was a housing bubble—e.g. Colander et al. (2009); Pettifor (2006). 
Just like in the investigation of the causes of an airplane accident, in which one of the 
purposes is to identify whether there was some kind of human error, in the case of the 
housing bubble we can ask whether economists failed indeed to acknowledge or predict 
the existence of a housing bubble. If so, the question is whether this constitutes failure.  
If economists are now being blamed for failing to recognise that there was a bubble, it is 
not necessarily because they didn’t think about it or did not discuss it. There was, in fact, 
quite some discussion about this issue in the aughts. An analysis by Gerardi, Foote, & 
Willen (2010) of the literature that was being published in the run-up to the crisis about 
whether there was a housing bubble, argues that economists were mostly agnostic about 
the fact, with a few exceptions on both sides of the debate. The agnostics often found 
some signs of a bubble but thought that this evidence was not conclusive to assert that 
this was the case. Those that did take sides on the debate were often relying on evidence 
that corresponded to different methodological choices with respect to how house prices 
are measured relative to fundamentals. For instance, a common way to do it is to use the 
price-rent ratio, which follows the same rationale as equity markets, which uses the price-
dividend ratio. Standard theory states that the price of an asset should be equal to the 
present value of the sum of expected dividends. The dividend of a housing asset is thought 
to be the flow value of shelter, which is roughly equal to the rental price. The housing 
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pessimists, as Gerardi et al. (2010) refer to those who argued there was a housing bubble, 
relied on rising price-rent ratio as evidence for the existence of a bubble. In a seven-year 
period, between 1995 and 2002, the house price index rose by almost 30 percent, whereas 
the rental index rose by 10 percent (Gerardi et al., 2010). The optimists, on the other hand, 
did not dispute that the price-rent ratio had risen more than rents in these years but argued 
that the price-rent ratio as it is calculated is not a good measure to determine whether 
housing prices accurately reflect fundamentals. In particular, Himmelberg, Mayer, & Sinai 
(2005) argue that the correct calculation of the financial return of an owner-occupied 
property is a comparison between the value of living in the property for one year and the 
opportunity cost of that capital. In consequence, they calculate the one-year cost of owning 
a house––the imputed rent––which includes six elements representing both costs and 
offsetting benefits such as tax deductibility on mortgage interests, that can then be 
compared with rental costs3. According to this measurement, there was no housing bubble.  
My purpose with this example is not to suggest that one methodological choice was better 
than the other. Instead, such a debate raises a few questions that are helpful to guide the 
search for the sources of failure and that can ultimately illuminate the identification of 
“weak points” or points along the modelling process where failure is more likely to happen. 
The first thing to note is that there was disagreement among economists with respect to 
whether there was a bubble and, especially, a widespread scepticism. A set of questions 
that emerges is, what is the position that, given the tools and background knowledge 
available, was expected for economists to take? Could we expect economists to accurately 
predict a housing bubble? If we accept that there was a bubble4, does this mean that the 
sceptics and the optimists were wrong? My point here is to question whether it is 
reasonable to expect that economists predict the bubble or whether perhaps scepticism 
was a reasonable position to take given the evidence available at the time. On the answer 
we give to this prior set of questions depends whether we regard the inability to recognise 
the existence of a bubble as a failure.  
Another set of questions is whether we attribute the failure to recognise the existence of a 
bubble to economists’ judgement, to the evidence, or to the models they were using? 
Before we can do that, we need to answer other questions such as the reasons each side 
                                               
3 For details see Gerardi, Foote, & Willen (2010); Himmelberg, Mayer, & Sinai (2005). 
4 Eugene Fama claimed in 2010 that bubbles can’t exist since they can’t be predicted (see 
interview by John Cassidy (2010). 
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had to defend their position. That is, whether the disagreement was ideological, 
methodological or of any other kind. Above, I noted that the disagreement between 
optimists and pessimists was methodological; they had different views about what the right 
way to measure the price of an asset such as housing was. A question that needs to be 
answered here is whether and why the optimists were wrong and what (methodological) 
reasons they had to defend their position. This is important because, even if they were 
wrong about the outcome, they could be right about their methodological choices. The 
same holds for the pessimists: they were right in the outcome, there was a bubble, but not 
necessarily because their methodological choice was the most appropriate. With respect to 
the agnostics, was evidence the only reason for defending this position? Gerardi et al. 
(2010) make a very interesting observation about the practice that suggests that beliefs and 
incentives play a rather important role.  
In their discussion of the literature, Gerardi et al. (2010) point out that the “Fundamental 
Theorem of Asset Pricing”, the basis of modern asset pricing theory, which states that the 
evolution of asset prices is unpredictable, make the reluctance to commit to one of the two 
opposing positions in the housing bubble debate unsurprising. They cite three reasons in 
particular for this. First, with the theorem as a widespread belief, the burden of proof for 
those who claim that assets are under- or overvalued is huge. That is, the theorem is more 
or less the default position and to prove that in a particular case it does not apply requires 
a higher burden of proof than to confirm the validity of the theorem. Second, given the 
importance of expectations for the performance of the economy, economists at policy 
institutions might have shun from commenting and taking a position publicly to avoid self-
fulfilling prophecies. That is, even if they had opinions about the housing bubble, they 
might have kept them to themselves. Finally, they suggest that economists might have 
abstained from taking a position for fear of damaging their reputation. In other words, 
considering that it is generally believed that the fundamental theorem is true, suggesting 
otherwise was a very risky bet, reputation-wise. This suggests that the reasons for being 
sceptical about the conclusiveness of the evidence, at least publicly, are not purely 
epistemic or methodological.  
This case illustrates the complexity of what the assessment of the modelling practice 
involves and the many dimensions that need to be considered for a thorough 
understanding of model failure. More specifically, the previous example brings to the fore 
the need for discussion about how expectations of the performance of models are formed, 
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the role that evidence plays in the judgements economists make and the role of beliefs and 
private incentives of economists and policy makers in the claims they make. Another 
important aspect is how to account for disagreement among the profession with respect 
to an economic phenomenon. This shows that it is not even clear to determine what the 
purposes of a model are. Something like reputation (the attempt to preserve it) might 
determine how evidence is interpreted and thereby the purpose that a model is meant to 
fulfil.  
Given that this seems to complicate the task I have for this chapter much more rather than 
simplify it, the only alternative left to have at least a preliminary answer to what 
philosophical accounts of models say about failure, is to take these philosophical 
contributions for what they are. That is, since these accounts have mostly focussed on 
accounting for model success, in terms of say, representation or explanatoriness, we can 
try to explore whether the criteria that have been offered for success can also be used as 
criteria for failure. Hence, the survey that follows of philosophical accounts of models 
starts from the premiss that, in principle at least, the elements that have been highlighted 
by the literature as explaining the success of models should, at the same time, be able to 
say something about failure, even if failure hasn’t been explicitly addressed.  
3. Extant philosophical theories of models 
As I said above, I will use the characterisation of Frigg & Hartmann of the extant literature 
to guide my exploration of the literature. I will discuss the ontology of models very briefly, 
since this is the branch in which it is less likely that criteria related to model failure is found. 
Still, it is important to briefly discuss what this literature has been mostly concerned with. 
Afterwards I shall continue with the other two branches, namely the semantics and the 
epistemology of modelling.  
3.1. Ontology of models 
Insofar as models are physical, things we can see, touch, and, in general, manipulate, there 
isn’t an ontological conundrum about what they are or about the epistemological 
implications of such kind of object. Properties of the model are easily comparable with its 
target. For instance, in the San Francisco Bay - Delta model, it is relatively easy to 
distinguish in which aspects exactly the model differs from its target. So, the scale, the 
material, the mapping of the bay floor, etc. are precisely known and easily comparable with 
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the target (Weisberg, 2013). Likewise, model results obtained from a scale model are 
relatively straightforward since we can know, even if sometimes with difficulty, why a 
particular result holds: we can trace the way in which the model is manipulated. In the 
Phillips machine, even if not quite a scale model, we know that movements in output that 
are drawn on the sheet of paper are the result of the water levels in the tanks of 
consumption, investment and government expenditure. In addition, the representational 
relation in which the model stands with respect to its target is usually easier to grasp. The 
floor of the Delta model represents the floor of the actual bay and the amount of water in 
the investment tank in the Phillips machine represents the stock of investment of the UK 
economy. 
Other non-physical kinds of models, by contrast, do pose ontological conundrums. Firstly, 
they are not tangible; only in our heads. A question that arises is therefore what kind of 
entities these models are. Several attempts have been made in the literature to answer this 
question. Some commentators have argued that models are set-theoretic structures; others 
have suggested that models are equations; and, more recently, it has been suggested that 
they are fictional entities very similar to novels or films (Frigg & Hartmann, 2009). Let me 
just add that all of the accounts offered so far about the kind of entities models are face 
important objections. Another problem for this literature is that, regardless of the kind of 
entity that theoretical models are, the fact that they are abstract, poses questions about 
the implications for their manipulability; a feature often considered essential for learning 
about the model and thereby about the world (Morgan, 1999, 2012, Chapter 1; Morrison 
& Morgan, 1999). Furthermore, considering the different kinds of non-physical models, 
for instance mathematical models, simulations, or thought experiments, another question 
that arises is whether there are features that they all share and whether they share them 
with physical models as well.   
Surely some of the questions with which this literature deals are not strictly metaphysical. 
As I suggested above, some commentators explore what the epistemological implications 
would be if models were one kind of entity or another. Godfrey-Smith (2009), for instance, 
tries to identify the challenges (some of which are epistemological) of squaring 
the ontology that model users implicitly attribute to their models, the “folk ontology”, with 
a philosophically sound “external” metaphysics. The point that is important for us 
here, though, is that regardless of the nature we end up attributing to models, an 
undeniable fact is that these allegedly mysterious entities are used by modellers to make 
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inferences about the world that often prove to be reliable. Some seem to believe 
that identifying the “right” metaphysical characterisation of models will allow them to 
shed light on why these entities allow modellers to make correct inferences about the 
world, but arguably, an accurate answer to this question is much more likely to come from 
cognitive science, with respect to the way in which humans use these devices as a sort of 
extended cognition. For this reason, I leave the ontology of models aside and move on to 
the other two branches, in which there might be aspects more relevant for my interests in 
model failure.  
3.2. Semantics of modelling 
The literature on the semantics of models can be identified mainly with the attempt to 
provide clues with respect to the kind of relationship that obtains between models and 
their targets. A general assumption of this literature is that the clue to understanding why 
it is possible to learn about the world from models that are false (or that, in 
general, misrepresent their targets) is to be found in the representational relation models 
stand with respect to their targets. Philosophers have tackled different aspects of this 
relationship and different views have been offered about what precisely constitutes this 
relationship. The general aim of this literature can be summarised as attempting to provide 
a theory of scientific representation.  
Based on the extant literature on scientific representation, Frigg & Nguyen (2016) have 
compiled a set of the minimum requirements that a theory of scientific representation 
ought to have. They rely on the different accounts offered and the objections raised to 
them to propose five specific issues that any general theory of scientific representation has 
to be able to respond to.  
 
1) The Representational Demarcation Problem.  
This requirement is that a position must be taken with respect to whether, and if so, how, 
scientific representations are different from other kinds of representations. Most 
philosophers have endorsed this position. However, the requirement arises mostly because 
some philosophers, in particular Callender & Cohen (2006), have argued that there’s 
nothing special about scientific representation; they give precedence to representation as 
something that goes on in the mind and that therefore belongs to the domain of 
philosophy of mind. Scientific representation is derivative of this primitive form. The 
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requirement is thus that if there’s something special about scientific explanation, this needs 
to be made explicit in a way that demarcates it from other kinds of representation. 
 
2) What counts as a scientific representation? 
Depending on the answer that has been given to the Representational Demarcation 
Problem, the analyst must also provide an answer to either of two further questions. Those 
who demarcate scientific from non-scientific representations have to provide an answer to 
the Scientific Representation Problem, which can be summarised as ‘What fills the blank 
in “S is a scientific representation of T iff ___”?’. Those who reject the Representational 
Demarcation Problem have to address the Epistemic Representation Problem, which 
addresses the question of what constitutes a representation in the cases in which it’s 
possible to learn about a specific target, indirectly, by means of the object (model) doing 
the representation. This is summarised as what fills the blank in “S is an epistemic 
representation of T iff ___”.  
At the same time, the answers provided to this question need to fulfil five requirements of 
adequacy. First, that the representation allows for surrogate reasoning. That is, that the 
representation allows for generating hypotheses about the target system. The 
representation is used as a stand-in for the target. Second, that there’s room for 
misrepresentation. That is that the proposed criterion allows for the distinction between 
an inaccurate representation and a non-representation. My drawing of a purple sun with 
mountains should be able to be regarded as a misrepresentation of a sunny day at noon, 
rather than as a failure to represent the sun at all. Third, that there’s the possibility for 
representation regardless of whether there is a specific target (target-less models). Many 
models are not built with a concrete target in mind, sometimes they are meant to capture 
a generic mechanism, but nothing concrete in the world. Target-less models should still be 
able to represent. Fourth, that there is a sense of directionality––representation is a one-
way relationship. My drawing of the sun represents the sun, but not the other way around. 
Finally, this answer needs to be explicit about how this theory of representation is reflected 
in the mathematics often used in models. 
3) The Problem of Style. 
This problem addresses the need to acknowledge and accommodate that there are many 
ways in which a single target can be represented. So, a building can be represented by a 3D 
render, a 2D blueprint, or a physical scale model. This suggests that there are different 
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representational styles and a theory of scientific representation should be able to account 
for this possibility––and not, for instance, take such a building as a different target or a 
different representation altogether. Whether it’s possible to determine a priori all possible 
representational styles is an open question, but the theory should be able to distinguish 
that a target may be represented in different styles.   
4) Standards of Accuracy. 
How do we identify what constitutes an accurate representation? The answer offered to 
the problem of scientific/epistemic representation has to be able to provide a standard of 
accuracy. It is not sufficient that such an answer allows us to distinguish between 
inaccurate representation and non-representation. A certain standard of accuracy is 
needed, which allows us to distinguish between two models that represent a target in terms 
of which one is a more accurate representation.  
5) The Problem of Ontology. 
Any answer provided above will have to say something about the kind of objects that serve 
as representations. For physical objects there’s no conundrum, as explained above in the 
section on ontology. But for other kinds of models––e.g. mathematical––this is more 
difficult to establish. This requirement seeks to have clarity about metaphysical 
commitments. For instance, it’s important to determine whether the entity representing 
something is indeed in capacity to perform a representational function. 
Whether a representation is regarded as scientific or not is not something that determines 
whether a model fails or not. The models under investigation here are already considered 
scientific. The attempt to demarcate scientific representation seems thus orthogonal to the 
discussion of failure. This excludes requirements one and two as potential criteria that 
might help identify model failure. Style of representation and the problem of ontology are 
also not very helpful: there appear to be both successful and unsuccessful models in 
different representation styles and ontologies. That is, a model is not necessarily more likely 
to fail because it represents in a particular way or is physical or mathematical. And, even if 
this were the case, since most models in economics are mathematical, we’re interested 
anyway in more fine-grained criteria. This excludes requirements three and five as potential 
leads for the identification of failure and leaves only requirement four for consideration.  
The fourth requirement states that a theory of scientific representation has to formulate 
standards of accuracy. This means that any account that tells us in virtue of what a model 
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represents its target will also have to say something about the extent to which such a 
representation is accurate. So, if an account states that a model represents its target in 
virtue of being similar––e.g. Giere (2004)—the standard of accuracy will be able to tell us 
how similar a model is to its target. We could thus think of a criterion for model failure 
such as “less-accurate-than-intended” or something along these lines. Likewise, different 
degrees of accuracy may allow us to compare models and determine whether one 
represents its target more accurately than another, which might also be helpful in 
identifying model failure. The problem is, however, that such a requirement doesn’t say 
anything about how accuracy of representation maps into a measure of reliability in terms 
of say, epistemic import or predictive accuracy. To be sure, to demand that one’s theory 
perfectly maps accuracy of representation into reliability (of prediction, explanation etc.) 
would be a tall order. But my concern is that if it is not possible to track degrees of accuracy 
in representation with any epistemic import, it is unclear why this is a requirement for a 
theory of scientific representation. 
Interest in scientific representation as a special category comes from the belief that there 
is something special about scientific representation that makes it unlike other kinds of 
representation. In fact, Frigg & Nguyen (2016) suggest as much in their discussion of 
minimum requirements for a theory of scientific representation. With respect to the first 
requirement of adequacy, namely, that a theory of scientific representation allows for 
surrogate reasoning, they argue that this requirement helps to distinguish scientific 
representation from others such as lexicographical––e.g. preferences or numbers––or 
indexical––e.g. smoke5––representation, which do not allow for surrogate reasoning. Yet, 
they also argue that surrogate reasoning is insufficient because it allows for other non-
scientific kinds of representation: it “does not constrain answers sufficiently because any 
account of representation that fills the blank in a way that satisfies the surrogate reasoning 
condition will almost invariably also cover other kinds of representations”. They use as 
example a picture taken by a traffic camera to detect those who speed. The picture allows 
for surrogate reasoning since it allows its users to make inferences about the speed of cars 
and charge fines accordingly. This, however, is a case they do not want to include in the 
category of scientific representation. So, scientific representation seems to be about 
something more than just being able to make inferences about the target, even if Frigg & 
Nguyen do not specify what precisely this is. Presumably this has to do with making 
                                               
5 See Peirce’s indexical signs (Atkin, 2013). 
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accurate inferences that add to our understanding of the world or with affording us some kind 
of epistemic benefit that we in general value. If this is the case, then such a theory should 
be able to say how standards of accuracy translate into this kind of (special) epistemic 
benefit. At the very least, it should make explicit why a measure of representational accuracy 
is something that should be required of a theory of scientific representation. Otherwise, 
an explanation needs to be provided with regard to what makes scientific representation worth 
of attention as a different kind of representation. Surely it can’t be just the kind of 
representation that is typically done by modellers within the confines of academic 
institutions.   
3.2.1. Weisberg’s account 
Among the different views of scientific representation that are on offer in the literature, 
Michael Weisberg (2013) has provided one in which the relationship between a model and 
its target is one of similarity. Ronald Giere (1988, 2004, 2006) and Paul Teller (2001) have 
also argued that similarity is what accounts for the model-target relationship. Weisberg, 
however, is the only one who has tried to cash out this relationship formally. According 
to Weisberg, this account makes possible to measure how similar a model is to its target. 
More importantly though, it allows a scientist to compare models (with respect to how 
similar they are to a common target) and to compare the actual similarity of a model with 
the similarity expected to be accomplished. Given that it renders the degree to which a 
model is similar to its target, it is helpful to determine whether such a metric (rather than 
the more abstract notions of similarity) can help with identifying similarity (or lack of it) 
as a potential source of failure. seems to be a metric that, in principle, might allow us to 
measure model failure. But, as I said above, unless we have some idea of how accuracy of 
representation tracks epistemic import, it is unclear how this would help. Let me present 
Weisberg’s formal account and see whether Weisberg’s account deals with this aspect, and 
if so how. Then we can see whether there’s something that might be said about model 
failure.   
Weisberg (2013) builds on a method used by Amos Tversky to capture judgements of 
similarity or dissimilarity made by experimental subjects. Tversky’s contrast account of 
similarity says that the similarity of two objects a and b depends on the features they share 
and those they do not. The former count towards the measure of similarity whereas the 
latter against it. Formally, the basic idea is expressed as follows. ∆ is a set of features that 
can be qualitative or quantitative. For two objects a and b, A is the set of features in ∆ 
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possessed by a and B is the set of features in ∆ possessed by b. There’s also a weighing 
function ƒ(•), which is defined over the power set of ∆(ÃD) . Similarity of a to b is given 
by the following equation:  
S(a, b)= qƒ(A ⋂𝐵) - aƒ(A - B) - bƒ(B - A) 
(8.3)6 
 
Where q, a, b are term weights. Weisberg uses this idea to provide an account of the 
model-world relationship. Then he goes on to modify the original form in order to 
accommodate models. Weisberg modifies the form of the equation––making it the ratio 
of the similarities and differences, rather than the difference––and distinguishes between 
kinds of features, namely attributes, a, and mechanisms, m. The idea here is to distinguish 
the properties and patterns of a system from the mechanisms that generate them, as 
scientists may be interested in being able to distinguish between representing properties or 
patterns of a system and the mechanisms that bring them about. The following equation 
is the one he starts with to make his analysis (Weisberg, p. 147):  
 𝑆	(𝑚, 𝑡) = |𝑀-	 ⋂𝑇-| + |𝑀0	 ⋂𝑇0 ||𝑀-	 ⋂𝑇-| +	|𝑀0	 ⋂𝑇0| + |𝑀- − 𝑇-| +	|𝑀0 − 𝑇0| +	 |𝑇- −𝑀-| +	|𝑇0 − 𝑀0| 
 
(8.8) 
 𝑀-	and 𝑇- would therefore be the set of attributes of model m and target t, respectively, 
that are in ∆. Weisberg refers to this equation as the core of his weighted feature-matching 
account of model-world relations. Here the simplest possible weighting function has been 
assumed, where each element in D is weighted equally and therefore each term in the 
similarity equation takes the value of its cardinality. Weight parameters are all assumed to 
be equal and are therefore dropped. S is a value between 0 and 1. 
                                               
6 Weisberg’s nomenclature has been preserved for easy referencing. 
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Naturally, in order to obtain a measure of similarity, it is necessary to determine what goes 
into ∆, the function ƒ, and the weight parameters, 𝜃, 𝜌, 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝛿 so the equation that 
results in such a metric is the following: 
 	𝑆(𝑚, 𝑡) = 
𝜃𝑓(𝑀- ⋂𝑇-) + 𝜌𝑓(𝑀0	 ⋂𝑇0)𝜃𝑓(𝑀- ⋂𝑇-) + 𝜌𝑓(𝑀0	 ⋂ 𝑇0) + 𝛼𝑓(𝑀- − 𝑇-) + 𝛽𝑓(𝑀0 − 𝑇0) + 	𝛾𝑓(𝑇- − 𝑀-) + 	𝛿𝑑(𝑇0 −𝑀0) 
 
(8.10) 
 
According to Weisberg, these elements should be determined as follows. The scope of the 
model is what determines what actually goes into D. The scope consists of the aspects of 
the target that are intended to be represented by the model and are therefore determined 
on a case by case basis. The weighting parameters are determined according to the 
modelling goals of the modeller. The modelling goals that Weisberg discusses are obtained 
based on different kinds of modelling, namely hyper-accurate modelling, how-possibly 
modelling, minimal modelling and mechanistic modelling, which are instances of the three 
different modelling activities that Weisberg (2007, 2013, Chapter 6) has previously 
identified. For instance, he suggests that if a modeller is interested in hyper-accurate 
modelling, the theorist would want the model to have all the features of the target (𝑀⋂𝑇) and not to have any distortions (𝑀 − 𝑇) or approximations (𝑇 − 𝑀)  7 . With 
how-possibly modelling, the idea is to find a possible mechanism that recreates a set of 
properties or patterns, in which case the modeller tries (𝑀-⋂𝑇-) to have a high value of 
similarity whereas (𝑀0⋂𝑇0) should have low value. It’s the properties or patterns that 
need to be similar and not the mechanism through which these are reproduced. Weisberg 
thus defines the goal of how-possibly modelling (again in the simplest possible version) as:  |𝑀-⋂𝑇-||𝑀-⋂𝑇-| + |𝑀0 − 𝑇0| → 1 
                                               
7 It is unclear why Weisberg considers hyper-accurate modelling as one of the goals. If such 
kind of modelling were possible, the question arises why a modeller would want to engage 
in modelling in the first place instead of experimenting in the target directly––or whether 
this activity would still be regarded as modelling.  
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Finally, with respect to the weighting function, which determines the relative importance 
that each element and combinations of elements in D have, Weisberg recognises that the 
function that would satisfy equation 8.10 above would demand too much from scientists. 
It demands that the function ƒ(•) be defined over ℘(∆-)⋃℘(∆0), which means that a 
modeller would have to be able to express such a function. Instead, he suggests that 
because modellers usually know which features of D are more important, more weight can 
be given to the special features subset of D, whereas others continue to return their 
cardinality. Background theory should be able to help modellers determine which are the 
special features. 
As I mentioned above, this account returns a metric of the similarity between a model and 
its target. This is certainly an advantage over other commentators who have defended the 
similarity account in non-formal terms. The question that emerges, though, is how is this 
metric useful to assess the reliability of the inferences that are drawn about the targets of 
our models. Is it supposed to guide our judgement about how good a model is? When 
Weisberg defends his account of model representation in terms of similarity, as opposed 
to other unsuccessful, model-theoretic accounts 8 , he indicates his agreement with 
commentators such as Giere or Cartwright, who “have argued that successful models are 
similar to their targets” (2013, p. 142, emphasis added). Presumably, therefore, a formal 
account of similarity should help us to understand how similarity explains success. 
However, when Weisberg discusses the uses of his account, he seems to have other goals 
in mind. He suggests his account is useful to compare models with respect to how similar 
they are to a target and, particularly, for scientists to be able to measure how far they are 
from their modelling goals. The point of reference here is thus not necessarily the target, 
but any modelling goal such as mechanistic modelling. This is how Weisberg puts the issue 
(2013, p. 151):  
It is traditional to say that the model-world relation is the relationship in virtue 
of which studying a model can tell us something about the nature of a target 
system. But at the same time, scientists are often interested in comparing the 
relationship that a model actually holds to the world to the one they are interested 
in achieving between the model and the world […] weighted feature matching 
allows scientists to assess how close they have come to meeting their goals. It also 
                                               
8  Isomorphism, homomorphism and partial isomorphism are such model-theoretic 
accounts, which are also formal and thus comparable to Weisberg’s formal treatment  of 
similarity. They all have important drawbacks and are therefore are regarded as 
unsuccessful (see Winther (2016) for details).   
 90 
recognises that different goals can require different kinds of similarity relations, 
or at least the emphasis of different kinds of features.  
Weisberg’s idea seems to be that if a modeller’s aim is, say, to build a how-possibly model 
that accurately represents properties but not mechanisms––as I discussed above––they 
might want to have a metric of the similarities and dissimilarities between model and target. 
While this is perhaps interesting for a scientist to know, it is unclear what the added-value 
is. First, Mary Morgan (1999, 2012) has argued that a crucial feature of models that allows 
modellers to learn about the world is that models can be manipulated and therefore 
reasoned with. It is this manipulation, “understanding the world in the model”, Morgan 
argues, which allows scientists to gauge how close they are to meeting their goals. This 
view is consistent with Rodrik’s (2015) account of the modelling practice in economics, in 
which he suggests that craft and experience are important in deciding what the best model 
is for a particular situation. Second, it is unlikely that such a metric would replace the 
scientists’ judgement of how successful they have been. I think it is more likely that a 
modeller would make this judgement simply based on the model result they get. If the 
result is quantitative, the numerical distance between actual results and an expected interval 
or the sign of the result would offer a more direct metric of how far a modeller is from 
meeting their goals. If the result is not quantitative, background theory or knowledge of 
the phenomenon under investigation should be able to do the job. In general, ‘the feeling’ 
that modellers may gain with experience as well as whatever measure of validity they use 
for their models are more likely to inform scientists about how far they are in their goals 
than a metric of similarity. The reason is, I think, because there isn’t a way to relate degrees 
of similarity to epistemic import. Put differently, even if the account makes it possible to 
compare two or more models and determine which of them is more similar to a common 
target, given a specific modelling goal, it is unclear whether it would be possible to judge 
the most similar model also as the most successful or the one with the most epistemic 
import, predictive success, or any other cognitive goal.  
It seems to me that the problem with Weisberg’s account is that it presupposes––rather than 
demonstrates––that there is a straightforward relationship between representation and 
epistemic success. By straightforward I don’t mean a linear relationship; it is clear that 
Weisberg acknowledges that there may be different levels of similarity that a modeller may 
want to achieve, depending on the kind of modelling they are interested in. I mean that it 
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is presupposed that similarity and degrees thereof determine model success even though 
it is unclear how. To be able to have a metric of similarity doesn’t help much in that respect.  
Weisberg follows the classical discussions about model-world relationships in which such 
relation is a model-theoretic analogue to truth. In turn, this presupposes that the less 
idealised––or the more accurate a model representation is––the more true things such a 
model can tell us about the world. While this idea may be attractive intuitively,  such an 
assumption should be made based on our experience of how models are used and the 
purposes they are supposed to fulfil. That is, this should be a consequence of our 
explorations of different models and their successes and failures and not something we 
merely presuppose. Particularly because there are cases in which a purpose like empirical 
success is advanced by fewer shared properties between the model and the target. As 
Northcott (2017) and Reiss (2007, 2008, Chapter 8) have argued, and I will discuss below, 
sometimes simpler models, those that are more adaptable, perform better than causally 
(and thus representationally) accurate models. This demonstrates that it’s not always the 
case that better representation (or more similarity) translates into more reliability or more 
epistemic import. Therefore, a clear specification of how accurate representation tracks 
epistemic import would be needed. But because it’s clear that such a might be impossible 
to come by9, it is unclear, at best, how such an account in terms of similarity is helpful to 
understand the modelling practice and thereby to assess the ways in which models succeed 
and fail.  
3.3: Epistemology of modelling 
The epistemology of models is the most relevant of the three branches for the concern 
that I have. Literature that is interested in understanding what and how model users can 
learn about the world by using models determines their function and thereby their 
limitations. In principle, therefore, this should allow us to say something about model 
failure. If a model is used in a way that exceeds its limitations, we can expect it to fail. 
While this kind of model failure is not the only one––a model might fail even when it’s 
‘performing’ within its limits––it still allows us to cover some ground in establishing the 
possible sources of model failure. In consequence, what I shall be looking for in the survey 
of this literature is the criteria that are used to assess models’ functions.  
                                               
9 A specification of how accurate representation tracks epistemic import and therefore 
reliability would amount to solving the problem of induction. 
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There are two major features of this literature: first, it has focussed its attention on 
theoretical models. This is not surprising. If there is a mystery about the epistemology of 
models, it is why theoretical models, in contrast with say, statistical models, are capable of 
telling us true things about the world despite their numerous false assumptions. Empirical 
models are, arguably, not mysterious in this way. Second, the literature has focussed on 
establishing whether models can be explanatory. This is not a trivial question, considering 
that it is generally thought that only true accounts explain. If models are false, at least to 
some extent, a question arises whether it is possible that they explain (Reiss, 2012). And, 
in the last years, an alternative to the explanatory role has caught the attention of 
commentators, leading to explorations of whether models might provide understanding—
instead of or besides explanation. 
To a certain extent, focus on this literature is problematic for my purposes. According to 
number of philosophical accounts of what scientific explanations are, economic models 
do not fulfil the criteria for any of them (Reiss, 2012). This means that, according to these 
philosophical accounts, economic models do not provide scientific explanations. If we 
were to use these criteria for our purposes, we would conclude that economic models are 
all failures––they aren’t explanatory according to the philosophical accounts. This is, of 
course, unsatisfactory: one of the reasons why there is so much talk about the failure of 
economic models lately, is because presumably they have succeeded in other occasions. If 
we turn to the notion of understanding, which has also been explored with respect to 
economic models, the problem is that understanding is not a dichotomous concept like 
failure or success. Understanding, reflecting the different depths of understanding that an 
agent might have about a subject, comes in degrees Elgin (2007) I’ll thus concede at the 
outset that it is unclear how the criteria that are explored in this literature might be mapped 
into notions of failure and success. Still, considering that recent literature on economic 
models has focussed mostly on their epistemology, it is still worth exploring the literature 
in order to see how the criteria used there might be useful to think about model failure.  
The current debate with respect to whether models explain or afford understanding is as 
follows. Most of the commentators have defended models, arguing that they are 
epistemologically useful. These I’ll call the enthusiasts. Others, the sceptics, claim that 
models are only useful heuristically; models are useful for discovering new hypotheses or 
as heuristics to formulate causal claims, but by themselves models do not say anything 
about the world. Let me discuss the sceptics first and then move on to the enthusiasts. 
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3.3.1. The sceptics 
Some commentators have, for different reasons, downplayed the epistemic import of 
models, attributing them a very minimal heuristic role. Here one finds philosophers like 
Dan Hausman (1992, Chapter 4), who has claimed that models are mostly conceptual 
explorations. He suggests that it’s only hypotheses that state that a target system satisfies 
a class of the model’s assumptions that are related to the world; not models per se. Another 
commentator is Anna Alexandrova (2008), who, in an attempt to offer an account of 
models that accommodates the ways in which models are used in market design, has 
suggested that models be regarded as ‘open formulae’. Only later, via experiments or other 
methods, these open formulae can be specified further and therefore ‘closed’ to make 
causal claims. Even stronger, Alexandrova & Northcott (2013) claim that there’s no 
evidence that supports the view that models ‘isolate’ causal mechanisms, a view long 
defended by Uskali Mäki (1992, 2005, 2009), or that they state ‘capacities’, as argued by the 
early Nancy Cartwright (1989). In particular, Alexandrova & Northcott (2013) argue that 
there is no evidence that economic models can do the same kind of things that we could 
do if models were capable to isolate or state capacities; if they did, models would have a 
better predictive record than they actually have.  
The bottom line of this literature is that models don’t have any epistemic function except 
for their heuristic role, helping modellers in their process of discovering hypotheses. If this 
is the case, then this literature appears to be of little relevance for my purposes: if models 
are only heuristic devices and they don’t make any claims about the world, then they can’t 
fail (except in the limited sense of not being heuristically useful; but this is not my concern 
here). With this in mind, there are two positions that advocates of this view might take 
with respect to model failure. On the one hand, they may claim that model failure, at least 
in the way in which I mean it here, namely with evident, empirical consequences (recall 
aviation accidents), can only be caused by the misuse of models. That is, by using a model 
that only has a heuristic role for making direct claims about the world. In this case, 
advocates of this view would have to regard model failure as neglect on the part of model 
users or mere stupidity for using models for different purposes than their heuristic role. If 
this is the stance, the response to those who claim that the crisis was caused by models 
would be that it is model users who are at fault. There wouldn’t be much more for me to 
look for and this would be the end of the chapter. On the other hand, sceptics could claim 
that models, in the way they are used, say to carry out policy, are typically complemented 
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with other kind of knowledge that is being left out of the analysis of the philosophical 
modelling literature and this is where failure may come from. In this case, if we want to 
find the sources of failure, then our accounts of models need to account for the way in 
which models interact with other sources of information. The point is thus that those who 
defend the view that models are purely heuristic devices also need to explain the source of 
model failure.  
Alexandrova & Northcott (2009, 2013), who defend their view based on models used for 
market design, argue indeed that there are more elements at play, like experiments, in the 
whole process of designing and carrying out a successful auction. So, they hold the latter 
view. In fact, they maintain that the approach to understanding the role of models (theory), 
should be accompanied by how this theory is applied, in the same fashion it is done in 
engineering. They even make an analogy with Formula One racing in which they suggest 
that while theoretical knowledge of Newtonian mechanics, material composition of 
rubber, and so on, are necessary conditions for the success of racing cars––measured in 
terms of speed and reliability––so are the experimental trials of drivers in private circuits, 
new chassis in wind tunnels, etc. They thus maintain that the modelling process is more 
complex than just the use of the theoretical model. However, while they maintain that the 
contribution of theoretical models can only be assessed instrumentally, with respect to the 
empirical success of the engineering exercise, they remain silent about whether and how a 
model can fail or make the whole process fail. To be fair, this has surely not been their 
purpose; they use the FCC auctions as a success story and highlight how models and 
experiments worked successfully together. But my claim in this respect is precisely this: 
that a view of models, regardless of the function that one attributes to them, has to be able 
to account for why models succeed and fail. Alexandrova & Northcott (2013) do offer an 
error theory of why economists might be mistakenly led to believe that their models 
explain when they in fact don’t, but they are silent with respect to how this may have 
negative consequences in engineering-type exercises. Furthermore, while they 
acknowledge the importance of the wider setting in their view of models as open formulae, 
the philosophical analysis of this larger setting is still missing. 
3.3.2. The enthusiasts 
In contrast to the sceptics, other commentators have attempted to defend the epistemic 
import that models have: they highlight, justify, and defend some of the various epistemic 
roles that models might have, emphasising their advantages or benefits. In the remainder 
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of this section I shall discuss the work of some philosophers of economics whose work 
represents the two features I mentioned above: they have focussed  on the explanatory 
role of theoretical models. All methodologists I am going to discuss here have analysed 
the Schelling model of spatial segregation. Economist Bob Sugden is presumably the one 
who first paid significant attention to Schelling’s model in his “Credible Worlds: The Status 
of Theoretical Models in Economics” (2000), referring to it––and Akerlof’s model of 
lemons––as “the kind of model building to which I aspire” (2000, p. 2). Since then, this is 
perhaps the model that most attention has received by philosophers of economics and 
thus arguably the one from which the most comprehensive analysis has been made. It is 
thus reasonable to expect that these accounts are able to determine whether, and if so why, 
Schelling’s model is particularly special. My take is that if we can identify what are the 
features that make Schelling’s model special, lack of these same features could offer 
guidelines that could help identify possible model failure. Naturally, analysis of a single 
model is not enough but it’s a start.  
Let me quickly describe what Sugden does in his paper. His intention, made explicit at the 
outset, is to defend the use of theoretical models. He is a theoretical modeller and, even 
though he is convinced that his models are useful, he says, he’s not really sure why. He 
thus sets himself to understand what theoretical models are capable of offering from an 
epistemic point of view. In this paper, he analyses Akerlof’s famous paper on the market 
for lemons and Schelling’s model of spatial segregation. He says that he has picked these 
two models for his analysis because he finds them as exemplary theoretical pieces and 
because they are models that possess features critics usually complain about: a high degree 
of abstraction and plain unrealisticness. In his analysis, Sugden explores two aspects: 
first, what the models can possibly be contributing and, second, how one would be 
justified in inferring that such a contribution applies to the world. With respect to the latter, 
he suggests that a model is not an abstraction or a simplification of the real world. The 
modeller creates a parallel world from which they make inductive inferences. These 
inferences are justified insofar as the parallel world is credible. We do such inductive 
inferences all the time. About what the models are contributing, he suggests that these 
models offer a hypothesis that could be considered an explanation, if pursued further.  
3.3.2.1. The meta-model: mechanisms and attention 
Aydinonat (2007, 2008, Chapters 4, 7) has discussed Schelling’s model extensively and has 
attempted to “explicate the explanatory characteristics of the checkerboard model in order 
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to understand its strengths and weaknesses” (2007, p. 430).  The basic idea of Schelling’s 
model is that “non-racist preferences”, or a preference for simply not being in the minority 
defined by a certain threshold, gives rise to segregated neighbourhoods. The model is thus 
interpreted as providing a mechanism of how individual preferences may give rise to a 
macro phenomenon––residential segregation10. Aydinonat argues that the model provides 
a “partial potential (theoretical) explanation” of residential segregation. The explanation is 
partial, Aydinonat argues, following Hempel, because it ignores other factors that may also 
give rise to the explanandum, like known systematic discrimination by housing developers. 
It is potential (and not actual), because the explanans are not known to be true; they are 
only conjectural. Despite the partiality of the model, Aydinonat suggests, the model still 
contributes epistemically because it can be added to the meta-model or theory (i.e. 
collection of models) that a scientist may recourse to in searching for an explanation of a 
concrete case of segregation. The mechanism suggested by the Schelling model contributes 
to the breadth of the explanatory meta-model, making it applicable to more instances of 
segregation by offering extra tools by which segregation can be explained. Whereas 
previous explanations of segregation suggested that the phenomenon was the outcome of 
explicit segregationist behaviour, the model shows that segregation can be an unintended 
macro effect of individual preferences and decisions. Such a mechanism does not exclude 
the presence of more direct segregationist behaviour.  
Since Schelling introduced the model, many different specifications have been explored 
afterwards. Some of these new specifications are purely theoretical, others introduce 
certain assumptions that are based on empirical findings. The results obtained from these 
new model specifications are mixed; for some, the “Schelling result” of segregation holds, 
whereas for others segregation does not occur. Aydinonat suggests that these explorations 
demonstrate that the hypothesis of the model is interesting and promising, encouraging 
scientists to explore the model conditions under which segregation occurs.  
This practice is not unusual in economics. In his discussion of the functions of models in 
economics, Rodrik (2015) argues that one of them is to clarify hypotheses and to reveal 
counterintuitive possibilities and unexpected consequences. Rodrik offers several 
examples among which is Ricardo’s Principle of Comparative Advantage. Intuitively, 
Rodrik suggests, trade would be considered beneficial for a trading party only when it has 
                                               
10 Given how much attention Schelling’s model has received, I will simply assume that the 
model is known to the reader.  
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an absolute advantage over the other––that is, when one party produces every potentially 
tradable good more efficiently that the other. Ricardo instead argued that a country 
benefits from exporting what it produces relatively better and importing what it produces 
relatively less well. Further model specifications, “tinkering with the model by theorists 
over generations” showed that this result did not depend on certain specifications such as 
the number of commodities or the number of countries trading.  
In this respect, Aydinonat’s analysis seems to capture economic practice well. However, 
the philosophical analysis he offers, namely his attempt to “explicate the explanatory 
characteristics of the model in order to understand its strengths and weaknesses” is, in my 
view, less successful. I understand Aydinonat’s main objective as to offer an analysis of the 
features of the model that account for both its epistemic benefits and its limitations. The 
analysis Aydinonat offers, though, is rather sanguine about the model strengths. 
Aydinonat’s analysis seems to presuppose that strengths and weaknesses are somehow 
independent. This, I shall suggest, raises questions about how potential the explanation 
actually is. I shall also suggest that whether the explanation is partial or not is a question 
that is better resolved empirically and not philosophically. Finally, I will argue that the only 
feature that Aydinonat offers as distinctive of Schelling’s model that could explain its 
success is philosophically unsatisfactory. 
To suggest that the Schelling model offers a potential explanation of segregation, 
Aydinonat makes the distinction between potential and actual explanations. As mentioned 
above, the latter are those whose explanantia are true. Because Schelling’s explanantia are 
just conjectural or fictional, and thus their truth cannot be guaranteed, Aydinonat argues 
that Schelling offers just a potential explanation. Aside from this feature, Aydinonat offers 
a substantive overview of the many different model specifications that scientists have tried. 
As mentioned above, some of these are theoretical and others are based on empirical 
findings. For some of them the result of segregation holds whereas for others it doesn’t. 
For instance, Aydinonat (2007) cites a study conducted by Bruch and Mare (2003), 
which suggests that utility functions that best describe real individuals’ preferences, which 
have the property of continuity, yield lower levels of segregation than the ones suggested 
by Schelling’s model, which uses a threshold function. Similarly, although this isn’t one of 
Schelling’s model specifications, Aydinonat cites in a footnote a test of the macro 
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implications of Schelling’s model performed by William Easterly (2009)11, which Easterly 
claims to contradict Schelling’s model results.  
These tests with contradictory results––that segregation does not occur––are crucial to 
determine the set of the conditions under which the Schelling result does hold. Especially 
the model specifications whose conclusion is that segregation does not occur should be of 
particular importance because they suggest that the model result does depend on certain 
specifications. If this set is wide enough––e.g. segregation holds regardless of the number 
of different players, or a very high number––it may be possible that the real-world 
conditions fall within this set. This would in turn lend support to the possibility that the 
Schelling mechanism holds in the world and that it may thus be a potential explanation of 
segregation, as Aydinonat claims. We wouldn’t know whether the conditions are true of 
the world, but we would be able to tell that the world conditions are likely to fall within 
the set of conditions under which the result of segregation holds. However, if the set of 
conditions under which the model holds is too constrained, in such a way that any world 
condition is very much unlike those of the model, the hypothesis loses force as being 
possible in the world. In other words, an explanation is only a potential one if the 
explanantia cannot be guaranteed to be true, but they are not known to be false. I don’t 
want to suggest that in Schelling’s case they are false; it is not my task to determine this. 
My point is that this sort of appraisal is necessary for the claim that the model may be 
applicable to the world, and would therefore be what Aydinonat has to do, if he is to claim 
that the mechanism described by the model is a potential explanation. However, while 
Aydinonat acknowledges that segregation occurs under a specific set of conditions (and 
not others), his analysis doesn’t contemplate that the model’s mechanism is a potential 
explanation contingent on the set of conditions under which it holds. Instead, he claims 
that the model already made an epistemic contribution: the original hypothesis suggested 
by Schelling’s model has added an additional potential explanation. That is, the model was 
causally responsible for an additional potential explanation that is at the disposal of 
scientists and policy makers to use whenever the explanation may be considered suitable. 
Furthermore, he claims that the “explorations” or the multiple model specifications are 
refinements to the meta-model of explanation of segregation, suggesting that the exploration 
can only be beneficial because it expands the meta-model. “If the argument that the 
checkerboard model contributes to a meta-model of residential segregation is accepted, 
                                               
11 Aydinonat (2007) cites a previous version of the paper, which was not yet published then.  
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explorations of the checkerboard model may be considered as future refinements and 
expansions of this meta-model. Hence, Schelling’s initial hypothesis and his checkerboard 
model helped researchers to expand their conceptual toolbox to include more explanatory 
factors” (2007, p. 444). The explorations, however, could suggest that the hypothesis be 
removed from the meta-model altogether if the conditions under which segregation occurs 
are too restrictive. Aydinonat considers that the explorations are only improvements, but 
such a conclusion is not warranted. The model’s benefits depend on the model’s 
limitations, which are being tested by the explorations Aydinonat describes. 
Leaving the issue just mentioned aside, so, assuming that Schelling’s model indeed offers 
a potential explanation, one may also question its partiality. Recall that a partial explanation 
is one whose explanans do not fully account for the explanandum. In this respect, 
Aydinonat argues that the Schelling mechanism that leads to segregation (from micro 
motives to macro behaviour) could be operating simultaneously with other more direct 
mechanisms of segregation like outright racism by real estate developers, so the model may 
actually be capturing a real mechanism, while not excluding others. One may ask, however, 
whether such a contribution is indeed partial if it has never been able to actually explain, 
partially, any real phenomena. To be sure, Aydinonat doesn’t say that it hasn’t, but he also 
doesn’t say that it has. Aydinonat’s assumption seems to be that, once the model’s 
hypothesis has made it to the “repository of possible explanations”, it can already be 
counted as both potential and partial. This is surely possible. But considering that there are 
reasons to think that the other more direct mechanisms are in place, like outright racism, 
economic and racial disparity, gentrification and other socio-economic and demographic 
dynamics, one may question what the “marginal contribution” of the Schelling result is to 
the explanatory meta-model of segregation.  
Some may rebut, by arguing that even if such a marginal contribution were infinitesimal, it 
would still have to be ruled out before an alternative hypothesis (say, outright racism) can 
be accepted. At the very least, they might add, the live possibility of the Schelling 
mechanism operating, lowers the warrant of alternative hypotheses. Ylikoski & Aydinonat 
(2014) make a similar point when they claim that the search for causal explanation has the 
structure of eliminative induction. Reiss (2015), in the context of his pragmatist theory of 
evidence, has argued as much.  
Reiss’s theory is meant to be of direct relevance for the biomedical and social sciences, and 
especially for those domains that take randomised controlled trials as the gold standard of 
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evidence. His theory is meant to be for causal claims––such as whether smoking causes 
lung cancer or whether segregation is caused by ‘mild discriminatory preferences’. To 
explain his theory, Reiss sometimes uses the analogy of TV detectives trying to solve a 
murder case. The idea here, briefly, is that if we’re investigating who murdered Maria, and 
we learn afterwards that Manuel was in the room when she died, our original hypothesis 
that Eva was the murderer is less warranted––Manuel is now a suspect too. We thus learn 
from knowing about Manuel, because we now have more hypotheses that need to be ruled 
out before we settle on one. The more competing hypotheses are discarded, according to 
Reiss’s theory, the more warranted the original hypothesis is12. In the case of the meta-
model of explanation, the more complete the set is, the more warrant one of the hypothesis 
has once the others have been discarded.   
The problem with Reiss’s analogy, though, is that it doesn’t apply to Schelling’s model of 
segregation. In the case in which we want to find out who murdered Maria, we don’t know 
who did it. So, any clue about who the culprit might be, learning about Manuel, is indeed 
helpful. By contrast, in the case of segregation, we know there are other causes. We know 
that segregation is caused by racism (Mahler & Eder, 2016), socioeconomic and 
demographic conditions (Florida, 2014, 2017) and explicit segregationist policies 
(Duursma & Heck, 2017), just to name a few. Here the right analogy, if we are to stick to 
murderers and detectives, would be that we know people are murdered with guns (x 
percent of the time), baseball bats (another y percent of the time), by suffocation (another 
z percent of the time), etc. The equivalent to finding whether segregation is caused by non-
racist preferences would be something like finding whether people are murdered by being 
quartered with a nail clipper. So, my point about offering a partial explanation is that being 
part of the meta-model doesn’t secure the model’s partial contribution. There are several 
other explanations that we know account for the effect of segregation. The partiality of 
the explanation, or its ‘marginal contribution’, is probably best established empirically by 
using other methods, such as econometric analysis, which allows us to identify how much 
non-racist preferences contribute to the effect of segregation. This is perhaps difficult to 
measure confidently, considering the outcome of segregation is the result of preferences 
that are not directly observable. But there are interesting methods such as instrumental 
                                               
12  Reiss (2015) makes a distinction between direct and indirect support. The former is 
evidence that directly supports the hypothesis in question. The latter is evidence that is 
incompatible with alternative hypotheses, lending indirect support to the hypothesis in 
question by ruling out alternatives. Warrant, which allows for degrees, is gained by having 
both kinds of support. 
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variables or differences in differences that combined with ethnographic research could be 
helpful in answering such a question. Such methods might prove to be more reliable than 
mere speculation that the mechanism suggested by Schelling may or may not play a role.  
 The points I’ve made so far about Aydinonat’s analysis of Schelling’s model have 
challenged the model’s epistemic contributions. Let me now turn to my final point, which 
is about a feature of the model that, according to Aydinonat’s analysis, seems to be a 
distinguishing feature. That is, a feature that distinguishes the model from others and that 
is, at least partially, responsible for the epistemic contributions the model makes. I am 
referring to the attention the model has received by scientists from different disciplines. 
According to Aydinonat, the attention, and the many different specifications that have 
later been explored by social scientists, are a sign of the model’s contribution to the meta-
model of explanation.  
These studies give us enough evidence that the checkerboard model has received 
considerable attention and its results and implications have been explored and 
tested in different ways. These explorations give us reasons to believe that 
Schelling’s insights may be relevant for the real world (2007, p. 443). 
It thus seems that it’s not the result of the explorations or tests, but rather the fact that 
these explorations have taken place, that give reasons to Aydinonat to believe that 
Schelling’s model might be applicable to the world. But attention as a criterion of relevance 
is not satisfactory. The role of the philosopher is precisely to come up with independent 
criteria for why a model is reliable, useful, etc. To judge the ‘goodness’ or relevance of the 
model by the amount of attention is it has received, is to beg the question. If the amount 
of attention Schelling’s model has received is significant relative to other models, part of 
the philosophical analysis calls for understanding why this is the case. Furthermore, it is 
remarkable that Aydinonat has chosen the attention and exploration of Schelling’s model 
as a criterion to judge its relevance because exactly the opposite claim has been made lately 
about macroeconomics and specifically about models with microfoundations. A recurrent 
criticism of macroeconomics and the causes of the crisis is that macroeconomists gave too 
much attention to DSGE models, which are too restrictive and can’t incorporate real world 
features such as heterogeneity of agents (Colander et al., 2009; Rodrik, 2015, Chapter 3). 
Obviously, this doesn’t make the critics right, but that attention and focus on a particular 
model or kind of models is considered as beneficial by some and damning by others is not 
helpful to understand the model’s benefits or weaknesses.  
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3.3.2.2. Robustness 
Others who have contributed to the discussion, providing a comprehensive account of 
modelling in which some adequacy conditions are discussed that can be useful to look at 
model failure are Kuorikoski & Ylikoski (2015). They defend a very similar view to that of 
Aydinonat (2007) and define the modelling exercise as a matter of extended cognition. 
Here models are not mysterious in their capacity to explain despite their many falsehoods; 
they are simply external devices that help us, cognitively limited beings, to make inferences 
about a phenomenon of interest. Like Ylikoski & Aydinonat (2014) they argue models 
afford understanding insofar as they allow us to make correct what-if inferences13. These 
correct inferences are possible by obtaining knowledge of dependencies––causal or other 
types, they call themselves pluralists in this respect. Explanations are answers to contrastive 
questions that understanding of a phenomenon affords. Thus, whereas understanding is 
about the ability to use the knowledge of dependencies to make what-if inferences, 
explanations are answers to specific contrastive questions.  
They also argue that models are representational to the extent that they allow model users 
to make correct inferences about a target. So, they basically turn the issue of representation 
on its head: while many philosophers claim that models afford epistemic import insofar as 
they represent their targets in the right way, Kuorikoski & Ylikoski (2015) claim that it is 
the amount and quality of what-if inferences that we can make with the use of a model 
that determine how well a model represents its target. They dismiss the literature on 
representation I discussed above quite strongly, suggesting that, if there is indeed 
something interesting to be discovered in the way models represent their targets, the 
answer is surely not to be found in philosophy. In other words, this is not a philosophical 
problem, if it is a problem at all.   
In their account, therefore, the crux of the matter is the number of inferences that are 
made based on the model and their precision. This depends on the truth of the 
assumptions of the model and the reliability of the inferences that can be drawn. These 
two issues can be tackled by means of conducting robustness analysis, which involves 
examining whether the same model result holds in different specifications of a model in 
which the tractability assumptions are varied. If the result holds, it is said to be robust, and 
                                               
13 Aydinonat (2007) hints at some of the explorations he discusses as being what-if questions. 
But suggests ‘what-if’ kinds of explorations are just a kind and that there are many ways in 
which modellers can examine the plausibility of a hypothesis. 
 103 
suggests that it is driven by an identified causal mechanism and not by the typically false 
tractability assumptions used in the model.  
Kuorikoski & Ylikoski (2015) argue that the reliability of the explanations derived from 
models hinges on the success of the robustness analysis conducted. This thus makes 
robustness––or lack thereof––a candidate for identifying potential model failure: if a 
model (or cluster of models) fails the robustness test, this could be a sign that the 
mechanism identified is not present in the world and that, if we were to make inferences 
based on this model, they may be incorrect. Lack of robustness would allow us, therefore, 
to prevent model failure.  
There are, however, at least three problems with using robustness as a criterion to identify 
possible sources of failure. The first is that the robustness of a result is not a necessary 
condition for at least some epistemic purposes. This is something that Kuorikoski & 
Ylikoski (2015) recognise with respect to understanding. A non-robust result––precisely 
because it’s not robust––may suggest that there is a particular assumption that the model 
does depend on14, as in the discussion of Aydinonat’s account above. So, they suggest we 
gain some understanding by learning this fact. Also for prediction, considering that 
accurate representation is not a necessary condition for successful prediction, robustness 
also doesn’t seem to be necessary. After all, robustness allegedly tracks true causal 
mechanisms, which are not necessary for accurate prediction. Admittedly though, that 
robustness is not necessary for understanding or for prediction doesn’t imply that it may 
not be necessary for another purpose. But then, if it were to be a necessary condition, it 
would be, at the very best, purpose-specific. 
The second problem is that it’s also not a sufficient condition, partly because of the 
practicalities of conducting robustness analysis. Lisciandra (2017) has argued that there is 
a difference between the ideal robustness test and the ones that can actually be performed. 
Similar claims have been made by Odenbaugh & Alexandrova (2011) and Reiss (2012). So, 
even if we have a robust theorem or a successful robustness test, this is not a method of 
confirmation. Kuorikoski, Lehtinen, & Marchionni (2012) admit as much.  
Finally, the extent to which these tests are actually performed by modellers is unclear. This 
is an issue about which Kuorikoski, Lehtinen, & Marchionni (2010) are ambiguous at best, 
                                               
14 It should be noted that there are more kinds of robustness than the one referred to by 
Kuorikoski & Ylikoski (2015).  
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and contradictory at worst. In their paper, they claim that, “theoretical economic modelling 
is to be understood as collective derivational robustness analysis” (2010, p. 549). Likewise, 
the title of their paper is “Economic Modelling as Robustness Analysis”.  Yet, in a remark 
about Nancy Cartwright’s (2005) suggestion that robustness analysis is rarely performed, 
they say: “Whether she was right in claiming that this is not sufficiently done in economics 
is a question we cannot fully address here. Our illustration provides an instance in which 
tractability assumptions are also modified, and this is not an isolated example” (2010, p. 
548). It is thus unclear why they claim that theoretical modelling in economics should be 
understood as derivational robustness analysis, if they can’t simultaneously assert that this 
is a common practice. That the example they provide is not an isolated example is surely 
not the same as being a common practice. And, as I have discussed earlier in this 
dissertation, there are other reasons for why economists model a particular phenomenon 
using different assumptions than just carrying out robustness tests. 
In conclusion, robustness analysis, if carried out, is a practice that may give us more 
confidence in the existence of an identified causal mechanism. In this respect, insofar as 
we’re able to make what-if inferences about causal dependencies, we may be able to gain 
understanding about a particular phenomenon. However, robustness analysis is not, at 
least by itself, a practice that is likely to help identify features of the modelling practice that 
may allow us to identify possible sources of model failure. 
3.3.2.3. Learning 
Grüne-Yanoff is another scholar who has analysed Schelling’s model, in the attempt to 
understand models’ epistemic contributions. He has been particularly interested in 
defending the epistemic relevance of models that he regards as non-representational. That 
is, he has argued that the assessment of models can’t be based on the representational 
capacities of models because not all models are meant to represent specific targets (Grüne-
Yanoff, 2009). He takes sides with Sugden, by suggesting that models refer sometimes only 
to possible processes, background conditions or possible phenomena or properties, 
without attempting to represent anything specific in the real world. In his paper 
“Appraising non-representational models”, Grüne-Yanoff’s (2013) specific concern is that, 
insofar as the representational capacity of a model is considered a necessary condition for 
learning about the world and the appraisal of models relies on this representational 
capacity, models that do not represent specific aspects of the real world can’t be properly 
appraised. The few philosophers who have looked at these models, Grüne-Yanoff claims, 
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have considered them to play, at best, a heuristic role, as some commentators (e.g. 
Hausman, 1992) have claimed. This heuristic role poses two additional issues, according 
to Grüne-Yanoff: If models are thought to play at most a heuristic role the criteria to assess 
their success is “unclear in the extreme”. Furthermore, this equates modelling with other 
activities that Grüne-Yanoff considers can’t be “rationally accounted for” like taking a walk 
or reading the newspaper in order for scientists to gain inspiration. He finds this situation 
unsatisfactory and thus attempts to repair it. His ultimate aim is to argue that it’s possible 
to learn from models, even if they lack an established representational relation to real-
world targets (p. 851).   
Grüne-Yanoff’s strategy is first to define what he takes learning to be, namely a change in 
confidence in a particular hypothesis about the world that is justified by reference to the 
model. Then, using the literature on how-possibly explanations, he suggests five 
opportunities in which learning may be achieved. Finally, he presents five models from 
different areas of science, each corresponding to one of the five opportunities of learning 
discussed before. Schelling’s model is one of the models he discusses and argues that the 
model makes us learn by “affecting impossibility claims”. This means that the model 
justifies changing one’s confidence in the hypothesis that racist preferences are a necessary 
cause of segregation. Because the model shows a mechanism in which non-racist 
preferences lead to segregation, a model user should be less confident in the claim that 
racist preferences are a necessary cause of segregation.   
I think Grüne-Yanoff is correct in his assessment that non-representational models play a 
significant role in science and that philosophers have not much considered what their roles 
are or have indeed lumped them in the category of “heuristic”. His claims are valid and 
important. But, in my view, he confuses the defence of a certain type of models for having 
an important epistemic role, with the assessment of such models. One thing is to identify 
their potential epistemic import and defend it. Another is to assess them as “good” or 
“bad” models. I think he conflates the two. Another way to put this is that while non-
representational models might make us learn, this doesn’t automatically make them good 
models. There might be “bad” non-representational models.  
At the outset of his paper, Grüne-Yanoff claims that assessing representational models for 
their “goodness” is relatively straightforward given that it is a matter of accurately 
representing the target. Criteria differ, he suggests, as there are commentators who would 
claim this is a matter of resemblance (Mäki), isomorphism (van Fraassen), or similarity 
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(Giere)15. Then he suggests that because non-representational models do not represent 
anything concrete in the world, but only possible entities, processes or properties, the 
criteria to judge the kind of inferences drawn from the model can’t possibly be how well 
these inferences represent a target. Instead, therefore, he proposes learning as his criterion 
of appraisal (Grüne-Yanoff, 2013, p. 853): 
In the cases discussed here, however, the knowledge processed by the model is 
different: it contains beliefs about possible entities, processes, or properties, 
which cannot be obtained by establishing an adequate representation of the 
model to actual target systems. Thus, adequate representation is not a useful 
appraisal criterion for such models. Instead, I propose learning as the appropriate 
criterion. 
So, Grüne-Yanoff justifies the use of learning as a criterion of appraisal based on the 
impossibility of using adequate representation as a criterion for non-representational 
models. But he doesn’t really argue why this is an adequate criterion. In fact, I don’t think 
it can be defended as a criterion for the assessment of a model. There are four reasons for 
this.  
The first thing to note is that learning, at least as it is defined by Grüne-Yanoff, is also 
something that is typically achieved by representational models, and that is usually desired. 
A scientific model represents a target generally because there is an interest to learn about 
that target. It is thus unclear why other criteria would be used for these models, namely 
adequacy of representation, as Grüne-Yanoff suggests, and not also learning. After all, it 
is a live possibility that a model adequately represents its target, but that we don’t learn 
anything from it––for instance, because it’s something that was already known. Prima facie, 
we would thus seem to be better-off with learning as a criterion than with adequacy of 
representation. Grüne-Yanoff would first have to explain why learning is not a criterion 
used with representational models.  
Another reason why learning could not be the criterion used to assess the goodness of 
representational models, or at least not the only criterion to assess a model, is that it is just 
too coarse. For non-representational models, it is sometimes too coarse and sometimes 
simply inappropriate. Let me illustrate this with an analogy. I like cooking very much. 
Every now and then I buy books and subscriptions to magazines with access to some of 
                                               
15 As I argued above with respect to Weisberg’s similarity, these criteria do not say anything 
about the “goodness” of a model, if understood as having some kind of epistemic import. It 
is generally assumed that this is the case but it’s not demonstrated.  
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the recipes and tricks of cooks I really like and from whom I can learn things. That is 
indeed something I aim at and I judge my purchases by whether I learn new cooking tricks. 
If learning were my only criterion, though, I wouldn’t be able to appreciate the emphasis 
on nutrition and health of Sarah Britton, or the exquisiteness and sometimes awkwardness 
of the ingredient combinations that Yotam Ottolenghi makes, or the emphasis on 
technique that Naomi Pomeroy makes to enhance even the simplest everyday meal. I 
would judge them all equally because I always learn from them. In fact, I would judge the 
“Tasty” bird-eye-view (and sometimes disgusting) short films of recipes that circulate 
nowadays on Facebook equally well, because I learnt an ingredient combination I hadn’t 
thought about. In addition, I wouldn’t be able to judge them by how good they are as 
recipe books: Ottolenghi, for instance, is too UK oriented ingredient-wise and not all the 
recipes have pictures––which I find very important. “El Mercado”, by the Peruvian Rafael 
Osterling is a beautiful book, but most of the recipes require advance preparation of other 
more “basic” recipes. I want to be able to judge them by how good they are as recipe 
books, even if I can learn from all of them. Goodness (of recipe books) for me, hinges on 
different criteria than just whether they make me learn. 
I want to make two points here: one is that, non-representational models in particular, 
have other purposes than just learning about the world. They may therefore be judged by 
other non-epistemic criteria such as simplicity, adherence to a particular modelling style, 
or the proof of an analytical result. Examples of the latter are the proofs of existence and 
uniqueness of general equilibrium (Arrow and Debreu) and Samuelson’s (in)famous Loan-
Consumption model16. The other point is that, even if we just appraise those models that 
indeed are capable of making us learn, we should still be able to judge them by how good 
they are, which requires different criteria. Learning is here too coarse a criterion.   
Another aspect that points to the difficulty of suggesting learning, at least as defined by 
Grüne-Yanoff, as an appraisal criterion of a model is that it is a subjective aspect. Grüne–
Yanoff uses the criterion of learning as if it were an objective property of a model to have 
the capacity to change model users’ confidence in a particular hypothesis. 
However, doxastic attitudes are subjective and depend on the network of propositions 
                                               
16 H. Maas (2014, Chapter 7) argues that despite the non-representational character of this 
model, we’re able to learn something about the world from this model. Yet, the model is 
considered “foundational” by economist Olivier Blanchard, who suggests that models such 
as the Loan-Consumption model make “deep theoretical points”. See Blanchard (2017) for 
details. 
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related to the one in question which a subject (an individual or a community) believe to be 
true. So, it could be the case that a model that provides a true result––say, correctly 
identifies a causal relation between two factors––but that, because the network of beliefs 
of the model-user are totally opposite (and thus probably false) a change in confidence in 
the proposition under scrutiny does not occur. This is perhaps an unlikely scenario but, 
shows that the criterion tracks something different than what we would want to assess in 
a model. To be sure, there is some subjectivity in the appraisal of a model. Models are 
arguably appraised relative to their purposes, which in turn are defined by subjects. But 
this is not how Grüne-Yanoff seems to be taking this criterion to work.   
Finally, just like Aydinonat, Grüne-Yanoff doesn’t seem to be open to the possibility that 
Schelling’s model fails. He argues that we learn from Schelling’s model because “the model 
result thus justified changing one’s confidence in the hypotheses about racist preferences 
being a necessary cause of segregation” (p. 856). That is, it shows that a segregation pattern 
may occur, given a possible initial condition (preference for not being a minority) and a 
possible process. Grüne-Yanoff thus suggests that Schelling’s model is an example of 
learning by affecting an impossibility claim by means of offering a how-possibly 
explanation (2013, p. 856): 
Schelling’s model shows that segregation patterns might be produced by another 
cause, which is an actual property of agents in many real-world populations: 
namely, the preference not to be in the minority (it shows only that it might be 
produced because it does so in a merely possible context—with an environment 
and a process that our knowledge does not rule out but that we by no means can 
assume to be the actual environment or process). 
Grüne-Yanoff thus acknowledges that we can’t assume the environment, or the conditions 
under which the result holds, to be like ours. This is the reason why the Schelling result is 
merely a possibility. However, as I already discussed with respect to Aydinonat’s analysis, 
social scientists working with the model and with its many specifications have been in fact 
expanding their knowledge about the model, in order to determine the conditions under 
which the Schelling result continues to hold. Grüne-Yanoff, nevertheless, attributes 
epistemic import to the model without considering that such import is contingent on the 
conditions under which it is established that the model result holds. Surely the work that 
sociologists have done (some of which is mentioned by Aydinonat) suggests that the model 
may apply widely, but that is what we have learnt afterwards; Grüne-Yanoff claims that we 
learnt from the model originally conceived by Schelling.  
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Let me summarise my points now with respect to Grüne-Yanoff. I have argued that to 
defend the epistemic import of non-representational models is a different exercise than to 
appraise them. Appraisal requires different criteria than learning. First, because not all 
representational models are in the business of learning about the world. Second, because 
even if they were, learning is too coarse a criterion; we want to distinguish the “good” 
models from the “bad” ones, even if we can learn from them all. Third, learning as defined 
by Grüne-Yanoff is a subjective concept, not something we can attribute to models. And 
fourth, the way in which learning is employed as a criterion is too weak and doesn’t leave 
open the possibility for failure.   
3.3.3. Epistemology and the economics context 
Now that I have discussed the details of each of the accounts, let me now offer some 
remarks about the literature in general. The enthusiasts, those whose view is that models 
by themselves do have epistemic import, would likely agree with the following way of 
characterising the epistemic import of models. In the cases in which a model result is 
robust, explanations derived from them are more likely to be reliable. This is the position 
of Kuorikoski & Ylikoski (2015), which is the most demanding and thus one with which 
neither Aydinonat nor Grüne-Yanoff would probably disagree with. In the cases in which 
there is no such robustness, it’s possible, according to Aydinonat (2007) and Grüne-Yanoff 
(2013), respectively: i) to enhance understanding nonetheless, because a broader set of 
what-if inferences can be made, or ii) to learn, by a change in our confidence in a particular 
hypothesis. Since Kuorikoski & Ylikoski (2015) concede that it’s possible to gain 
understanding from non-robust results, they would also agree with i). This suggests two 
things. First, that, at least for these commentators, epistemic import comes relatively 
cheap. For we can learn from non-representational models and gain understanding from 
non-robust results. This is, obviously, good news; this means that economists probably 
gain more understanding or learn just by toying with their models. But it also suggests that, 
if this is all there is to economic modelling, then it offers very little epistemically. In 
particular because, as I already mentioned above, it is debated whether economists are in 
the capacity to carry out proper robustness tests. So, this means that theoretical economic 
models will usually only be able to afford understanding, as defined by Aydinonat (2007), 
in the form of a broader meta-model of explanation, or because scientists are obliged to 
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be explicit about the assumptions of their models, and their inferences are more reliable, 
as Kuorikoski & Ylikoski (2015) suggest17.  
In fact, a concern raised by Northcott & Alexandrova (2014)18, is that philosophers like 
Aydinonat (2007) have defended and justified economists modelling activity as 
epistemically successful––because they have allegedly demonstrated that models do have 
epistemic import––when in fact the epistemic contribution, if any, is rather meagre. Their 
specific concern is that economists invest much effort and resources in devising complex 
mathematical models, that, in return, deliver very little––e.g. potential partial (theoretical) 
explanations.  
My view on this matter is the following. While Alexandrova and Northcott’s concern 
seems to be about (theoretical) economists investing their––and taxpayer’s!––resources in 
an apparently futile matter as modelling, and they offer some evidence of their own of 
what they call armchair science, the question is, to what extent is their view of economists 
mediated by the attention that other philosophers have given to theoretical modelling? As 
I mentioned above, theoretical modelling has been the main, if not the only, kind of 
modelling that has received significant attention by philosophers of economics in their 
enquiry about models. The reason, surely, has to do with theoretical models being the ones 
that pose an “epistemological mystery” and are thus the object of enquiry of philosophers 
of science. In economics, idealisations such as homo oeconomicus or the representative agent 
have been the object of constant criticism for their lack of realisticness and have prompted 
interest in trying to find out the extent to which these assumptions hinder or foster the 
reliability of the models that use these assumptions. The motivation is not minor because 
economics is a model-based science, and philosophers have been concerned about 
understanding the practice. This is part of the legacy of the naturalistic turn that, in the 
modelling literature, has been exemplified by Cartwright (1983, 1999) and Morgan and 
Morrison (1999).  
However, (pure) theoretical modelling, as analysed by philosophers, has been in decline in 
economics since the mid-eighties. While theoretical modelling played a major role in the 
                                               
17 Kuorikoski & Ylikoski (2015) suggest, in their defence of models as extended cognition, that 
there are at least three ways in which models enhance understanding: to oblige scientists to 
be explicit about their assumptions; to make inferences more reliable and to expand the 
scope of correct what-if inferences. The latter is more likely to be reliable if proven to be 
robust.   
18 This concern has also been raised in conference sessions. 
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sixties and seventies, afterwards it has declined sharply, at the expense of empirical 
observational and experimental work. An article published in the Journal of Economic 
Literature (2013) by economist Daniel Hamermesh shows this strong decline of theoretical 
modelling. He takes the total papers published in one year on the American Economic 
Review (AER), the Journal of Political Economy (JPE) and the Quarterly Journal of 
Economics (QJE) for six consecutive decades since 1963 and classifies them by different 
categories, among which is the “type of study” used, regardless of the topic. The different 
“types of study” are: theory, theory with simulation, empirical: borrowed data, empirical: 
own data, and experiments. Among the total papers published in one year in these journals, 
theoretical papers amounted to 50.7% in 1963, reached a peak in 1983 with 57.6% and 
then decreased steadily to 32.4% in 1993 and in 2011 only amounted to 19.1%. Here is the 
table of his findings (Hamermesh, 2013, p. 168): 
 
 
 
Obviously, while these numbers are very telling, they are just an invitation to investigate 
further these categories and the possible causes of these drastic changes19. Hamermesh 
speculates that possible causes are: first, theory having become so abstruse that journal 
editors refuse to publish it, recognising that few of the readers may be able to actually 
comprehend it; and second, developments in technology that facilitate the processing of 
empirical data. The latter doesn’t necessarily mean that economists have ditched theory 
                                               
19 In a more recent and larger study using machine-learning, Angrist, Azoulay, Ellison, Hill, 
& Lu (2017) show that the trend towards empirical research holds. However, they also show 
that microeconomics, the largest field in the literature studied continues to be very much 
theoretical. See their paper for details. Cherrier & Backhouse (2016) contest this ‘empirical 
turn’ and argue, in turn, for an ‘applied turn’.  
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altogether; in many cases they might be using this theory to test it empirically20. But the 
data still shows a striking and rather worrisome result, which is my second general point 
about the literature: philosophers have paid almost exclusive attention to a kind of 
modelling that, already by the end of the previous century, was substantially declining. A 
more provocative way of putting this point is that while philosophers claim to be interested 
in understanding the modelling practice, they have been ignoring most of what the 
modelling practice is actually about. Alexandrova and Northcott worry about economists 
wasting time and resources in developing models that do not seem to amount to much; 
presumably they should be at least as concerned about philosophers of models not having 
got their object of enquiry quite right.  
To be sure, attention has been given to relatively new developments such as simulation 
(See e.g. Grüne-Yanoff & Weirich (2010) for a review; Frigg & Reiss (2009));  experiments 
(See Guala (2005)) and to evidence-based policy (see Reiss (2013, Chapters 9, 11) which 
are all topics that are more or less directly related to models. Furthermore, there is also 
important work about statistical and econometric models (See e.g. Mayo & Spanos (2004);  
Morgan (1988, 1990)) and the ‘credibility revolution’ advanced primarily by economists 
Angrist & Pischke (2010) and the subsequent discussion of instrumental variables in 
research design (e.g. Reiss (2005)). I therefore do not want to suggest that there are no 
other discussions of models.  However, the literature is in general quite fragmented. By 
this I mean that there are few references and connections between the different branches 
mentioned above. In relation to the literature on theoretical modelling discussed above, it 
is generally discussed as if this was mainly what economic modelling was about. In fact, 
the literature is not even qualified as ‘theoretical’. Another way to put this is that the 
philosophical literature on modelling paints a picture of economics as largely theoretical. 
The story by Hamermesh (2013) above and extended and clarified by Backhouse & 
Cherrier (2014) and Cherrier & Backhouse (2016) paints a very different picture: one in 
which economics has mostly relied on empirical models and that there was rather an 
exceptional period of ‘high theory’ in the fifties and sixties.  In this respect, the sceptics, 
though they have restricted their analysis to the role played by theoretical models alone, 
they have at least recognised the role of models within a more complex, broader practice.  
A similar point can be made about explanation (or understanding) as a favoured epistemic 
goal. Philosophers have generally associated theoretical models with the goals of 
                                               
20 I thank Emrah Aydinonat for suggesting this point. 
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explanation and understanding. There are, obviously, good reasons for this: the crucial 
question is whether it is possible to learn something from these models that are typically 
highly abstract and unrealistic. For example, Kuorikoski & Ylikoski (2015) write the 
following in the introduction of their paper (p. 3817-18):   
The importance of model-based reasoning in science has not gone unnoticed by 
philosophers, and the autonomy and perceived unrealisticness of most models 
have raised questions concerning the way in which they can provide 
understanding of the world. This puzzlement can be summed up in two 
questions. First, how can the manipulation of these surrogate systems provide 
genuinely new empirical understanding about the world? Second, how can 
models, which always incorporate assumptions that are literally untrue of the 
model target, provide explanations, if explanation is taken to be factive? 
The issue here, though, is two-fold: one has already been highlighted by Reiss (2008, 
Chapter 8) which is that among the goals that scientists could pursue, philosophers and 
some social scientists have favoured explanation. Reiss argues that there are other similarly 
important, attainable, and methodologically contentious goals such as description, 
prediction and control (or intervention) and that there are no valid reasons to favour 
explanation over the others. According to Reiss, the “new mechanistic perspective”, NMP, 
that has become fashionable lately in philosophy, emphasises the importance of 
investigating causal mechanisms and thereby of explanation as a goal, even when there are 
good reasons for investigating issues related to other goals. In the case of modelling we 
could say that the issue is that, while some models aim at explanation, it is not the only 
goal economic models have. Here the literature on modelling seems to be an instance of 
the phenomenon that Reiss highlights of systematically ignoring other aims. The way in 
which some of the authors discussed above define explanation and understanding, namely 
as knowledge of dependencies that in turn allow for correct what-if inferences, 
presupposes, in general, a mechanistic model which refers to an underlying structure or 
process that is causally responsible for the phenomenon of interest21.  In this way, because 
philosophers are concerned with explanation as a goal, they have tended to focus their 
attention on what they regard as mechanistic models. They have done so despite the lack 
of agreement about what actually constitutes a mechanism in the philosophical literature, 
with many different views on offer (Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000; Reiss, 2007). So, 
                                               
21 Reiss (2007) recognises that despite the many views of models available, there are three 
features that they all share. This one is one of them.  
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by favouring explanation, mechanistic models are the focus of attention, but it is even 
unclear how a mechanistic model is to be unequivocally identified.  
The other aspect of the issue is that explanation tends to be associated with mechanistic 
models, but they do not necessarily go together. Arguably, not all models that could be (or 
have been) regarded as mechanistic, aim at explanation. Tinbergen’s models of the Dutch 
economy or the MIT-Penn-Fed model, for instance, can be considered mechanistic since 
they attempt to capture the causal structure of the economy, but they are not models that 
aim at explanation. Some of Tinbergen’s models, for instance, had as main purpose the 
evaluation of different economic policies, among which was the abandonment of the gold 
standard and the subsequent devaluation of the Guilder (Maas, 2014). Likewise, the MIT-
Penn-Fed model was a collaboration between the Federal Reserve, the University of 
Pennsylvania, and the MIT. The Fed commissioned the model to Albert Ando, at U Penn, 
and to Franco Modigliani, at the MIT. The model’s purpose was forecasting as well as 
economic policy analysis. In particular, the Fed was interested in a model that would 
represent the monetary sector in a way that was adequate for the policy needs of the Fed. 
Existing models at the time did not have this feature (Backhouse & Cherrier, 2017). Surely, 
these models presuppose an understanding of the economy––that is, that the model correctly 
captures the causal structure of the economy––but they were used and assessed as forecasting 
devices (Backhouse & Cherrier, 2017). The problem is thus that among the models that 
can be regarded as mechanistic, prevalence has been given to those that attempt to explain 
phenomena, like Schelling’s. Kuorikoski and Ylikoski (2015) grant as much in a footnote 
in which they justify having chosen Schelling’s model as their case study (p. 3817):  
The checkerboard model is perhaps also the most used stock example in the 
philosophy of social science literature, and worries have been raised that using it 
repeatedly may have created biases in philosophical views. Granted, the 
checkerboard model might not be representative of economic and sociological 
models in general. However, as the model has been heralded as an example of a 
good explanation in social sciences (Sugden 2000; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010), 
it must embody at least some of the key virtues that social scientists expect their 
theoretical models to have.  
Another way to formulate the issue with explanation and mechanisms is as follows. Reiss 
(2008) has framed his discussion around the goals of science, motivating his discussion by 
asking whether philosophers have reasons to prescribe explanation as the most important 
goal and ignore the aims that scientists set for themselves. This, in turn involves, according 
to Reiss, prescribing the use of mechanistic models. The strongest argument he considers 
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according to which philosophers could be justified in doing so, would be if investigating 
mechanistic models attained other aims, aside from explanation. In that case, mechanistic 
models would be the best models of data (description), for prediction and control. Reiss 
concludes that for neither of those it is the case that mechanistic models are the best and 
therefore other kinds of models are also worth of enquiry. He defends enquiry into other 
models that are non-mechanistic because they respond to other aims. My point here is that 
there is a subset of mechanistic models that has other aims than explanation that has been 
neglected. If the literature on models only focusses on the mechanistic models that are 
explanatory, the subset of models being investigated is even more limited than if attention 
is given to mechanistic models in general. 
To conclude, after going through an important part of the literature on the epistemology 
of modelling, there is arguably very little that is useful as criteria to determine model failure. 
Finding these criteria has surely not been the purpose of any of the commentators I 
discussed here, so my aim here has not been to criticise them for this. My critique is instead 
that an aspect of modelling such as failure, which is at least as important as success, has 
been neglected in the extant philosophical accounts of models. Such neglect is arguably 
the result of the limited scope of the literature. I have shown that it is limited in at least 
three fronts. First, the literature has focussed almost exclusively on theoretical models. As 
I noted above, by 2011 pure theory represented less than a fifth of the type of research 
that was done in economics. Even though the interest of looking at models has been partly 
to understand the modelling practice, it is unclear, at best, that this is being achieved if the 
object of enquiry is not representative of the actual practice. In this sense, Alexandrova & 
Northcott (2009) are the only ones who seem to recognise that models are used in larger 
contexts. Their view is incomplete, because they restrict their analysis to the role of models 
as open formulae. Second, the literature has largely focussed on explanation and thereby 
on mechanistic models. Above I argued that the criteria offered by commentators to justify 
the explanatoriness of the Schelling models aren’t useful as criteria that may help us identify 
model failure. Third, even though there are mechanistic models that aim at other goals, 
only those that aim at explanations are the focus. In the chapter that follows I will look at 
some aspects that might be helpful to identify model failure and thereby broaden the scope 
of extant analyses. But first, I will look at some objections that could be raised against the 
analysis made so far in this chapter.   
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4. Objections 
In the previous section I discussed the general approach of each of the three branches of 
the philosophical literature on models and concluded that none of them offer criteria that 
are helpful to determine model failure. In this section I shall discuss two possible 
objections to the points I have raised. The first is that my concern about diagnosing and 
identifying possible sources of failure is not something that the philosophical literature 
should be concerned with. The second is that my concern is in fact addressed, just under 
a different name.  
4.1. Analysis of model failure is not the business of the philosophy of modelling 
The first objection that can be raised against my claim that philosophical theories of 
models do not offer relevant criteria to assess whether a model has failed (or is more likely 
to fail) is that this is simply not the business of theories of models. Another way to put it 
is that this is not necessarily a task that philosophers have set for themselves. If this is the 
case, the argument would go, then it’s pointless to expect that their accounts illuminate 
aspects of model failure. To be sure, a thorough discussion of this objection would lead 
me to discuss what the purpose of philosophy of modelling is, or even of the philosophy 
of science more generally. In particular, one could ask whether philosophy ought to have 
a normative character. I have a strong opinion on the matter; I think philosophy of science 
should be instrumental in conducing to better scientific practice. This requires profound 
understanding of the practice, involvement, and the aim for relevance. In this dissertation 
I attempt precisely to reconcile philosophical accounts with current practice. But I do 
recognise that this is a difficult philosophical question in itself and to properly defend my 
position would bring me too far away off topic. I will thus restrict myself to offer an 
argument based on a mere observation of the philosophical literature.  
First let me offer a reason for why philosophers who are concerned with modelling may 
not have been particularly interested in understanding model failure. Traditionally, 
philosophers have been interested in the success of science. As scientific theories are 
considered the facilitators of this success, understanding their structure became of primary 
importance for philosophers. In this context, models were discussed only in so far as they 
were related to theories. In the syntactic view of theories or the Received View, as it is also 
known, models are structures that satisfy sentences of the formal axiomatic calculus that 
are theories. So, models don’t have any significant role, except as playing a heuristic 
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one, facilitating the understanding of the formal calculus (Portides, 2008). The semantic 
view, which superseded the Received View, gives more importance to models. In this view 
theories are identified with classes of models and, unlike in the Received View, models do 
have representational capacity and are thus considered vehicles of scientific knowledge. 
However, just like with the syntactic view, the interest here is to define the structure of 
theories and how such structure may be interpreted. In this case, such a structure is 
considered to be a family of models that yield the theory true. Arguably, therefore, the 
literature that has paid attention to models has traditionally attempted to offer a 
philosophically sound reconstruction of theories, which has little to do with appraising 
models independently from theories. The analysis of failure of models in this context could 
thus seem unnecessary or even incoherent. 
There are, however, at least two reasons for why it could still be expected that current 
literature on models has something to say about model failure. The first reason is simply 
that philosophers have somehow moved on from the syntactic and semantic views and 
have endorsed a third, pragmatic view. This view, first defended by Cartwright (1983), 
incorporates many aspects about the practice of science that were previously neglected, 
such as the fact that models, and not theories, are crucial for understanding science and 
therefore should be the unit of analysis of philosophers22. Morrison & Morgan (1999) gave 
impetus to this new project, by arguing (and compiling work that also argued) that models 
are autonomous and only partially dependent upon theory and data. Recent literature has 
therefore focussed on models as autonomous objects and on understanding the role that 
scientific models play in science, as discussed above.  
The second reason is that, aside from this new approach to understanding and 
characterising scientific practice, some philosophers seem to have a genuine interest in 
offering guidance as to how scientific practice may be improved. A good example is, again, 
Nancy Cartwright, who in her later work has striven to understand the extent to which 
causal claims are warranted, often offering guidance to policy makers with respect to the 
extent to which the alleged effects of certain policies may be warranted or not. For sure 
there are many other philosophers in the causality debates who have the same interest in 
providing relevant analyses for how causal claims are warranted, but Cartwright is certainly 
one of the very few who has got the attention of practitioners, at least from the point of 
                                               
22 See Winther (2016) for details. 
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view of economics (e.g. Deaton & Cartwright, 2016). So, this single instance suggests that 
there are indeed philosophers of science who have normative aims.  
In general, it is not easy to identify what the specific purposes of philosophers are or what 
their stance is with respect to the normativity of the philosophy of science. The philosophy 
of modelling is surely not an exception. There are some cases in which the purposes of 
philosophers are, at best, confusing. For instance, in his book Michael Weisberg (2013) 
mentions in the preface that the book is an attempt to synthesise his 15-year-long thinking 
about why modellers often use incompatible and highly idealised models. This suggests 
that he is in the business of understanding and conceptualising the modelling practice. The 
interest appears to be solely philosophical—“Is there a satisfactory philosophical account 
of models that explains how models are used by scientists?” seems to be the question 
Weisberg is trying to answer. Later in the book, when he discusses why he will be 
considering only three kinds of models––and not more and not less––he corroborates this 
purely philosophical interest by suggesting that he has opted for an “epistemic level of 
philosophical theorising”, whose purpose is to answer the question of how many 
categories of models are needed in order to build an account of model-based theorising. 
Other options, which he has discarded for his analysis are, “face-value practice of science”, 
which would force him to ask the question of how many types of models scientists talk 
about, or an ontological perspective, in which he would ask the question of how many 
kinds of models there exist (p. 20):  
When I say that there are three kinds of models, I’m not making a purely 
descriptive claim about how many categories of models are recognised by 
scientists, nor am I making a point about fundamental ontology. Rather, I am 
arguing that a philosophical account of models and modelling needs these three 
categories to account for modelling as it is practised in contemporary science.  
It is unclear whether the philosophical account of models that Weisberg has in mind is 
something that speaks to scientists. He doesn’t say much about how this philosophical 
account relates to the scientists’ perspectives or how it idealises or abstracts from their 
practice. In other words, it’s unclear how the epistemic level of theorising he has chosen 
relates to the face-value practice of science. Nevertheless, towards the end of the book, 
Weisberg claims that his account of models offers a framework that may be helpful for 
scientists to “locate sources of disagreement and to give scientists a way to explicitly 
formulate their standards of fidelity” (p. 174). A case would have to be made for why such 
an account that explicitly deviates from the scientific understanding of models is actually 
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capable of speaking to scientists. Weisberg doesn’t make such a case and his purposes are, 
as a consequence, confusing. For he intends to offer a philosophical account and 
presumably to be relevant for the scientific practice, without really explaining how the two 
views relate to each other.  
Another case that shows at least some ambivalence with respect to the motivations of 
philosophers to put forward a certain account is the following. In Kuorikoski et al. (2010, 
p. 541), it is argued that a great part of theoretical modelling in economics is dedicated to 
carrying out robustness analysis:  
A substantial portion of this modelling activity is devoted to deriving known 
results from alternative or sparser modelling assumptions. Why do economists 
spend so much time and effort in deriving the same results from slightly different 
assumptions? The key to understanding this practise [sic] is, we propose, to view 
it as a form of robustness analysis […]. 
One could argue that this is merely an idealisation of the practice. Presumably, such a 
characterisation allowed them to discuss the epistemic import of robustness analysis. While 
such an idealisation may offer the opportunity to discuss the epistemic import of 
robustness analysis, it may be difficult for practitioners to recognise themselves in such an 
activity, especially if the motivation of the account seems to arise from the description of 
a situation.   
These are clearly just two instances of the literature so it would be inappropriate to draw 
any strong conclusions from them. But these two instances do show that philosophers 
may have different aims with their contributions, and these are not always clear. This 
situation may generate analytical problems, for different conceptual frameworks may be 
used, depending on whether the purpose is to offer a philosophically sound account of 
scientific practice or whether it is to offer relevant criteria that may be helpful for scientists 
to improve their modelling practices. It may also have some practical consequences. One 
could be that scientists intending to rely on philosophical contributions to illuminate their 
methodological stance may dismiss the entire literature as irrelevant if they don’t identify 
themselves with the philosophers’ portrayal of their practice. This may, in fact, be one of 
the reasons why despite the vast amount work there is in the philosophy of economics, 
there is little collaboration or interest from practitioners to look at philosophical work. So, 
this situation suggests that philosophers, at the very least, should try to make the purposes 
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of their analyses explicit. Otherwise, they run the risk of being targets of analyses like this 
one, which demands things from them that they may have never set to do in the first place.  
4.2. There is philosophical discussion of model failure; just not in the modelling 
literature.   
Another objection is that there is philosophical discussion of model failure, but just not in 
the modelling literature. Another way to frame this objection is that I have created a straw 
man to build my case, because there is philosophical discussion of model failure, just under 
a different name and I have ignored it. There is quite some work both in economic 
methodology and general philosophy of science that deal with related issues. In economic 
methodology, Boumans (2005), Morgan (1988), and den Butter & Morgan (1998) are three 
examples of commentators who have discussed models in a broader context (than the 
limited one discussed above)and who have engaged with their means of appraisal. Morgan 
(1988) discusses the strategies that econometricians of the first half of the 20th century 
employed in order to bring together theoretical insights, which didn’t have the necessary 
statistical properties, and statistical techniques in order to find satisfactory empirical 
models, which meant that they had to work well with the data available. Boumans (2008) 
does something similar, looking at a longer period and exploring the different ways in 
which economists (econometricians) attempted to validate their models given the statistical 
developments brought by the time. Den Butter & Morgan (1998) go beyond strict 
modelling practices and discuss the role that empirical models play in policy making by 
means of how policy makers use policy advice and how this feeds back in the modelling 
process. In a number of case studies, they discuss different institutional arrangements in 
which the interaction between modellers and policy makers take place; the ‘value chain’ of 
the interaction, or how each party attains value from the interaction; and attempt to 
determine some organisational (institutional) conditions that have to be in place for the 
interaction between policy makers and academic economists to be successful.  
This literature offers important insights about the processes of model construction and 
use, the difficulties with which modellers might have been confronted, the methodological 
questions that have emerged given the techniques favoured by economists and the goals 
being pursued at different times, and the interaction between policy makers and modellers. 
These are clearly important insights that can contribute to a cogent understanding of model 
failure. After all, the difficulties raised by say, incompatible theoretical and statistical 
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frameworks, as discussed by Morgan (1988) or the incontestable authority that a model 
can have over expert advice in policy decision making, as discussed by den Butter & 
Morgan (1998) seem like good candidates for potential sources of model failure. However, 
there are two reasons for why this literature hasn’t been discussed above and is therefore 
not the object of my criticism. First, , this work doesn’t address the question of model 
failure explicitly—to the contrary, they are mostly focussed on cases of success—which is 
my interest here. And, second, in some cases it is more historical- than philosophically 
oriented. By this I mean that there is more interest in detailed description of (historical), 
sometimes comparative, cases than in offering more abstract and general accounts of 
models and modelling, as the ones discussed above 23. Therefore, while these detailed 
analyses might offer crucial insights for understanding model failure, they are not general 
theories of models.  There’s also the work of those who might be considered the first 
generation of economic methodologists, such as Terence Hutchison (1988) and Mark 
Blaug (1980), who dedicated a great deal of attention to the appraisal of economic theories. 
Their view was heavily influenced by Popper and Lakatos, which in turn lead Blaug to 
dismiss large chunks of economics as not fulfilling the Popperian/Lakatosian standards. 
These two approaches have been largely dismissed in philosophy of science, among other 
reasons, for their approach to the demarcation problem.  
In philosophy of science––as opposed to economic methodology, specifically––there are 
also commentators who have dealt with aspects that may be interpreted as signs of 
scientific failure. Literature on social epistemology addresses issues about expertise and 
aggregation of judgement, the reliability (or lack thereof) of peer review and the 
communication of scientific findings to the public. These are issues that clearly raise 
questions about the reliability of science and knowledge in general. The literature on 
climate models in the philosophy of science, specifically on the inconsistencies between 
                                               
23 It has been brought to my attention that this claim about orientation towards philosophy 
or history as characteristic of some work might be contentious.  To be sure, especially in 
interdisciplinary work that reflects upon scientific practice the distinction becomes blurry, 
which is, quite possibly, a positive state of affairs. However, two points should be noted. First, 
that the work is considered “oriented towards history” doesn’t imply that there is no 
philosophy there. Second, it is difficult to ignore that we continue to operate within fixed 
institutional disciplinary boundaries; we read and publish in philosophy-, economics-, 
sociology-, etc. journals; cite and are cited by clusters of scholars with fixed professional 
identities—e.g. philosopher, historian—, and attend conferences that, though perhaps in 
spirit interdisciplinary, are generally frequented by rather homogeneous crowds.  Still, I 
recognise that these are the boundaries that we need to break in order to bring about the 
kind of disciplinary changes this dissertation argues for.  
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models and different ensembles (W. S. Parker, 2006) and the role of values influencing 
uncertainty estimates (W. Parker, 2014; Winsberg, 2012) also have to do with reliability of 
models and estimates. So, there is surely other literature out there that I’m leaving out.  
My aim is, in fact, to a certain extent, to raise the question why philosophical accounts of  
modelling in economics have not been permeated by these insights, which speak clearly 
about an aspect of the use of models for practical purposes. So, if anything, what I’m 
suggesting is that philosophical accounts of modelling in economics should also 
contemplate these aspects as constitutive of the modelling practice. The philosophical 
accounts I have discussed above analyse models in isolation and for very specific purposes, 
such as explanation or understanding; models are used for more than that. A proper 
understanding of the practice of modelling is incomplete without contemplating what 
makes it successful and what makes it fail. Above I showed that the attempts that have 
been made so far to explain the success of models are not sufficient to explain their failure.  
Conclusions 
The literature on models, perhaps as much as the general philosophy of science, has been 
motivated by the success of science and the role that models play in such an achievement. 
Taking as a basis the recent accusations by different types of commentators have made of 
economic models, my aim has been to explore different aspects of the literature in 
philosophy, to evaluate the extent to which extant philosophical accounts of models offer 
lessons or insights about model failure. My approach to model failure has been similar to 
the way in which accidents in aviation are investigated: finding the weak links in the chains 
of events that go from the technical to the human factors, all with sight towards accident 
prevention. I have explored the philosophical literature on models from the perspective of 
their ontology, their semantics and their epistemology with the aim to find possible 
accounts of model failure. From my analysis, I have concluded that current accounts of 
models, especially those concerned with how models relate to the world, namely the 
literature on semantics and epistemology, have little to offer in this respect. This matters 
for a literature that is concerned with understanding scientific practice and the role of 
models. The understanding of scientific practice and the role that models play there cannot 
be complete if failure, as much as success, is not reliably accounted for.  
To engage with the literature on semantics, I discuss the conditions that Frigg & Nguyen 
(2016) have argued a theory of scientific representation should have in order to be a 
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satisfactory theory of scientific representation. The conditions they establish are based on 
different accounts of representation and objections raised that so far have been provided 
in this literature. I also discuss Weisberg’s account (2013) of modelling, an account that 
has formalised its notion of similarity. I argue that, as it is perhaps to be expected from a 
theory of scientific representation alone, which attempts to track successful and 
accurate representation, it is not sufficient to judge why or how a model has 
failed. Successful or accurate representation does not track epistemic import or inferential 
reliability.  
With respect to the epistemology of models, I explore the literature in the philosophy of 
economics that has offered appraisals of the epistemic import of models. This literature 
has focussed to a great extent on Schelling’s model of spatial segregation. As this model 
has received a great deal of attention, one might expect that clear criteria have been offered 
that explain the success of this model, which in turn could offer lessons for identifying 
failure. I suggest that the extant contributions limit themselves to argue, or rather justify, 
that it’s possible to ,depending on the account, learn or understand from this model, but 
that the criteria offered for this remains silent about possible reasons for failure. In fact, in 
some cases, I have suggested, the given accounts for success are invalid. In general, the 
focus on theoretical models alone and on explanation as an epistemic criterion, at the 
expense of the neglect of others, make the literature very limited and thereby has little to 
offer in terms of criteria that can offer insights into how to identify model failure.  
Later in this dissertation I will argue that the lack of such criteria, or at least attempts to 
shed light on model failure, an essential feature of the modelling activity, calls for a new 
turn in the modelling literature, namely towards the pragmatics of modelling. A first stab at 
this will be offered in the chapter that follows. 
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Knowledge and error flow from the same mental sources, only success can tell the one from the other. 
—Ernst Mach 
 
Towards a Pragmatic Account of Modelling––Amending Mäki.  
Introduction 
Extant accounts of models have generally focussed on understanding the success of models or, in 
other words, the features that allow models to have epistemic import. Accounts that focus on 
representation try to explain the success of models by means of the type of representational 
relation that they have with their targets. Other accounts try to somehow measure the epistemic 
import of models––what is it that we can actually learn from models? Do models afford 
knowledge? Knowledge of possibilities? Is knowledge of possibilities knowledge? Understanding?  
However, almost no account has attempted to understand model failure, what it entails, or how to 
detect it. If philosophical accounts are meant to understand the role that models play in scientific 
practice, they must be able to account for success as much as failure: both are part and parcel of 
scientific practice and modelling in general. In this chapter, I argue that accounts of success can’t 
double up as accounts of failure and therefore an explicit analysis of model failure is necessary. 
Furthermore, I argue that an analysis of model failure demands a pragmatic approach that views 
modelling as a process. Some commentators have focussed on parts of this process, but not in a 
sufficiently comprehensive way. Mäki (2017) is the only account that, in order to accommodate 
failure, has included pragmatic elements. I will argue that at least three further elements must be 
part of an account that attempts to understand failure.  
The development of the chapter is as follows. In section two I argue that accounts of success do 
not work simultaneously as accounts of failure. In section three I discuss the idea of modelling as 
a process and some of the accounts that focus on this process even if just partly. Then, in section 
four, I discuss Mäki’s attempt to accommodate failure in his account. In section five I discuss the 
three elements with which I amend Mäki’s account. Section six concludes.  
2. Why study failure if you can study success? 
There are at least two important reasons why philosophy of science ought to be engaged with 
understanding model failure. The first is that philosophers of science claim to be interested in 
understanding scientific practice. Both the success and failure of science are equally significant 
parts of the practice. An accurate understanding of the latter demands, at the very least, an interest 
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in both. In fact, if one defends a view that philosophy (and science, in general) ought to have 
societal value, as some university administrators claim nowadays, a focus on failure is perhaps even 
more pressing: the loss of value in terms of unemployment, foreclosures, bankruptcy, as well as 
the suffering of many due to the recent economic slump––that was allegedly a failure of models–
–call for attention to failure as a priority. Furthermore, as demonstrated by engineering practice, 
specifically the attempt to understand human error in disasters such as The Challenger or Chernobyl 
in 1986 (Reason, 1990), we can learn from the study of failure. A second reason is perhaps more 
controversial but not necessarily less important. If the role of the philosopher of economics, or of 
any other social science, is to play a role in the unification of the sciences, or in the way in which 
the sciences can offer complementary perspectives on the understanding of the social realm, as 
Ross (2014, Chapter 1) has argued, then the understanding of both success and failure is 
paramount. Only a comprehensive understanding of a discipline, of its strengths and weaknesses 
can allow philosophers to compare and gauge what each discipline has to contribute to the cross-
disciplinary understanding of social reality. For economics, a model-based science, this inevitably 
means to be able to make assessments of models in all areas of the discipline and regardless of 
whether they are mainstream or not.  
Some might think that there is little reason to worry about failure, at least explicitly, as I have done 
here, because any account of success serves equally as an account of failure. Not meeting the 
criteria for success is failure. If, as I argued in the previous chapter, philosophy of science is 
concerned only, or mostly, with accounts of why science in general, or models in particular, are 
successful, some might argue that philosophy is already fulfilling its task because, by implication, 
the accounts of success are also accounts of failure. While this position might sound intuitive, and 
might in fact have fed the reason for the neglect of failure in the philosophy of science, it is 
incorrect.  
There are two aspects to consider. First, its logic. Success in science is normally defined using 
sufficient conditions. That is, whatever conditions have been found in the modelling literature or 
elsewhere that yield success, it is quite likely that there are other sets (known or not) that also yield 
success. In chapter two I offered sufficient conditions for learning. Now, if meeting criteria S 
implies that we have success, we can conclude that the absence of success is failure to meet these 
criteria S. It is obviously not the case, however, that not meeting criteria S implies failure. Now 
consider that here I’m suggesting that we might be able to identify a set of criteria F that yields 
failure. Someone who claims that failure can accurately be defined as lack of success would have 
to show that not meeting criteria S is the same as meeting criteria F. 
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The second aspect is something I already hinted at in the previous chapter, namely, the role of 
expectations in determining whether a model is regarded as success or failure. The possibility to 
judge failure is expectations-dependent whereas success is not. This means that if there’s clarity 
about what is expected from a model, it is relatively straightforward to assess whether it has met 
those expectations, in which case it is considered a success and otherwise a failure. However, when 
there are no expectations, or at least these aren’t explicit, a model may be regarded as a success, 
say, because it accomplished something the model was not expected to do, but not a failure.  
Let me offer an example to illustrate this. Every professional cyclist who has a balanced 
performance in terms of both speed and (climb) endurance, aims to win the three grand rounds 
of Europe: Tour de France, Vuelta a España and Giro d’Italia. Nairo Quintana is a Colombian 
professional cyclist, team leader of the Movistar team, who has won two of the three: the Giro 
d’Italia and the Vuelta a España. He has been second at the Tour de France twice, the most 
prestigious of all. In 2017, he was expected to fight Chris Froome, Sky team runner and winner of 
the last three Tours de France, for the first place. Quintana, in the end, did poorly: he finished 12th 
in the general classification. Pundits thought it was foolish of his team’s strategy to participate in 
the Giro d’Italia, which takes place in May, if the goal was to win the Tour de France, which takes 
place just over a month later. We can say that Quintana failed, according to the expectations that 
were set for his performance.  
Now take Mikel Landa, a Basque support rider for Chris Froome in the Sky team. He is an excellent 
rider, who also run the Giro last year and won a stage. But there were no expectations at the Tour 
de France for him as an individual rider because there were several other contenders for the first 
place1 and, more importantly, because his job in the Tour de France was precisely to make sure 
Froome could keep the maillot jaune––the yellow jersey that the first runner in the general 
classification wears. Landa was in such a good shape throughout the Tour, that on stage 18th, which 
finished on the Izoard, a long, massive climb, Landa made an attack that raised suspicions among 
commentators whether he was running as support for Froome or to improve his own standing in 
the general classification and perhaps take the yellow jersey himself. In the end, he finished the 
Tour de France 4th in the general classification, just one second away from making it to the podium. 
In Landa’s case, there were no expectations that he would be so strong and finish in such a good 
place. His performance was considered successful––he got a contract to run in the Movistar team, 
as leader, at the Giro d’Italia in 2018. 
                                               
1 See Fotheringham (2017). 
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What this example illustrates is that commentators have been able to regard Landa’s performance 
as successful, despite the fact that there were no expectations for him. Instead, the performance 
of Quintana has been considered a massive failure. The point is thus that appraisals of failure are 
expectation-dependent, whereas success is expectation-independent: an appraisal of success can 
be made without there being previous expectations. 
Some might argue that having no expectations is itself an expectation. So that the fact that there 
were no expectations about Landa’s performance is an expectation. In that case, expectations are 
somehow inevitable, the only difference is whether they are made explicit or not. So those about 
Quintana were explicit whilst those about Landa were not. That might well be the case. But that 
is, in any case, all I need to make my point. As external observers––of models or professional 
cyclists––it is necessary to be aware of these expectations in order to appraise something as a 
failure. In order to have this knowledge, expectations have to be made explicit: We need to know 
what the model (or the cyclist) was supposed to do in the first place. We can’t judge some 
economic models as failures for not having predicted the crisis if that is not what they were meant 
or expected to do. Instead, a model such as Schelling’s can and has been regarded as successful in 
offering explanations of urban segregation regardless of whether that is what Schelling expected 
the model to do2.  
In short, given that the criteria of success so far offered are most likely only sufficient conditions 
and that analysis of failure is expectation-dependent, an explicit analysis of failure, independent of 
that of success, is necessary for a comprehensive understanding of the modelling practice.  
3. Modelling as a process 
I have previously suggested that a way to understand models and the ways in which they might fail 
is to use a similar approach to how accidents are investigated in aviation. Part of the idea is thus 
to look at the ‘chain of events’ or the process of how models are conceived, built, and used. Such 
an approach and aspects inherent to modelling such as the role of expectations in judging failure 
that I just discussed are what I will call a pragmatic approach to modelling. This pragmatic 
approach not only traces the chain of events in modelling; it also considers different contexts in 
which models are used, how they are used by different agents, and how they might play in 
                                               
2 In the introduction of Schelling’s Micromotives and Macrobehavior, Schelling describes how he 
was always very curious about how people arrange themselves. He gives a very vivid example of how 
he noticed how people sorted themselves out in a venue in which he was going to give a talk. This 
suggests, at least, that his model arose out of mere curiosity for phenomena which involves people’s 
motives and the behaviour that arises as an emergent property and not because he intended to 
explain the process of racial segregation in particular.    
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arguments in which authority and power also play a role. Here I present an outline for a pragmatic 
approach to modelling, and focus in particular on elements that might be potential sources of 
model failure.  
Let me start with the ‘chain of events’, or the process of how models are conceived, built and used. 
Obviously, there is a part of this that is not new. Some of the literature I discussed above 
presupposes this process and engages with a particular aspect of it. The branch of semantics, for 
instance, in particular the more recent accounts that are defined as pragmatic accounts of 
representation, recognise the importance of agency and purpose for representation to take place. 
However, in that literature the emphasis is given to the kind of relationship that is formed between 
a model and its target in the abstract. My interest here is that the process from conception to use 
is acknowledged and analysed as such, such that weak joints or spots, in which risk of failure is 
higher, can be identified. Another way to put it is that I’m interested in an approach that is 
accurately descriptive and at the same time capable of offering independent philosophical 
assessment.  
There are other commentators who have addressed parts of the process explicitly. Mary Morgan 
(2012) discusses extensively, through a number of different models as examples, different aspects 
of models, their conception and their use. With respect to their conception, for instance, she 
discusses the Edgeworth Box (2012, Chapter 6), the role played by visualisation in its conception 
and how indifference and contract curves became standard in economics after this model, thanks 
to the possibility that visualisation of these curves offered. Marcel Boumans (1999) too has 
discussed a part of the process of modelling. Specifically, he has focussed on how models are built 
and has emphasised how this process brings together different ingredients. Boumans suggests that 
model building is like baking a cake without a recipe, because it is a process of trial and error, 
although there is already a good idea beforehand of what a cake should look and taste like. He 
emphasises that multiple ingredients are needed, which include functional forms or results of other 
models, as well as policy views and empirical facts.  
The problem with the analyses of these commentators is that, like the others I have discussed 
above, they have focussed exclusively on the positive aspects of models, much at the expense of 
their weaknesses and possible sources of failure. Boumans’s main claim is that the possibility to 
build a completely new model from different ingredients, without later being able to discern the 
individual ingredients is evidence of their built-in justification. This is in contrast to other 
commentators who argue that models are built and then tested against empirical data for their 
justification. Morgan, on the other hand, avoids making general claims about models; she prefers 
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to engage with the details of each of the cases she treats. Sometimes she discusses how certain 
aspects of the modelling practice might be criticised or how they might have less epistemic import 
than other methods, but she is more focussed on highlighting the aspects that make each model 
interesting or significant for the discipline, rather than attempt to generalise why models might 
fail. Her aim, in her own words is “to present, as three-star tourist sites, some of the best known, 
and historically significant, models in economics” (2012, p. xv). 
Mäki’s (2017) account of models as representations can also be interpreted as focussing on (a part 
of) the modelling process. Mäki (2005, 2009) has generally defended a view of models as 
representations that allow modellers to isolate mechanisms of interest. He builds on the account 
of models by Giere (1990, 2004, 2006, 2010) as representations in terms of similarity. The basic 
tenet of this and other pragmatic accounts of representation is that representation is not seen as a 
dyadic relation between a model and its target, but as a many-placed relation that includes 
subjective elements such as agents’ intentions and/or interpretation. The representational relation 
between a model and its target is determined by the agent who uses the model as a stand-in for 
the target3. Just like Giere, Mäki has offered his account of models as representational devices in 
which the emphasis is on the kind of the representational relation––Mäki defends resemblance, 
rather than similarity. However, over the years Mäki has modified his account, each time adding 
more elements that belong to the praxis of modelling. While Giere has defended the 
representational relation as a four-placed relation (“agent A uses model M to represent (part of 
the) world W for purpose P”), Mäki has continued to add elements to his account. In his (2009) 
the number of elements were six––agent, model, target, purpose, commentary and audience––and 
in his (2017) he had added another two––description and context. The fact that Mäki continues 
to add places to the representational relation4 in order to be able to accommodate features of the 
modelling practice such as failure, demonstrates that the view that tries to frame the modelling 
practice purely in terms of representation is limited, ultimately misguided, and lends credibility to 
the need for a pragmatic account of models. 
Another aspect of Mäki’s (2017) account that requires attention is that it has dealt with model 
failure explicitly. I consider his approach to analyse model failure wanting in some respects, but 
some of the elements of his account are useful to characterise the process I’m interested in.  
Therefore, Mäki’s account deserves a separate section.  
 
                                               
3 See Giere (2004) for a defence of the pragmatic aspects of representation in models, which suggests 
the emphasis ought to be in the act of representing rather than on representation.  
4 See Knuuttila (2005) for a critique on the emphasis on models as representational devices. 
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4. Mäki on failure 
Let me introduce Mäki’s account as it is presented in Mäki (2017). Mäki’s departing point, as that 
of many other contemporary philosophers, is that the representational relation between a model 
and its target is not a simple two-placed relationship between the model and its target. A model 
doesn’t represent its target unless there is some agent that intends this in the first place. In 
consequence, many philosophers now agree that for an object to represent something else, the 
relation between the object and what it is meant to represent is much more complex than the 
simple dyadic relation. Even though it is clear that the relation is not dyadic, different accounts 
have been offered about the kind of relation necessary for representation. Mäki’s own account has 
itself changed, becoming more and more complex. His last version [ModRep] is as follows: (Mäki, 
2017, p. 6): 
Agent A   
uses multi-component object M as  
a representative of (actual or possible) target R 
for purpose P,  
addressing audience E,  
at least potentially prompting genuine issues of relevant resemblance between M and R to arise;  
describing M and drawing inferences about M and R in terms of one or more model descriptions 
D;  
applies commentary C to identify and coordinate the other components;  
and all this takes place within a context X.  
 
Briefly, what this means is the following: An agent A stipulates that a model M will act as a stand-
in for target R. This target can be an actual target, say the British labour market, or a possible one, 
such as an abstract process like the core-periphery concentration of economic activity. Agent A 
wants to use model M as a stand-in for the target for a particular purpose P. That purpose can be 
epistemic, such as explanation or non-epistemic, such as aiding in policy making5. The agent also 
has a particular audience in mind. Here Mäki talks about kinds of audiences, so academic, non-
academic, experts, etc. He also talks about a purpose in addressing that specific audience, so to 
communicate, to persuade, to impress, to educate, etc. To prompt genuine issues of relevant 
                                               
5 Mäki only gives examples of these two purposes in passing and therefore doesn’t say much about 
what exactly he means by “aiding in policy making”. Considering that some models are meant to 
simulate the effects of a particular policy (and therefore learn about the possible effects), it is 
controversial that they are considered as non-epistemic by Mäki.  
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resemblance means that it is not enough that the agent merely stipulates a model as a stand-in for 
a target. It is necessary that i) the model has a likely capacity of resemblance with (or 
correspondence to) the target, “so resemblance must not be utopian” and ii) that irrelevant 
resemblances do not count. Furthermore, Mäki makes a distinction between the model and the 
model descriptions. The former is taken by Mäki to be imagined abstract objects, whereas the 
latter are the concrete items in which the model is typically expressed: mathematical symbols, 
narratives, diagrams, checkerboards, etc. The point here is that the modeller draws inferences 
about the model and the target in terms of these model descriptions. With the commentary, the 
idea is that the modeller makes explicit how the other components hang together: “Its task is to 
identify the various components of representation and to align them with one another”. Finally, 
there is a context in which this all takes place. Mäki doesn’t specify much more than this. 
Now let me discuss Mäki’s take on modelling failure. Let me start by his motivation. Mäki seems 
to be motivated mainly by a worry about the themes with which philosophy of science ought to 
be concerned. His point is thus broader in scope than mine when he argues that philosophy of 
science should pay more attention to the failures of science. He suggests that philosophy has 
been mostly concerned with those aspects of science that make it successful, and that in turn it 
has paid less attention to other aspects, like its failures, that constitute science and its practice just 
as much as the successes. He thus claims that “Developing accounts of the nature, conditions and 
dynamics of both failure and success should be on the philosophy of science’s agenda. Ability to 
produce such accounts should be one of the criteria of success of philosophy of science itself” 
(p.2). Models here are thus an important but not the only element of science that should be 
analysed in terms failure. In this paper, Mäki focusses on models as a prominent style of scientific 
enquiry.   
In his paper, Mäki identifies two types of modelling failure. On the one hand, he suggests, there is 
failure in modelling failures in the target system. By this he means that, there might be failure in 
modelling some targets to which we can ascribe a state of functioning properly but that may 
experience sudden breakdowns: heart failure in a properly functioning human body, for 
instance. Failure to model the heart failure in an otherwise healthy body is one kind of failure. This 
is analogous to the “failure in economic [models] to model the failures of the financial system” 
(2017, p. 3). The model captures correctly the properly functioning heart or economy, but can’t 
account for the sudden breakdown. Mäki calls this “double failure”: failure to account for the 
failure. The other kind of failure Mäki identifies is failure in modelling, which is when the model 
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fails to model its target in its proper, “normal” functioning. Mäki focusses on the “double failure”, 
since it better represents the failure of models in the context of the financial crisis6.   
Mäki recognises that there are currently many different accounts of modelling in the philosophical 
literature and claims that the capacity of any of these accounts to deal with model failure may be 
considered to be one of the criteria to judge their success as philosophical accounts. Since he has 
an account of his own [ModRep], Mäki’s purpose is to ‘test’ it, by determining how much it has to 
say about model failure. 
There are many such accounts [of models] available in the literature, and the challenge is 
to compare them for their credentials. One obvious way to proceed is to check them 
against empirical evidence concerning actual models and actual modelling practices. And 
provided we take these practices to include failures, then the capacity of the philosophical 
accounts in dealing with such failures may be taken as a major criterion of the success of 
those accounts (p.2).   
Mäki doesn’t offer an argument for why his account is capable of accommodating modelling 
failure. Instead, once he has stated that he is interested in only one particular kind of modelling 
failure, the “double failure”, he proceeds with a discussion of how each of the components of his 
account is allegedly capable of accommodating different sources of modelling failure. The test is 
thus, presumably, that if each of the components of his account is somehow able to deal with 
aspects of modelling failure, then the account can be regarded as having passed the test. It is not 
really clear, however, what being able to deal with aspects of the modelling failure is.   
Since Mäki proposes this test and suggests that every account of modelling should be subject to 
testing, one could argue that he, at least implicitly, offers a model or framework to test other 
philosophical accounts of models for their capacity to say something about model failure. That is, 
in principle, we could use Mäki’s way of proceeding to test his own account, namely to go through 
each of the components of the account, to do the same with other accounts. In fact, by claiming 
that a measure of the success of a philosophical account of models is its capacity to account for 
model failure, Mäki seems to be inviting proponents of other accounts to carry out such test of 
their own accounts. I could use such a procedure for my own purposes: if my interest is to explore 
what accounts of models have to say about model failure, I could follow his example and do what 
he does with other accounts.  
                                               
6 Dani Rodrik (2015, Chapter 5) also suggests something similar when he claims that the financial 
crisis can be interpreted as an ‘error of omission’ given that many of the causes have been analysed 
and understood by economists, but that they ignored these models for favouring others that support 
the idea that markets are efficient and don’t need intervention.  
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The problem, however, is that Mäki says very little about what the test consists of. Except for 
suggesting that the accounts need to be checked against evidence related with actual models and 
modelling practices, it is unclear what the test is about. In fact, it seems that Mäki pursues two 
different projects in his paper. He first suggests that any account of models has to be tested for its 
capacity to accommodate failure as much as success. The test supposedly involves checking 
accounts against models or modelling practices. I can think of one way to do this, namely that one 
would take a model or a cluster of models and assess whether it is capable of accurately performing 
under normal circumstances and under a target failure, following Mäki’s definition of failure. In 
order to do this, some kind of criterion would be necessary to determine what it is to perform well 
under normal circumstances and what it is to fail. Then, the test of the account would be to see 
whether the account is capable of accounting for or explaining the failure. Instead, what Mäki does 
is show, or rather attempt to show, that there might be sources of failure that could be categorised 
in each of the components of [ModRep]:  
 
The components [ModRep] and their relations will next be investigated as potential loci 
and sources of modelling failure. It appears that many existing critiques of economic 
modelling can be construed as focusing on some specific component in the structure of 
[ModRep] and that some other possible critiques can also be envisaged within this 
framework (Mäki, 2017, p. 6). 
What he ultimately does is a classification exercise. To be more specific, Mäki starts with the first 
component of his account <<agent A>> and discusses some of the criticisms that have been made 
about models that could potentially be classified as a failure of the agent using the model. He 
continues with <<uses multi-component object M>>, and so on, until he reaches his last component 
<<context X>>. For instance, his discussion of <<addressing audience E>> is based on a criticism 
by Joseph Stiglitz and John Quiggin, stating that, prior to the crisis, there was the belief among 
leading academics and politicians that unregulated markets have self-stabilising capacities, and that 
their beliefs were mutually reinforced, leading them to ignore important aspects of the economy. 
This criticism signals the failure of overspecialised economic work and the prevalence given to 
ideas that are more likely to be accepted by the discipline as a whole. Mäki discusses this in terms 
of test partners as the first curators of the ideas that are disseminated to the larger audiences like 
academic journals and conference presentations. In general, the problem here seems to be that 
audiences determine to a great extent the ideas that are disseminated and, in this case, there was 
lack of a big picture because other aspects like technical details prevailed in the current audiences 
being addressed. Presumably, since the criticism is categorised in one of Mäki’s components, this 
makes his account successful in dealing with this kind of model failure.  
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This way of proceeding can’t be considered a test. If in order to test other accounts we were to 
proceed in the same way as Mäki does, namely by classifying criticisms into the different 
components in each of the accounts, we wouldn’t really be able to appraise that account. Suppose 
that we proceed in the same way to test Giere’s account. We would then classify the criticisms into 
the four components of Giere’s account: agent A, uses model M to represent target T for purpose 
P.  So, for instance, the problem I just mentioned that Mäki classifies as belonging to audience, in 
Giere’s account it would have to be classified as of the agent A, or perhaps the purpose P. Giere’s 
classification would just be coarser than Mäki’s.  
Perhaps one could make the case that Mäki’s is a better account because it classifies potential 
failure more precisely, but that would require at least two extra steps. First, that the accounts be 
compared. In this case, the test would no longer be of the individual accounts with respect to 
models but among accounts. Second, that we come up with some criteria that allows us to judge 
which account accommodates failure better. It is far from obvious that the number of components 
is a useful criterion to compare accounts of models and to determine that the more components 
an account has, the better it is.  
If Mäki’s exercise does not constitute a test for the capacity to account for model failure, how does 
it help us to better understand model failure? Or, in other words, what do we learn from Mäki’s 
account about model failure? Clearly, to be able to classify critiques into different categories might 
indeed signal different potential sources of model failure. To categorise criticisms as potential 
sources or kinds of failure is helpful in the same way that the causes of an aviation accidents are 
categorised into technical, human-communication, human-institutional, etc. If we identify a failure 
that may be prevented, we might avoid accidents or unnecessary model failure. So, to be able to 
say, for instance, that the shock therapy advocated for Russia by prominent economists to 
reintroduce a market economy after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which culminated in massive 
loss of industrial production, output and dramatic hyperinflation, might have been a failure in 
properly gauging the context––and not, say, the purpose––is certainly helpful. Identifying the failure 
as a lack of understanding of Russian culture, the underdevelopment of legal and social institutions 
and thereby misjudging that a market economy could suddenly emerge, is probably more accurate 
than to say that there was a failure in the purpose by attempting to reintroduce a market economy 
in a flawed command economy7.  
                                               
7 I can see how this claim can be considered controversial for some, particularly in times when 
confidence in markets seems to be receding. The adverse effects of globalisation and the future of 
capitalism are a fascinating topics that for obvious reasons I do not address here.  
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Of course, to be able to judge whether it is a failure in context and not purpose or the agent and not 
the model, requires clear definition of each of the categories. Furthermore, some criteria, or at least 
some reasoning behind what precisely constitutes failure (and success) in each of the categories is 
necessary to determine actual failure. It is not sufficient to rely on criticisms such as Stiglitz’s or 
Quiggins’s as above, to establish failure. While the critique is a good place to start looking for 
possible sources of failure, the critique cannot be taken for granted. Independent criteria are 
needed. After all, these criticisms could be misguided.  
Unfortunately, Mäki doesn’t do any of this. Mäki offers a laundry list of aspects of the modelling 
process that come in handy in identifying potential sources of model failure but not a substantive 
account that tells us what are the criteria in each of the categories established that flag, at least 
potentially, failure.  
Let me offer another example from Mäki’s analysis to illustrate this. Take his discussion of the 
agent as a possible source of failure. Here Mäki discusses two aspects for which economists have 
been repeatedly criticised, namely for being too narrow in their interests, downplaying the 
importance of other social sciences and for being more self-seeking than other disciplines. He 
regards this aspect a possible source of model failure. It is useful to quote him at length (Mäki, 
2017, p. 7): 
 
Economists are generally recognised as intelligent people. Yet the critics argue that this 
is not sufficient for successful modelling and that the failures regarding the 2008 crisis 
are one indication of this. They say economists are too narrowly educated (mainly just in 
contemporary economics, math and statistics), too ignorant about history (of the 
economy and of their own discipline), about the other social sciences, about culture and 
human psychology. Some say their competences and epistemic preferences are ill suited 
for modelling the complexities of social reality. Their mathematically inclined style of 
inquiry encourages them to streamline the nuances of the real world in epistemically 
harmful ways: they are extremely skilful in mathematical puzzle solving when reasoning 
about the model worlds, but relatively speaking clumsy and uninformed in connecting 
their formulas to the detailed complexities of real world economies. These capacities and 
their limitations may also nurture over- confidence, hubris, and arrogance – 
characteristics often attributed to the economics profession and conducive to the sorts 
of failure witnessed in connection to the 2008 crisis (see e.g. Posner 2009; Fourcade et 
al. 2015).[…] Regarding the contents of their worldviews, there is empirical literature 
suggesting that economists are more self-seeking than other professions, either due to 
economics education or self-selection (see e.g. Carter & Irons, 1991). This may be 
suggested to result in systematic biases in favour of models that put too much stress on 
self-seeking behaviour amongst the populace at large.  
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I can think of two ways in which these allegations can be interpreted. One is merely as pure rant, 
which is quite common in some circles8. Many people say that economists are narrow minded and 
poorly educated and that they are not even interested in the history of their own discipline. Blaug 
(2001) made this point distinctly. However, I doubt that rehearsing the rant is what Mäki intends. 
It is not what interests us, as philosophers, for an account of modelling that allows us to detect 
model failure. Another option is therefore that Mäki uses these criticisms as guidelines for 
establishing criteria for model failure. What we are interested in is criteria that help us judge when 
a model might be considered a failure. So “narrowly-educated/-minded model user” could be one, 
as per above. It could thus be that a certain level of narrowness in education increases the 
likelihood of model failure––e.g. for lack of a comprehensive view of the world. The problem with 
using this particular criticism as a guideline for a criterion of failure is that it can’t really be used as 
such because, if being “narrowly-educated/-minded model user” is what explains the crisis and 
model failure in general, then it also makes model success a mystery. In other words, we can’t say 
that economists’ narrow education is what explains their model’s failures because those same 
narrowly-educated economists also build successful models.  
Furthermore, even if we put that aside and suppose that we should interpret the criticisms as 
guidelines for criteria, only identifying them is not sufficient. Critics may point to these aspects 
and we, as laypeople, may casually accept them because intuitively they make sense: J.M. Keynes, 
Irma Adelman or J.A. Schumpeter probably had a better sense of the world than, say, Ed Prescott. 
But the task of the philosopher, the task of an account of modelling, is to spell out why a narrowly-
educated model user is likely to produce models that fail more often. It could well be the case that 
a critic comes up with a criterion and spells out why this is likely to be an aspect that renders 
models more fallible. Surely, as philosophers we can only but go along with such an appraisal. But 
as philosophers we also need to be able to provide independent reasons to support these as criteria. 
Mäki, unfortunately, doesn’t do this. In fact, just as other philosophers, Mäki seems ready to take 
sides with respect to whether economists should be praised or condemned. In this case, they aren’t 
praised.   
In short, Maki’s analysis is still incomplete with respect to the criteria that are likely to help us 
identify model failure. A substantive account of modelling would have to offer, at least, guidelines 
that indicate why a certain property of a model or the modelling process is likely to lead to failure. 
Maki’s account doesn’t provide that. In the remained of this chapter I will argue that there are at 
                                               
8 See Rapley (2017) for a recent example in popular media. See Csaba (2017) for an academic piece, 
and for a reply see Vergara-Fernández (2017). 
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least three further elements that have to be considered before a substantive account that 
accommodates failure can be offered. I will also offer some preliminary criteria that, though 
defeasible, is likely to encourage further work in analysis of model failure.  
5. Three elements 
I will focus on the categories of agent, purpose and context in particular. The elements I will offer 
in each of these categories, which are based on how some models are used in economics, will 
contribute to the analysis that is necessary to fully grasp the process of economic modelling and, 
specifically, to be able to systematise the understanding of failure. Only a substantial account of 
the modelling practice that is capable of explaining both the success and failure of models, is likely 
to help to prevent unnecessary model failures. 
5.1. Incentives I 
There’s one aspect in the category of the agent that is quite significant and neither Mäki nor any 
other commentator of the philosophical accounts has so far discussed. Despite the prominence 
that recent accounts of models have given to the role of the agent in the establishment of the 
representational relationship, the agent or, more specifically, their ‘identity’, has been neglected. 
The agent has generally been assumed to be a person who uses a model in order to learn about 
the world; it is someone who attempts to uncover the truth about the target they are modelling. 
Often, the agent is assumed to be an academic who is trying to gain understanding of a particular 
phenomenon. Yet, as we know, model users are not only those who have exclusively epistemic 
interests. There are some who are interested in having an accurate picture of the world in order to 
do something with that knowledge. Therefore, they have the incentive to be as accurate as possible in 
the modelling exercise because there is a higher goal that they want to achieve. A good example 
are board members of the Fed (and their teams), whose ultimate aim is to carry out monetary 
policy. In some cases, the higher goal might be to advance some private gain, like investors or risk 
managers who benefit financially from their accurate assessments. These agents generally have the 
incentive to model their object of interest accurately, but sometimes they might have additional 
(and perhaps stronger) incentives that pull the modelling exercise in a different direction. 
When all the incentives pull in the same direction, it is perhaps safe to assume that there’s the sole 
interest to model the phenomenon of interest accurately and that there’s thus a purely epistemic 
incentive. However, the analysis of some of the causes of the recent financial crisis suggests that 
when incentives are at odds with each other, non-epistemic incentives might trump the one to 
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model the phenomenon of interest accurately. Take analysts at rating agencies such as Moody’s 
prior to the crisis. While it was certainly in their interest to model the risks posed to each of the 
Collateralised Debt Obligation’s (CDO) tranches accurately in order to give an accurate rating of 
these products, commentators have discussed how changes in corporate structures in the nineties 
changed these incentives, making accuracy in risk measurement less important.  
Sam Jones (2008) has noted two important changes in the financial sector that might have created 
conflicts in the incentives analysts had. There is, first, the change in who the client of the rating 
agencies was. Since the 1920s, when it was already common practice to rate corporate bonds, 
ratings were paid by investors, in the form of subscriptions. Since investors are the ones interested 
in evaluating the risk involved in their potential investments, it is in their interest to have an expert 
rating agency do this work for them. However, there were two forces that generated tensions in 
this scheme. One was that the rated products increased in complexity––CDOs, for instance, 
emerged in the eighties—while the increasing size of the industry made the subscription scheme 
unsustainable for the rating agencies: the expertise needed was greater than what agencies could 
afford within such a system. The other was that, at some point, ratings became indispensable, with 
investors requiring two ratings for each financial product––one from Moody’s and the other from 
Standard & Poor’s, the only two players in the industry at the time9. Being the only two firms in 
the business, this gave the agencies power and independence, which in turn caused exasperation 
on the side of banks, the issuers, because the banks fully depended on these two companies to be 
able to issue their products. According to Jones (2008), these tensions led eventually to a change 
in the scheme, whereby ratings began to be paid by the issuers of the bonds: the banks. In addition, 
Jones (2008) suggests that the independence and stringency of judgement for which rating agencies 
were known changed due to the vision of an influential character, Brian Clarkson, who was in 
charge of Moody’s mortgage bond division in 1997 and who changed the personality of the 
business. Clarkson viewed ratings as a service, which required cultivating their clients and 
establishing amiable working relationships with them, instead of the outcome of a serious and 
independent analysis by academics, as rating agencies were previously perceived.  
Second, Jones (2008) points out that in the year 2000 Moody’s was floated as a public company. 
This created a culture of being driven by profits within the company that no longer allowed it to 
have an independent judgement. Ann Rutledge, who worked at Moody’s in the structured finance 
department in the mid-nineties, is quoted by Jones (2008) as saying that Moody’s was “lily white” 
                                               
9 While Fitch, the other player in the rating industry, was founded in 1914, it only became a nationally 
recognised statistical rating organisation (NRSRO) by the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission in 
1975 and only in the nineties became a significant player (Jones, 2008). 
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until the company went public and lost the oversight of the financial publisher Dun & Bradstreet. 
People like Clarkson deny that accuracy was ever jeopardised––it was never a policy to subordinate 
ratings to the company’s market share. However, Jones adds that many do claim that there was 
fear of losing business, in particular because employees were often rewarded with stock options. 
This clearly creates the incentive to act in ways that maximise the immediate gains of the company 
but not necessarily its sustainability, which is best secured by offering the most possibly accurate 
results and thereby maintaining its reputation. 
This example shows the tension that was created in the incentives of analysts when a conjunction 
of conditions was in place: investors handed over the role of client of rating agencies to the banks, 
the issuers of the products to be rated; a culture of service to the clients, rather than of expertise 
and judgement took over the industry; and Moody’s in particular, floated as a public company 
changed the reward schemes of its employees. The tension in incentives arises because satisfying 
clients doesn’t translate into making accurate assessments necessarily. Instead, it translates into 
subjecting assessments to the expectations of their clients––e.g. a junk CDO with a triple A rated 
tranche. In turn, satisfying the client brings in more business and more business translates into 
higher corporate profits and, in a public company, this translates often into higher share prices, 
with which employees are compensated.  
How are we supposed to analyse a situation like this one, when trying to understand model failure? 
If we ignore the clash of incentives, and all we observe is a sudden downgrade to ‘Junk’ of billions 
of dollars in CDOs that were originally rated as triple A, without an account that is capable of 
accounting for the influence of the incentives of the agent, we might be inclined to attribute the 
miscalculation to the technical performance of the model alone10. Instead, if there is awareness of 
the clash of incentives of the model user, the failure will accurately be regarded as of the agent and 
not exclusively of the model. The point here is therefore that since some incentives might clash 
with the purely epistemic ones, it is necessary to consider this in the analysis of models for an 
accurate assessment of failure. In the example just provided the clash is between what I’ve called 
epistemic and private incentives, but there might be other cases in which the incentives that clash 
are of a different nature. Failure to acknowledge these clashes will inevitably lead to bias the 
judgement of model failure, for instance by attributing it to a lack of resemblance or similarity with 
                                               
10  Some commentators––e.g.Barnett-Hart (2009); Benmelech & Dlugosz (2010)––have suggested 
that the miscalculation of CDOs was indeed caused to some extent by the failure to include default 
correlations at a macro level. But they also acknowledge the prevalence of ‘rating shopping’ by 
issuers in the build-up to the crisis.  
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the target, ultimately generating the type of accusations that many commentators have made, 
namely that the models—and not their users—failed.  
Considering that economic models are used not only within the academic domain, but also, and 
increasingly, in many other domains such as government administration (see den Butter & Morgan 
(2000) for a range of contributions about the role of economic models in policy making) and the 
private sector—Cherrier & Backhouse (2016) refer to the frontier between academic economics 
and private enterprises like Google as ‘increasingly porous’—competing, and often contradictory, 
incentives are more likely to emerge. This situation should compel us to consider the identity of 
the agent, or the elements that allow us to judge what their incentives might be. Mäki’s account 
could thus be amended with the incentives of the agent such that we obtain:  
Agent A, who has the identified incentives I, 
uses multi-component object M as […]. 
 
In addition, preliminarily, we can offer the following guideline for identifying model failure: models 
whose users have (identified) clashing incentives are more likely to fail. Obviously, before we take 
it seriously such a guideline we have to, at least: i) test it in other contexts; ii) provide a threshold 
or definition of what counts as clashing incentives. I’ll leave this research for a future project. Here 
I’m interested in signalling the potential different sources of failure and the categories that we’d 
have to consider before we start delving into each of them.   
5.2. Goals G 
One could argue that the need to account for the incentives of the agent that I have just discussed 
is already taken care of by the inclusion of the purposes of the agent in the account of models 
offered by Mäki. That is, the purposes of the agent have been considered precisely because it is 
acknowledged that agents have a variety of aims when they use a model. So, in the example that I 
provided above with rating agencies, it could be said that the purposes of agents at Moody’s differ 
from those of an academic economist: the former’s are to maximise private gains whereas the 
latter’s are to understand the phenomenon of investigation. While I don’t think there’s anything 
in Mäki’s interpretation of purposes that precludes this way of accounting for the different 
incentives that agents have, there are at least two problems with this proposal. 
First, that purposes and incentives are not the same thing and thus a single place for both is 
insufficient. Above I did not suggest that agents have a multiplicity of purposes. Instead, I 
suggested that, in general, agents probably have the same epistemic purpose, like correctly 
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representing the phenomenon of interest and understanding it, but that there might be a 
discrepancy between the incentives they have. The purpose of analysts at Moody’s was to use their 
risk models to accurately assess the risk associated for each of the tranches of a CDO. They also 
had the incentive to do this properly. However, they also had incentives that, as I showed above, 
conflicted with the main purpose of using the model. This suggests that in order to properly be 
able to account for the possibility of conflicting purposes and incentives, a single place in the 
account for purposes is not sufficient.  
Second, even though Mäki doesn’t explicitly impose any restrictions on what belongs in the 
category of purposes, other elements in his account and the way in which he defines model failure 
suggests that the purposes considered are rather limited. For there are some purposes that are not 
necessarily advanced by an improved resemblance between the model and the target. In the 
discussion of one of the elements, the required resemblance between model and target, <<. . . at 
least potentially prompting genuine issues of relevant resemblance between M and R to arise>>, Mäki suggests 
that the model has to resemble the target in relevant ways in order for the agent to be able to use 
the model as surrogate of the target. He says as much in Mäki (2009), where he makes explicit that 
it is not sufficient to stipulate the representational relation between the model and its target; 
learning about the target requires resemblance: “Secondly, one could only hope to learn about 
target R by examining model M if M represented R in the second sense: M resembles, or 
corresponds to, the target system R in suitable respects and sufficient degrees” (p.32). On this 
basis, failure is defined as not resembling the target either because the modeller tried and failed––
issues of resemblance didn’t arise––or because the modeller didn’t intend the model to resemble 
the target in the first place––the modeller engaged in “substitute modelling” rather than “surrogate 
modelling”.   
There are, however, situations in which less resemblance between model properties and the target 
are what advance modellers’ purposes. For instance, in a paper in which Northcott (2017) tries to 
make a case for giving more attention to the purpose of prediction than what scientists and 
philosophers have given, he describes the case of weather forecast models in which less 
resemblance between the model and the target has proved beneficial for the predictive purposes 
of the modellers. Northcott’s point of departure is that scientists and philosophers have generally 
favoured the development of theory and mechanisms, with the aim of being able to explain 
phenomena. He then suggests that empirical success is a necessary condition for explanation, and 
that in social and field sciences this success is sometimes only achieved by using purely predictive 
models. In order to advance his case, he discusses weather forecast models. The core of these 
models is some differential equations that represent the laws of thermodynamics, which govern 
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dynamics of air in the atmosphere and how these are affected by temperature, pressure, and other 
factors. Northcott suggests that these equations are known as the “fundamental theory that 
remains a true description of the weather system” (p. 21). But, according to Northcott, in the 
attempt by weather forecasters to improve their forecasts, not only is it not sufficient for these 
equations to produce accurate forecasts, but the refinements that have been made of the models 
based on the fundamental theory hasn’t proved successful. Instead, in a first version of a model in 
which the effect of mountains on atmospheric circulation, air flow, and precipitation was included, 
a physically realistic cut-off mountain height proved to decrease the predictive accuracy of the 
model. A following version of the model, still based on the fundamental theory, but deviating from 
the physically realistic, causally explanatory feature of mountains, their cut-off height, improved 
the forecasts produced by model. Thus, a model that resembled the target less, proved better at 
predicting: “Notice the sequence here: the less physically realistic formulation was the one 
eventually adopted, because it generated more accurate forecasts” (Northcott, 2017 p. 24). Reiss 
(2007) has made a similar point.  
Another case are the tests that were carried out at the beginning of the fifties by the Cowles 
Commission of Lawrence Klein’s structural models of the US economy. Klein’s 16-equation 
model was compared in its predictive performance against two ‘naïve models’: one predicted that 
tomorrow’s income would be like today’s plus a random error—Y*(t+1)=Y(t)+e(t) and the other 
included the difference in output between today and yesterday plus a random error—
Y*(t+1)=Y(t)+(Y(t)-Y(t-1))+e(t). In the end, the naïve models proved to offer better predictions 
than Klein’s models, despite the fact that the latter were allegedly capturing the structure of the 
economy (see Christ (1951) for details; Maas (2014, Chapter 6) and Boumans et al. (2010, pp. 42–
46) for discussions).  
The point is therefore that if Mäki’s account defines the element of <<. . . at least potentially prompting 
genuine issues of relevant resemblance between M and R to arise>> as I described above, then purposes like 
prediction, or at least some cases thereof, for which it is not necessary that issues of relevant 
resemblance arise, can’t be properly accounted for by Mäki’s account.  
Of course, with respect to the weather forecast models Mäki could reply that both models resemble 
the target because the fundamental equations are still part of the core of both models. So there are 
some issues of resemblance that arise for both models. The ontological and pragmatic aspects of 
resemblance imposed by [ModRep] are being fulfilled by both models. If this is the case, however, 
it is unclear how relevant resemblance of a model with its target (or lack of it) is determined. Is 
there some kind of threshold that determines whether relevant resemblance takes place? Can we 
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say that the naïve models resemble the US economy? Mäki could still bite the bullet and reply that 
this ought to be determined by the purposes the agent has, and that for this reason [ModRep] 
leaves this unspecified. However, it should be noted that in both cases, modellers regarded the 
cut-off mountain height as properties of the model and target as relevant for their purpose and 
therefore they were meant to be represented as realistically as possible. Only later they discovered 
that less resemblance than they had originally intended returned better predictions.  
The problem here for Mäki’s account is that it fails to accommodate cases like the above. While 
the account is meant to have a placeholder for any purpose, it cannot deal with those cases in 
which less resemblance delivers better results. If the account is to be saved by insisting that both 
models do resemble their targets, then it is unclear what different degrees of resemblance do or 
whether resemblance is at all necessary, which also creates problems for the account.  
A way to give some room in Mäki’s account to these purposes is to make a distinction between 
the epistemic purpose P of a model and the practical goals G. The idea is that the purpose P is 
related to the representational relation––or the one without which the representational relation 
would not obtain––and the goals are of a practical nature. I use purposes P for the epistemic 
purpose and goals G for practical purposes for mere convenience.    
The distinction is important because it allows us to take into account the fact that models are not 
used for a single purpose. Often, models are used for goals that piggyback on the epistemic 
purpose. So, in the example of the weather forecast models above, the epistemic purpose was to 
learn about the causal determinants of the weather.  The aim of improving the weather forecast 
predictions piggybacks on this epistemic purpose.  
Accounting for multiple aims and distinguishing them between epistemic and practical has a few 
advantages. First, it is a more accurate description of how models are used and thus helps with my 
attempt to understand modelling as a process. The advantages of the process view of modelling 
were discussed in the previous chapter.  Second, in an account of models in which representation 
and epistemic purposes are prominent, such as Mäki’s, the introduction of goals as a different 
category allows for taking into account other, practical aims that are not necessarily related to 
representation and that may often be more easily observable than the purely epistemic purpose. 
Third, it allows us to disentangle two categories for which we would, at least sometimes, want to 
have different standards. In the example discussed above of the weather forecasts, modellers were 
interested in being as realistic as possible in their models in order to offer better weather forecasts. 
We could thus say that their goal was to have better forecasts by means of first achieving their 
purpose of learning about the determinants of the weather––by accurately representing them in 
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the model. Ultimately, they gave up accurate representation of the phenomena for better 
predictions. So, we can say that they succeeded in their goal but not in their purpose.  
Let me illustrate these advantages with another example. Take again the Fed-Penn-MIT model 
that I briefly mentioned in chapter four. Recall that this large-scale model11 was the outcome of a 
collaboration between the Federal Reserve, the University of Pennsylvania, and the MIT. So, a 
collaboration between an institution in charge of carrying out policy and academia. According to 
Backhouse & Cherrier (2017), the model had several aims. First, the model was intended to show 
quantitatively the structure and dynamics of the economy. There was a specific interest in 
representing the monetary sector, since existing models at the time did not have this feature. This 
is why the Fed commissioned this model in the first place. Model simulations determined whether 
this goal was satisfactorily achieved. This can be regarded as their epistemic purpose: to represent 
the structure and dynamics of the economy, including the monetary sector, in order to gain 
understanding of those dynamics and, specifically, learn about the potential effects of different 
monetary policy scenarios. Second, Modigliani and Ando were interested in resolving a theoretical 
controversy that emerged with the rise of monetarism. In 1963, before the model was 
commissioned by the Fed, Friedman, trying to revive the quantity theory of money, had published 
a paper with Meiselman in which they showed that the correlation between money and private 
consumption was higher and more stable than the Keynesian multiplier, implying that monetarism, 
rather than Keynesianism, was the correct macroeconomic theory. Ando and Modigliani’s 
response had been to argue that they had failed to specify correctly the variables involved 
(Backhouse & Cherrier, 2017) and attempted to solve the controversy using the commissioned 
model. Third, the Fed aimed to carry out a monetary policy that was consistent with the objective 
to have low and stable unemployment (Rancan, 2017). Fourth, the Fed had a political goal, namely 
to demonstrate that independent, monetary policy could well counteract unemployment. In 1951, 
the independence of the Fed from the government had been declared, but the new theory of 
finance, as well as monetarism undermined the role that monetary policy could have in that front 
(Cherrier, 2017; Rancan, 2017). These three latter aims can be regarded as practical goals since they 
are not (directly) concerned with learning about the phenomenon. As such, these goals can––and 
should––be independently appraised. Each requires different standards of appraisal. Treating them 
                                               
11  It is difficult to determine whether this model can be considered a single model. During its 
construction, which lasted from 1966 until 1970, different groups with different specialties worked 
on independent sub-models that would later be put together. In addition, the Fed worked on an 
aspect of the model that was to remain secret and was therefore not shared with the rest of the group 
(See Backhouse & Cherrier (2017) for details).  
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independently offers a more comprehensive understanding of the model and the contributions it 
made in different fronts. 
There are some important lessons in terms of model failure that we can draw from this example. 
Above I mentioned that the model pursued a number of goals in addition to the epistemic purpose. 
This is by itself an important aspect to consider in terms of model failure because it shows that a 
model does not simply fail or succeed with respect to a single purpose or goal. Insofar as there are 
different goals that are somehow independent from the epistemic goal, these are more or less 
observable, and they have different measures of appraisal, a single model might simultaneously fail 
and succeed. The Fed-Penn-MIT model could thus be a success for the simulations it made and 
the monetary policy that followed based on these simulations, while perhaps it was considered a 
failure in the theoretical contributions it made.  
In fact, Backhouse & Cherrier (2017), argue that some of the goals of the model were 
contradictory, suggesting that they were not all simultaneously attainable. They mention that there 
was a point in the process in which the dynamic simulations, estimates of GDP and unemployment 
based on forecasts of the model of previous periods, improved if current income was dropped 
from the consumption equation. While the economists at the Fed were happy to trade predictive 
accuracy for theoretical consistency, the academic economists were not as satisfied: “I am surprised 
to find that in these equations you have dropped completely current income. Originally this 
variable had been introduced to account for investment of transient income in durables. This still 
seems a reasonable hypothesis” (Modigliani, quoted in Backhouse & Cherrier (2017)).  
An implication is thus that to talk about model failure simpliciter is misguided and of model failure 
with respect to its epistemic purpose is incomplete, if considered as an appraisal of the model as a 
whole. Even when a model might be thought to have failed epistemically––or, for that matter in 
its capacity to accurately represent a target—it is misguided to regard the model a failure. That 
models pursue epistemic purposes and practical goals and that they perform differently at each of 
them is probably a good explanation for why some models have been regarded as failures and yet 
continue to be used by some economists—e.g. DSGE models. Furthermore, a single model is 
used many times in relatively different contexts and by different model users. Economists such as 
Gilboa, Postlewaite, Samuelson, & Schmeidler (2014) and Rodrik (2015), who have discussed the 
way in which models are used have defended this view, as much as philosophers such as 
Kuorikoski & Ylikoski (2015) and Ylikoski & Aydinonat (2014). This can count as well as a model 
with a specific epistemic purpose which satisfies several goals at different times. 
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Obviously, this is not to suggest that models seldom fail or that they always succeed at something. 
The point is rather that understanding how models are used by economists within academia as 
well as in many other institutions, implies acknowledging the multiple goals they are sometimes 
meant to accomplish as well as the nature of these multiple goals.  
Multiple goals being simultaneously pursued, together with conflicting incentives of the model 
user, surely renders models and the modelling practice complex and, perhaps, some might argue, 
unnecessarily so. It seems to me that insofar as these complexities are likely to be the sources of 
failure, there’s no other way than to try to analyse them and make sense of them.  
5.3. An expanded Context X  
Mäki recognises the importance of a context; it is the last addition to his account. The elements 
that he suggests should be accounted for in this category are “lots of various further ingredients 
that make a difference for models and modelling practices” (2017, p. 16), which include items such 
as “intra-disciplinary conventions and practices, standards and incentives, arrangements of 
education, research and publishing, and so on” (2017, p.16). These are all elements that indeed 
make a difference to the models produced by the discipline. But these elements that pertain 
primarily to the academic environment. In the examples that he offers as possible sources of model 
failure in the domain of the context, Mäki mentions the deficiency of offering adequate 
commentary of models, which in turn is possibly caused by the narrow way in which economists 
are allegedly educated; a disciplinary fracture between macroeconomics and finance, which in turn 
leads to a failure to account for financial aspects in macroeconomic models, and a specific set of 
epistemic values and conventions underlying the economics practice that favour the use of some 
controversial kinds of idealisations or techniques at the expense of others.  
However, as the examples that I discussed above illustrate, model users are not confined to 
academic institutions. Above I discussed the role of analysts at rating agencies in prioritising private 
gains over model performance and economists at the Fed who had a political interest aside from 
developing monetary policy. This demonstrates that the elements of the context that are relevant 
for a philosophical account of models are much broader than its presupposed by philosophical 
accounts. The category of context should be able to accommodate a larger context than the purely 
academic one.  
Obviously, these elements that belong to the context might be of very different kinds and therefore 
can’t be all determined a priori. How do we know how broad the category has to be? Where to 
begin? My proposal is to start by exploring the historical context in which models have been 
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developed. The distinct historical circumstances in which models have been developed will be able 
to uncover those aspects that have shaped the model, its epistemic purpose, and its practical goals, 
and which give the model its epistemic and practical significance. 
Biddle & Winsberg (2010) have argued something similar with respect to climate models. 
Specifically, they argue that climate models, and particularly that at which they are good at, such 
as forecasting global surface temperature, are determined by (extra-epistemic) historical 
circumstances under which they are built. Climate models consist of a number of modules that, 
according to a process of trial and error, are assembled together. Some parts of the process are 
principled, but others are “kluges”, which means that they are assembled in a specific way because 
they are functional, but not because they follow a specific theoretical rationale. Therefore, two 
models that begin with the same basis, but have been enlarged with a slightly different order of 
modules, will perform differently with respect to say, predicting the global mean surface 
temperature. Model performance is therefore path-dependent on how that model has been 
developed12. And, Biddle & Winsberg argue, how a model is developed is determined by decisions 
by modellers to emphasise certain prediction tasks over others.  
Let me now offer three brief concrete examples of important aspects of models that can only be 
known if the historical circumstances of the model are considered. This, in turn, has implications 
for how the model is assessed. First, take again the risk models at rating agencies. Until 2004, 
Moody’s used a “diversity score” as part of its ratings procedure. This score prevented structured 
financial products like CDOs from repackaging the same kind of collateral if they were to get the 
highest rating. This means that a CDO would not get a triple A rating if it consisted only of 
mortgages. Moody’s was the only one of the three rating agencies that used this score and scraped 
it when it became clear that Fitch and S&P were getting more clients because it was easier to get 
higher ratings with them (Jones, 2008). Second, take again the Fed-MIT-Penn model. As I 
suggested above, this model began to be built in 1964 and only until 1970 there was something 
that could be called the model. Before then, different groups of individuals were working on parts 
of the model depending on their expertise. Each of these groups worked according to certain 
restrictions, like the way in which the data should be treated and the way in which parameters were 
to be estimated. The idea was to later assemble all the working parts into a large model and the 
                                               
12  Instead of using the term path-dependence, Biddle & Winsberg use Wimsatt’s notion of 
“generative entrenchment” employed by Wimsatt to explain the relationship between biological 
development and evolution. A “generatively entrenched feature of a structure is one that has many 
other things depending on it because it has played a role in generating them” (Wimsatt, 2007, p. 133, 
quoted in Biddle & Winsberg 2010).  
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sub-models had thus to have a common ground with the other parts13. Third, take the famous 
Solow growth model. In this model, as it is well known, it is technological progress and, specifically 
the labour-augmenting technological progress, that allows for per capita growth. Without 
technological progress, the model states, per capita growth declines given that population grows 
at a constant rate, for any given savings rate, which is also exogenous. The key in this model is, 
therefore, technological progress: a constant savings rate is not sufficient to have per capita growth. 
An interesting feature about this model is that although the individual decision-making process 
that determines the savings rate is not modelled, the model result is consistent with those models 
in which the savings rate is determined within the model. More specifically, insofar as individual 
behaviour is assumed to lead to a path of savings that is consistent with smooth consumption over 
time, formally it can be shown that the results obtained from the Solow model are substantially 
similar to those models that do model individual saving and investment decisions (Athreya, 2013, 
Chapter 5).  
The general point is the following. The three kinds of models that I just discussed, in isolation, 
only as an end-product, fail to convey information about the model that is crucial to determine the 
epistemic purpose of the model, its practical goals, and some of the incentives of agents using 
them. In other words, the model in its ‘final stage’ and whatever its relation to the target doesn’t 
convey enough information to accurately appraise the model. A look at the history of the model 
will determine which elements are important for the performance of the model and therefore 
belong in a particular category. In the case of Solow’s model, for instance, to know that its result 
is substantially similar to models in which the individual decisions are endogenous, suggests that 
the model holds under a wider set of conditions. We know that the model result holds when 
savings rates are determined exogenously and also when they correspond to a certain individual 
decision making process. This wouldn’t be the case if the model alone were analysed. This 
information, as part of the context of the model, is very likely to be helpful in judging its epistemic 
import. It is also likely to help in judging the conditions in which the model can be ‘safely’ used as 
a quick shortcut––without having to model explicitly household decisions––given that we know 
that its results are consistent with certain household decisions.  
Likewise, an exploration of the historical context of the model will often shed light on the elements 
that belong in the other categories. The Fed-MIT-Penn model shows that there were different 
groups and agents that had different goals with respect to what the model was meant to 
                                               
13 For an example, see a discussion by Duesenberry & Klein (1965) about how different parts of the 
Brookings model, a predecessor of the Fed-MIT-Penn were to be integrated. 
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accomplish. Likewise, in the case of the rating agencies, knowing the fact that a diversity score was 
considered important by Moody’s at some point, suggests that private incentives probably did have 
an effect on how models were used.  
Conclusions 
In this chapter I argue that analysis of model success doesn’t serve also as an analysis of failure 
and that, in consequence, there is a need for an explicit analysis of model failure. Furthermore, I 
argue that an analysis of model failure in particular demands a pragmatic approach that views 
modelling as a process and concerns with how models are used. Commentators have recognised, 
even if to a limited extent, the importance of this process. The problem, however, is that they have 
generally focussed only on a part of the process, treating it in the abstract, and have favoured the 
study of successful modelling: those cases that are considered exemplary, generally because the 
model has epistemic import, in one way or another.  
In order to better understand the potential sources of failure, my proposal here has been to amend 
Mäki’s account of models. I argue for the inclusion of three elements. First, I the identity of the 
model user. While Mäki and other commentators acknowledge the importance of the agent in the 
representational exercise, the underlying assumption is that this agent has only an epistemic 
purpose when using models. I argue that, especially nowadays, model users are not only confined 
to academic institutions, but are part of other organisations whose business is other than purely 
understanding a phenomenon. Examples I provide above are model users at the Federal Reserve 
and at rating agencies. These, in turn, may cause the agent to have conflicting incentives that affect 
the modelling exercise. For this reason, it is important to account for the incentives that might be 
driving the modelling exercise. I call this the identity of the model user.  
Second, practical goals in addition to the epistemic purpose. Maki’s, as well as other accounts of 
models do recognise that models are used for a specific purpose. Accordingly, the representational 
relation of the model with the target is established. However, models generally have, in addition 
to its epistemic purpose, practical goals. These also drive the modelling exercise and help 
determine the standards according to which a model is appraised.  
Third, the historical context of a model. Investigating the history of a model is useful in two fronts. 
It helps to shed light on elements that might be relevant to add in the other categories and, 
simultaneously, offer clues about what are the elements of the context of the model that are helpful 
for its appraisal and its possible sources of failure.  
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This attempt has some loose ends. I haven’t specified, for instance, whether the elements I have 
discussed are sufficient or necessary for an analysis of model failure. Neither have I specified what 
precisely is model failure and how to recognise it. Is it even possible to make sense of model 
failure, with capital m and capital f? While I can see how this might be disappointing for some 
readers, I think that such an analysis brings us far already in grasping the extent of other dimensions 
of the modelling practice that until now have been underestimated by philosophers concerned 
with models.  
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here’s little doubt that philosophers of science have become attentive to scientific practice 
in the last decades. Philosophical claims are generally based on case studies in one or more 
sciences that speak for the descriptive accuracy of the enterprise. Furthermore, philosophers 
welcome the participation of practitioners at conferences, in the attempt to learn from them and 
establish links with the practice. In this respect, in comparison with logical positivism, philosophy 
of science has become much more practice-oriented.  
In this dissertation I have argued, however, that this attention to practice has come with what I’ve 
called an optimistic bias. In the philosophical accounts of models in particular, this bias has been 
reflected in the incessant attempt to explain the mystery of models: their success as vehicles of 
scientific knowledge, despite their patent falsities. This bias, in turn, limits the questions that we 
ask and influences the conclusions we draw. I argue for a look at scientific practice that leaves 
behind the baggage of the optimistic bias and takes the study of scientific practice as an end in 
itself. This spirit is already present in some areas in philosophy of science—e.g. philosophy of 
science in practice, though it remains heterogeneous—and my claim is that more of this approach 
should be brought to the extant philosophical accounts of models. Two main aspects that I 
highlight in this respect are the need to shift the unit of analysis of models from individual models 
to clusters of models that reflect research questions and the need to address model failure explicitly 
in our philosophical accounts of models.  
There are at least two ways in which my project might be considered to be incomplete. On the 
one hand, I haven’t offered a coherent account of models that incorporates each of the elements 
that I discuss on each of the chapters. In other words, I’ve mostly flagged elements of the 
modelling practice that have not been picked up by extant philosophical accounts of models and 
that I argue a relevant for an accurate and comprehensive understanding of the practice. For 
instance, I have not said much about how a pragmatic account of models that is capable of 
accommodating the potential sources of failure that I highlight in the last chapter, concretely 
relates to the view advocated in chapters two and three that models ought to be analysed as 
clusters. In fact, Mäki’s account, the one I offer amendments for, is an account that has been 
thought for an analysis of a single model. One could thus argue that, by amending Maki’s 
[ModRep] account of models, I endorse the analysis of single models that at the outset I reject. 
My answer to this is still what I claim in chapter two: we need more analyses of more models. Only 
a more extensive survey of the use of models will be able to uncover whether a general 
philosophical account (that is capable of accommodating failure) of models is actually possible, as 
some commentators presume, or whether such an approach is a misguided enterprise, as some 
T 
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others have at least implicitly suggested, by endorsing an approach that refrains from making 
general claims about models, but instead try to uncover the nuances of individual cases. . I think 
there is merit in both approaches. But to defend either requires a more extensive survey. It can’t 
be yet claimed that philosophical accounts of models, as currently offered, cover all the important 
aspects there are to modelling or even that they are helpful to understand current scientific 
practice. Above I argued how limited they are. But it can’t be claimed either that such an attempt 
is a futile exercise and therefore shouldn’t attempt to establish general accounts of models. My 
contribution here, perhaps more negative than positive, has been to argue why the general 
accounts, as they currently are, are unsatisfactory.  
On the other hand, to accept my claim that the modelling practice ought to be studied as it is, 
means that there are many more aspects that need to be studied than I what could possibly engage 
with in this dissertation. One that has become more pressing in the last years, for instance, is how 
big data may affect modelling practices. In this dissertation I have tried to emphasise that 
theoretical and statistical models are usually used together and that analysing theoretical models in 
isolation is a misguided enterprise, particularly as a reflection of the discipline. A pressing question 
is whether statistical models will continue to have the significance they have in conveying 
information about populations if and ever big data can identify the sort of patterns economists 
and other social scientists are interested in. This is not a question that philosophical accounts of 
models, if focussed only on theoretical models can answer. Another is whether, given current 
trends in which potentially significant data is owned by private companies such as Google or 
Apple, national statistical departments, on which many social scientists rely to get their data, are 
likely to become redundant or, worse, totally unrepresentative. Or, in relation to what I argued 
before about the incentives of modellers, assuming that private companies gain more prominence 
in the social scientific domain as the rightful owners of data, whether this is likely to generate 
incentives that conflict more often. Most likely some of these questions are being addressed in 
other areas of philosophy and science and technology studies. The philosophical accounts of 
models in economics could definitely profit from those analyses in order to guide its explorations 
of the modelling practice.  
I introduced this dissertation claiming that philosophers of economics didn’t take advantage of the 
greatest recession since 1929 to sell some philosophy of models. Clearly though, that claim is just 
partly true. Philosophers of economics haven’t produced much philosophy of models for economists 
or about model failure, but the philosophy of economics, within general philosophy of science, 
has never been in a better state. The philosophy of economics has become increasingly recognised 
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within philosophy of science, attracting more and more students, becoming more present in the 
field with participation in journals and conferences, and even job openings in philosophy 
departments. This is clearly a good thing.  
My attempt here has been to suggest that, particularly if one endorses a view of a socially 
responsible philosophy of science, a more comprehensive look at the modelling practice, one that 
is interested in all philosophical issues that arise from it, might not have to wait for the next 
economic crisis to become attractive for economists and other social scientists. That, I think, is a 
good thing too.   

Additional Material

  
Summary 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, in the search for objectivity in the social sciences, 
scientists have given models an increasingly important role. Economics is nowadays acknowledged 
as a model-based science and other social sciences such as sociology, which used to lean more 
towards interpretive methodologies, have also become more model-oriented. Similarly, the 
attempt to remove discretion from public policy and enhance instead objective, evidence-based 
policy1, has also driven policy makers and governmental institutions to rely on models, empirical 
and theoretical.  
Up until the seventies, philosophers of science had given little attention to models. These were 
mostly thought of as the result of imperfect, ongoing thinking that would become redundant once 
a proper theory was established. Later, thanks to an explicit attempt to offer philosophical accounts 
of the practice that were descriptively accurate, philosophers recognised the ubiquity that models 
have in scientific practice and acknowledged their significance: models, instead of theories, are 
what ultimately represent phenomena and carry scientific knowledge.  
In this dissertation I start from the premiss that, since the significance of models in the scientific 
enterprise was acknowledged, the main purpose of the literature has been to solve a mystery that 
models pose: they are often capable of yielding understanding about phenomena despite their 
evidently false assumptions. I argue that the attempt to solve this mystery has generated 
philosophical accounts of models that suffer from an optimistic bias. That is, models are 
presupposed to have epistemic import and the attempt has been to uncover how this is possible. 
In general, three perspectives have been taken. Accounts that attempt to explain model success by 
the kind of entities they are (ontology), by the kind of representational relation they have with their 
targets (semantics), and relatedly, explore the kind of epistemic import models afford and how 
they accomplish this (epistemology). 
Furthermore, I argue that the attempt to solve the mystery of models has narrowed the lens 
through which the modelling practice is observed. In other words, accounts of models are 
descriptively accurate only insofar this conduces to solving the mystery. But important aspects of 
the modelling practice have been understated at best or ignored at worst. I argue for a look at the 
modelling practice as an end in itself, without the baggage imposed by the mystery of models. This 
                                                        
1 Here I’m not only referring to the evidence-based policy (EBP) movement that has emerged in the 
last couple of decades whose main attempt is to test causality claims, but to the much longer tradition 
that became quite prominent in the USA with the reformers at the end of the nineteenth century.  
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fresh look, in turn, raises philosophical questions that are both important and relevant for a socially 
responsible philosophy of science, given the many different realms beyond the purely scientific, in 
which models are used. 
In chapter two, I address the question of what unit of analysis of models philosophers should 
investigate. I argue that the philosophical investigation of models should be focussed on clusters 
or research questions, rather than on single models and their components, as has generally been 
done. I suggest that two specific philosophical questions, which attempt to solve the mystery posed 
by models, may have guided the interest of philosophers towards individual models and model 
components. One of the questions is the kind of representational relation that exists between 
models and their targets. The other is the role of models within the debate on realism. The 
modelling practice, as well as philosophical arguments that maintain that our models are incapable 
of fulfilling at once all the purposes we might have for them, are, nevertheless, compelling reasons 
to explore how models among themselves are related. Using models in the New Economic 
Geography (NEG) as example, I argue that models are used such that they establish what I call 
vertical and horizontal complementarities with other models. These are important to determine 
the epistemic import of models. 
In chapter three, François Claveau and I discuss three epistemic roles that models might play and 
offer sufficient conditions for a model to actually play each of those roles. We use the traditional 
definition of knowledge as true justified belief (KATJB) as a basis to define learning and thus 
establish these conditions. The motivation of the chapter is that, while there has been a long 
interest from philosophers to defend the epistemic success of models, there has seldom in the 
literature been a clear definition of what precisely this epistemic benefit is. Having defined learning 
as ‘coming to know’, the attempt here is thus to establish the sufficient conditions that a model 
would have to fulfil in order to determine whether it can be said to have epistemic benefit. The 
three epistemic roles we discuss are, evidential, which states that models can count as evidence for 
a claim about the world; stimulating, which states that models can be a stimulus for carrying out 
empirical research, and revealing, which states that models can generate new hypotheses about the 
world.   
Although this chapter might be considered to fall prey to the attempt to solve the mystery of 
models that I have criticised, it has three important features that correspond to the fresh look at 
the praxis that I defend. First, it is an exploration of a cluster of models or, rather, of a research 
question, instead of a single model. In this sense, it can be taken as an example of what was argued 
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in chapter two. We use the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) model2, which is part of the 
search and matching theory that has been developed in economics since the 70s, as a case from 
which we pick out the potential epistemic roles models can have. Second, since our analysis is on 
a research question rather than on a single model, we are able to rely on the relations that exist 
between purely theoretical models, statistical models, and data. So, in our example, justification 
for believing a particular proposition about the world coming from the model is possible thanks 
to a network of beliefs that agents derive from other sources such as empirical data. In this sense, 
models are not mysterious at all but rather another tool, among many, that are used to understand 
the world. Third, it is an enquiry in the field of labour economics, which has important relations 
with and implications for macroeconomics. This is a field that has seldom been investigated by 
philosophers of economics concerned with modelling.  
                  
              
                
                  
                
                 
            
                
                
            
                 
             
               
           
                  
                
  
Finally, in chapter five, I continue with the subject of model failure. I argue for the need of an 
explicit analysis of model failure and, specifically, for a pragmatic account of models. Such a 
pragmatic account, I argue, is capable of accommodating aspects that determine the outcomes of 
                                                        
2 The DMP model is known as a model (singular). However, strictly speaking it is a class of models 
that were developed throughout the years by the three economists mentioned above.  
In chapter four I move to a different subject. In an attempt to make sense of what it means for 
macroeconomic models to have failed, which many commentators have argued in light of the 
financial crisis, I survey the philosophical literature for guides as to how the accounts that have 
been offered so far, can elucidate these claims of failure. My conclusion is that there is little that 
has been explored by philosophers with respect to model failure and little in their accounts that 
can be used for making sense of this aspect of modelling. This exercise suggests that, despite the 
great interest that models have received from philosophers, especially due to the acknowledgement 
that models play a major role in scientific practice, the reach of the literature has been constrained 
to comprise only three aspects. One of them is the almost exclusive focus on theoretical models 
(as individual units). This is particularly remarkable in economics, given the transformation that 
the discipline has gone through in the last decades to a more empirical (or applied) science. This 
transformation is not reflected in our philosophical accounts of models and raises important 
questions about how close philosophical enquiry actually is to practice. The other two are the focus 
on explanation and understanding, and on the identification of causal mechanisms. Surely these 
aspects are important for science and the use of models more generally. But they are not the only 
aspects driving science and the use of models. In studying only these, other aspects of the practice 
are underestimated.
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the modelling activity, and that cannot be accommodated by extant accounts of models. I discuss 
Uskali Mäki's (2017) account of models “[ModRep]” for two reasons. First, because, though 
introduced as an account of representation, it has been extended over the years to include 
pragmatic elements. Second, and more importantly, because Mäki (2017) suggests that [ModRep] 
is sufficient to accommodate model failure. I argue, based on a few examples of the practice, that 
some potential sources of failure cannot be accounted for by [ModRep] and therefore suggest 
three additional elements. First, the incentives that the model user might have. The idea here is 
that depending on the identity of the model user, they will have different (private) incentives. 
Second, the goals that agents might have with their models. Here I make a distinction between 
epistemic purposes, which is part of [Mod Rep], and practical goals. Third, the historical context 
of the model. This element recognises the importance of previous uses and purposes in shaping 
current use and potential failure.   
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Samenvatting 
Sinds het begin van de twintigste eeuw hebben sociale wetenschappers, in hun poging de 
objectiviteit van sociale wetenschap op een of andere manier te garanderen, steeds intensiever 
gebruik gemaakt van modellen. De economie wordt tegenwoordig gezien als een modelgebaseerde 
wetenschap en andere sociale wetenschappen, zoals de sociologie die toentertijd meer een 
interpretatieve inrichting insloeg, bedienen zich nu ook toenemend van modellen. Evenzo heeft 
de ontwikkeling van discretionair beleid naar een voorkeur voor objectief ‘evidence based’ beleid 
bij beleidsmakers geleid tot een vergroot vertrouwen in modellen, of die nou empirisch of 
theoretisch zijn. 
Tot de zeventiger jaren was er weinig aandacht voor het modelgebruik in de wetenschappen. Deze 
werden gezien als het resultaat van imperfect en tentatief denken, overbodig zodra een adequate 
theorie zou worden ontwikkeld. Pas later – toen filosofen expliciete belangstelling begonnen te 
ontwikkelen voor een descriptief accurate weergave van wat er feitelijk gebeurde in de wetenschap 
– kwam de erkenning van de alomtegenwoordigheid van modellen in de wetenschappelijke 
praktijk: modellen en niet theorieën representeren de sociale verschijnselen en zij zijn de dragers 
van wetenschappelijk inzicht. 
In dit proefschrift kies ik als startpunt de premisse dat, sinds het belang van modellen in de 
wetenschappelijke praktijk werd erkend, de filosofische literatuur vooral als doel heeft gehad om 
een mysterie op te lossen dat modelgebruik schijnt te genereren: dat modellen blijkbaar 
wetenschappelijk inzicht helpen geven in verschijnselen ondanks dat zij uiteraard berusten op 
onware aannames. Ik beweer dat de poging om dit mysterie op te lossen filosofische analyses heeft 
voortgebracht die onderhevig zijn aan een optimistische bias. Dat wil zeggen, modellen worden 
voorondersteld ware kennis te genereren en filosofen hebben geprobeerd om te ontdekken hoe 
dit eigenlijk mogelijk is. Daartoe zijn drie perspectieven gehanteerd. Er zijn verhandelingen die het 
succes van het gebruik van modellen in de sociale wetenschap verklaren door wat modellen zijn 
(de ontologische benadering), door welk verband zij onderhouden met hun bedoelde referent (de 
semantische benadering) en, ten slotte, door de wetenschappelijke kennis die modellen genereren 
en de manier waarop zij deze genereren (de epistemologische benadering). Bovendien beweer ik 
deze pogingen om het mysterie op te lossen de lens, waardoor de praktijk van modelleren wordt 
bezien, vernauwen. Anders gezegd, beschrijvende adequaatheid van een studie van modelgebruik 
kan alleen komen als deze het mysterie oplost.  
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Maar heel belangrijke aspecten van het gebruik van modellen zijn in het beste geval onderschat en 
in het slechtste geval compleet over het hoofd gezien. Daarom kies ik voor een benadering die het 
onderzoek naar modelgebruik als een doel op zichzelf stelt., zonder de bagage van het hierboven 
genoemde mysterie van modellen. Zo’n frisse blik levert namelijk nieuwe filosofische vragen op 
die er toe doen als het gaat om een sociaal verantwoordelijke wetenschapsfilosofie. Zeker gezien 
de vele gebieden buiten de academische wetenschap waarin modellen in gebruik zijn. 
In hoofdstuk 2 ga ik in op de vraag wat het object van filosofische analyse behelst. Mijn visie is 
dat zo’n analyse gericht moet zijn op clusters, of op onderzoeksvragen, in plaats van op de 
gebruikelijke enkelvoudige modellen en hun componenten. Ik denk dat twee heel specifieke 
filosofische vragen, gericht op het oplossen van het mysterie, hebben geleid tot een beperking tot 
enkelvoudige modellen en modelbouwstenen. De eerste vraag is welke afbeeldingsrelatie er bestaat 
tussen modellen en hun referenten. De tweede betreft de rol van modellen in het realismedebat. 
Toch geven zowel de wetenschappelijke praktijk van modelgebruik als allerlei filosofische 
overwegingen – namelijk dat modellen nooit alles kunnen doen dat we van ze verwachten – reden 
genoeg om eens uit te zoeken hoe meerdere modellen zich tot elkaar verhouden. Met behulp van 
een voorbeeld uit de Nieuwe Economische Geografie (NEG) laat ik zien dat modellen gebruikt 
worden om ‘verticale en horizontale complementariteiten’ tot stand te late komen met andere 
modellen. Dat is cruciaal om het epistemische belang van modellen te bepalen. 
In hoofdstuk 3 gaan François Claveau en ik verder in op de vraag welke epistemische rol modellen 
spelen. We formuleren de voldoende voorwaarden voor zo’n epistemische rol. Daarvoor kiezen 
we de filosofisch traditionele definitie van kennis als gerechtvaardigd waar geloof als basis om leren te 
definiëren. De aanleiding voor dit hoofdstuk is dat, terwijl filosofen veel aandacht hebben gehad 
voor het epistemische succes van modellen, er zelden een scherpe omschrijving is gegeven van 
wat dit succes dan wel pleegt te zijn. Na ‘leren’ te hebben omschreven als ‘te weten komen’ 
proberen we de voldoende voorwaarden op te stellen voor het epistemische nut van een model. 
De drie epistemische rollen van modellen die we aan de orde stellen zijn: die van bewijsvoering, 
om bewijs te leveren voor de waarheid van een bewering over de wereld; die van stimulans, om 
empirisch onderzoek te entameren; en ontsluiering, de rol van modellen om onverwachte 
hypotheses over de wereld voort te brengen. 
Nu mag het lijken dat dit hoofdstuk lijdt aan precies dezelfde kwaal van pogingen om het mysterie 
op te lossen die ik eerder al bekritiseerd had, het levert wel een benadering met drie eigenschappen 
die corresponderen met de frisse blik op de praxis die ik verdedig. 
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In de eerste plaats rapporteert dit hoofdstuk over een zoektocht naar de aard van modellen in 
clusters, d.i. naar aanleiding van een onderzoeksvraag, in plaats van naar enkelvoudige modellen. 
Daarom is het een voorbeeld van wat in hoofdstuk 2 werd bepleit. We gebruiken het Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) model, onderdeel van de search and matching theorie die sinds de 
zeventiger jaren werd ontwikkeld, als een casus waaruit we de potentiële epistemische rol, die 
modellen kunnen spelen, afleiden. 
In de tweede plaats kunnen we gebruik maken van de verbanden tussen theoretische modellen, 
statistische modellen, en data doordat we onze analyse richten op onderzoeksvragen in plaats van 
op een enkelvoudig model. Bijgevolg is, in ons voorbeeld, de rechtvaardiging voor een van het 
model afkomstige propositie, die nochtans over de werkelijkheid gaat, alleen mogelijk doordat de 
gebruikers van het model binnen een netwerk van wetenschappelijke overtuigingen denken; en dat 
netwerk is weer voortgebracht door andere bronnen, zoals empirische gegevens. Zo gezien is er 
helemaal niets mysterieus aan modellen. Het zijn gewoon instrumenten als alle andere die ingezet 
worden om de werkelijkheid beter te begrijpen. 
In de derde plaats betreft het DMP model een onderzoek arbeidsmarkteconomie en dit heeft 
implicaties voor de macro-economie waarvan we eerder opmerkten dat deze nogal onderbedeeld 
is in de filosofische aandacht voor economische modellen. 
Hoofdstuk 4 gaat over een ander onderwerp. Het levert een onderzoek naar wat de filosofische 
literatuur ons leert als we willen weten hoe macro-economische modellen precies kunnen falen. 
Deze vraag doet er nogal toe sinds veel critici beweren dat economen er niet in slaagden de 
financiële crisis van 2008 te voorspellen of te voorkomen. Mijn onderzoek laat zien dat er bijzonder 
weinig door filosofen is nagedacht over dit aspect van modelgebruik. Ondanks al die aandacht 
voor en erkenning van het belang van modelgebruik belicht de literatuur niet meer dan drie 
aspecten. Eén komt voort uit de exclusieve focus op theoretische modellen (als op zichzelf staande 
eenheden). Dat is opvallend daar het de economie betreft, gegeven de transformatie die deze 
discipline heeft ondergaan in de richting van meer empirie en van een meer toegepaste wetenschap. 
In onze filosofische aandacht voor modelgebruik is weinig van deze transformatie merkbaar en dit 
doet de vraag ontstaan over de descriptieve adequaatheid van wetenschapsfilosofisch onderzoek. 
De andere twee aspecten komen voort uit, respectievelijk, een focus op verklaren en begrijpen en 
een focus op oorzakelijke mechanismen. Dit zijn in het algemeen belangrijke aspecten om te 
onderzoeken als het om wetenschap en het gebruik van modellen gaat. Maar zij zijn lang niet de 
enige aspecten die de machinerie van de wetenschap gaande houden en deze exclusieve focus 
brengt een onderschatting van het belang van andere aspecten met zich mee. 
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In hoofdstuk 5, ten slotte, vervolg ik mijn onderzoek naar het falen van modellen. Een veel 
explicietere analyse van het falen van modellen is hard nodig. Meer specifiek verdedig ik de 
bewering dat daarbij een meer pragmatische benadering van modellen nodig is. Zo’n benadering 
kan inzicht geven in wat de uitkomst van modelleren nou precies bepaalt; een resultaat dat we niet 
mogen verwachten van de gangbare benaderingen. Er zijn twee redenen om daarbij Uskali Mäki’s 
(2017) verhandeling over modellen “[ModRep]” aan de orde te stellen. De eerste is dat er, al begon 
deze met de vraag naar representatie, gaandeweg steeds meer elementen van pragmatiek in werden 
opgenomen. Maar belangrijker is de tweede reden, namelijk dat Mäki zijn [ModRep] voldoende 
acht om het falen van modellen in kaart te brengen. Ik gebruik enkele voorbeelden uit de praktijk 
van economisch onderzoek om te laten zien dat potentiële bronnen van falen helemaal niet door 
Mäki’s verhandeling kunnen worden begrepen en ik stel drie aanvullende elementen voor. Het 
eerste element betreft de individuele prikkels die de respectievelijke gebruikers van een model 
ondervinden. Deze zijn mede afhankelijk van de identiteit van deze modelgebruikers. Ten tweede 
zijn de doelen, die zij met het model hebben, van belang. Ik onderscheid daartoe epistemische 
doelen - onderdeel van [ModRep] - van praktische doelen. Ten slotte is er het element van de 
historische context. Hiermee kan informatie over vroeger gebruik en voormalige doelen ingezet 
worden om het tegenwoordige gebruik en het potentieel falen van een model te verklaren. 
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